Arredondo v. Brockette

Citation648 F.2d 425
Decision Date19 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1031,80-1031
PartiesMaria ARREDONDO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. M. L. BROCKETTE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Unit A
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Edward J. Tuddenham, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., Hereford, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fortunato P. Benavides, McAllen, Tex., for Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School Dist.

Gregory Wilson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., Travis Hiester, Mario E. Ramirez, Jr., McAllen, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before BROWN, GEWIN * and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

The sole issue in this case is the constitutionality vel non of Tex.Educ.Code Ann. tit. 2, § 21.031(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978), which provides:

In order for a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for the purpose of attending the public free schools separate and apart from his parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under an order of a court, it must be established that his presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible for determining whether an applicant for admission is a resident of the school district for purposes of attending the public schools. (Emphasis added.)

Appellants are United States citizens between five and eighteen years of age, not living with their parents or legal guardians, who have chosen to live in a school district for the primary purpose of attending its free public schools. They were denied tuition-free admission to the public schools because of the strictures of the challenged statute. The district court, 482 F.Supp. 212, upheld the statute. We affirm.

The original complaint was filed as a class action, but this aspect was eliminated by an amended complaint. Only two of the original plaintiffs remain, Roberto Morales and Rita Gomez. 1 It is contended that § 21.031(d) of the Texas Education Code violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.

Appellants argue that the challenged statute, as applied, results in invidious discrimination against Mexican-Americans, violating their right to equal protection. The Supreme Court has found classifications based on race or alienage inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1851-1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). Were this statute to be so classified, it would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny and would not be upheld unless a compelling state interest were shown. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). We do not address this question because discriminatory application is not alleged in the amended complaint. The issue may not be revived on appeal.

Appellants assert a second ground for application of the compelling interest test the statute improperly burdens the fundamental right of interstate travel. Strict judicial scrutiny is also appropriate in those situations in which a constitutionally protected right is infringed. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40, 93 S.Ct. at 1300. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the right to interstate travel has been repeatedly recognized as a basic right, fundamental to the concept of our federal union. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177-1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). We recognize that the statutory definition of residency in § 21.031(d) denies tuition-free admission to public school to those whose presence in the school district is primarily for that purpose. All residency requirements, however, are not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has distinguished between residency requirements and durational residency requirements, finding only the latter violative of the right to travel. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.Ct. 1154, 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976). Based on this distinction, the district court declined to apply the strict scrutiny standard, requiring instead that the statute be supported by minimum rationality and, on that basis, found the statute constitutional.

We agree in principle with the district court's analysis of the right to interstate travel. Nevertheless, we defer the determination whether the strict scrutiny or rational basis yardstick should be applied for under either measure Texas' interests in enacting the statute are sufficient. We need not decide whether in another instance involving a similar statute a legitimate state interest alone would suffice. We are in accord with the district court's articulation of the state's interests, expressed as follows:

"A state has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its educational system and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis. Vlandis v. Kline, (412 U.S. 441, 452-53, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2236-2237, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973)). Similarly, the state would have an interest in preserving the financial integrity of the various components of the state educational system, i. e., the individual school districts. East Texas Guidance and Achievement Center, Inc. v. Brockette, 431 F.Supp. 231, 236 (E.D.Tex.1977) (T)he statute on its face (applies) to children of parents living anywhere in Texas or in any of the United States. Since the statute applies to any minor student living apart from his parents, guardian or other person with lawful control, it even applies to attempted transfers between different school districts within the same county. The Court is satisfied that these kinds of transfers, free of all tuition, would cause budgetary and administrative planning problems sufficient to justify the tuition scheme of the statute. As stated in DeLeon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District, (552 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1977, no writ)):

'The variability of student population is a serious impediment to the effective planning of virtually all phases of the educational process. There is no justification for a requirement that a school system educate in tuition-free manner those children whose only indicia of residence is mere presence within the district, accompanied by the student's desire (or that of his parents) to attend school therein. It is reasonable to draw the line of residency, at least for school admission purposes, between those who come within a school district because they had to move into the district for some valid reason other than for educational purposes, and those who have come there for the sole purpose of getting tuition-free education within the district. There is no reason to add to the burdens of a school district by freely admitting to its schools anyone who has previously resided outside the district simply because they wanted to attend the schools in the district.' 552 S.W.2d at 925."

(Footnotes omitted.)

Appellants argue that regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny, the statute at issue creates an irrebuttable presumption of non-residency and, therefore, violates the due process clause of the fourth amendment. Section 21.031(d) allows a person under 18 to establish a residence separate from his parents or legal guardian, for the purpose of attending school in the district in which his separate residence is located, but only if the minor's residence is not established in that school district for the primary purpose of attending its free public school. Appellants insist that through its definition of residency the statute establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a person living in a school district for the primary purpose of attending its school is a non-resident. We are impressed by the well-reasoned and thorough analysis and discussion of the district judge and adopt his response to this contention as our own:

"This contention is essentially grounded on two key cases, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675) (1965) and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63) (1973). In Carrington, the Court was concerned with the provision of the Texas Constitution that prohibited any member of the armed forces of the United States who moved his home to Texas during the course of his military duty from ever voting in a Texas election so long as he or she is a member of the Armed Forces. The Court held that this provision violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, however, it was undisputed that the petitioner had been domiciled in Texas and that he 'intend(ed) to make his home there permanently.' 380 U.S. at 91 (85 S.Ct. at 777). The Court stressed that Texas had the right to require all military persons to be bona fide residents of the community before they were entitled to vote but concluded that if the military personnel were 'in fact residents, with the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely', then they had the right to be treated the same as other Texas residents. Id. at 93-94 (85 S.Ct. at 778-779).

"In Vlandis, the Court considered a Connecticut statute which attempted to define residents and non-residents for purpose of paying higher tuition at state universities. Under the statutory scheme, once a student was classified as a 'non-resident', his status was permanent and irrebuttable during the entire time that he remained at the university, regardless of the particular fact situation of any given student. The Court held that this statute was a violation of the constitutional right to due process. In so doing, however, the Court was careful to observe that it was not questioning the segregation of students into resident and non-resident categories nor the charging of higher fees to the latter group. The narrow holding in Vlandis, therefore, was simply...

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8 cases
  • Martinez v. Bynum
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 2 May 1983
    ...the traditional definition has any impermissible basis, it cannot be said that § 21.031(d) violates the Constitution. Pp. 330-333. 648 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.1981), Edward J. Tuddenham, Hereford, Tex., for petitioner. Richard L. Arnett, Austin, Tex., for respondents. Justice POWELL delivered the......
  • D.R. v. Grant
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • 21 March 2011
    ...there is a “presumed lack of capacity to form the requisite intention necessary to establish a separate domicile.” Arredondo v. Brockette, 648 F.2d 425, 431 (5th Cir.1981). This is because “[a] minor is not sui juris.” Medlin v. Church, 157 Ga.App. 876, 278 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1981). According......
  • People v. Matthews
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 28 May 1993
    ...requirements and durational residence requirements, finding only the latter violative of the right to travel." (Arredondo v. Brockette (5th Cir.1981) 648 F.2d 425, 428, affd.sub nom., Martinez v. Bynum (1983) 461 U.S. 321, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 75 L.Ed.2d I. Standard of Review The equal protectio......
  • Daker v. Davis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • 17 September 2021
    ... ... “to form the requisite intention necessary to ... establish” domicile. Arrendondo v. Brockette, ... 648 F.2d 425, 435 (5th Cir. 1981). This is because a ... “minor is not sui juris.” Medlin v ... Church, 157 Ga.App ... ...
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