Williams v. The Sirius

• Decision Date: 02 January 1895
• Docket Number: 11,101.
• Citation: 65 F. 226
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: THE SIRIUS. v. THE SIRIUS. WILLIAMS

65 F. 226

THE SIRIUS.

WILLIAMS v. THE SIRIUS.

No. 11,101.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

January 2, 1895

Walter G. Holmes, for libelant.

Andros & Frank, for claimant.

MORROW District Judge.

The libel in this case was brought to recover the sum of $176.25 claimed to be a balance due the libelant for services rendered in taking care of the engine and boilers of the steam vessel Sirius. The testimony established that the libelant was employed from May 23, 1893, to September 4 1894, by claimant, at $40 per month. His earnings for this period aggregated $616, of which he acknowledges having received $439.75, and he now seeks to enforce a lien on the vessel, under the state statute, for the remainder. It is averred in the libel that the Sirius is a British vessel. This is denied by the answer, and it is therein alleged that the vessel is now, and was at all the times in the libel mentioned, wholly owned by the claimant, who was then, and still is, a resident and citizen of the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, and that said last-named place is her home port. On the hearing it was developed that the Sirius had formerly carried the British flag; that she was sold at this port to the claimant under a venditioni exponas issued out of this court; that her register as a British vessel has been canceled; that she is now, and was during all the time Williams was employed on her, out of commission; and that up to the time of filing the answer she had not been enrolled as an American vessel. The facts of the case show further that Williams had been acting as engineer of the vessel for some 11 months previous to the time of the sale; that when the claimant bought the vessel he engaged the libelant to look after and care for her engine and boilers and to exercise a general supervision over her. In connection with his employment, he also acted as watchman in relieving the deck watchman. But it would seem that this latter service was rather incidental to his chief occupation of looking after the machinery of the vessel. The deck watchman testified that he watched the deck, while Williams watched the engine. The Sirius was not then engaged in navigation nor, so far as the evidence discloses, were there any immediate prospects of her doing so. She was without a register, and when Williams was employed, and during the continuance of his employment, she was lying idle in the Straits of Carquinez, being floated twice a day by the tide. The evidence does not show that the libelant rendered any maritime service connected with the navigation of the vessel, either present or prospective. His duties consisted and were confined to taking care of the engine and boilers, and looking after the vessel in general. He was by occupation an engineer, but there is nothing to show that he rendered any services as such, other than in the taking care of the machinery so as to prevent the accumulation of rust and unnecessary decay and deterioration. In fact, it does not appear that the vessel was even once moved from her anchorage during the entire time of libelant's employment. The mere fact that he was an engineer by occupation does not alter the real character of his services in the present case, which is ordinarily known as that of 'ship keeper.' The claimant contends that the libelant was, to all intents and purposes, a watchman, but I deem it immaterial to the decision whether he be called a ship keeper or a watchman. The principles of admiralty law applicable to both of these services, so far as this case is concerned at least, are substantially the same. It is conceded by claimant that the libelant was employed to take care of the engine and boilers, and to look after the vessel generally, at $40 a month for the period above stated; but it is claimed that the services rendered were not of such a maritime character as would justify this court to take cognizances of a libel to recover wages for the same. The answer also sets up that the libelant performed his work so carelessly and negligently that the engine and boilers became rusted and 'pitted,' to claimant's damage in the sum of $176.25, an amount equal to that claimed by libelant as his balance of wages. The testimony of the deck watchman and of other witnesses would seem to indicate that the libelant was delinquent in his attention to the duties of his employment, and that through his carelessness and negligence the engine and boilers became rusted and 'pitted.' It was testified that the damage done would amount fully to $200. On the whole, the testimony against the libelant on this matter is of such a character that, if the case were to be disposed of on the merits, I should feel inclined to allow the claim for damages as an offset to the balance of wages claimed by libelant. But, the question of jurisdiction having been raised, that feature of the case must be considered and determined.

The claimant contends that the service which libelant rendered, whether it be called that of a watchman or ship keeper, was not of a maritime nature, and that, therefore, this court, as a court of admiralty, has no jurisdiction over the cause of action for balance of wages arising from such employment. The libelant, on his part, claims that he rendered a maritime service, for which he claims to be entitled to a lien by virtue of the state statute. Section 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 'all steamers, vessels, and boats are liable: (1) For services rendered on board at the request of, or on contract with, their respective owners, masters, agents, or consignees. ' The question, therefore, to be considered is, was the service which libelant rendered a maritime service? We begin with the elementary proposition that the test of admiralty jurisdiction over causes of action arising from contracts is not the locality of the performance of the contract, but its subject-matter. It is a cardinal principle of admiralty jurisprudence that, to give a court of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts, the subject-matter thereof must be maritime. It is not enough that the service which sprang from the contractual relation be performed on water, or even that it be done on board, and for the benefit, of a vessel which is afloat. These are not the exclusive tests. The service arising from the contract must be of a maritime character, and I might add not nominally, but substantially, so. The expression 'maritime character' or 'nature' is held to mean any act which contributes to the indefinite statement, but the needs of vessels in navigation are so complex and diverse that it is difficult to give an exhaustive, and at the same time accurate and intelligible, definition. However, Judge Betts, in Cox v. Murray, Abb. Adm. 340, Fed. Cas. No. 3,304, gives one an excellent idea of the scope of the expression as applied to contracts. He says:

'The subject-matter of the contract-- the substantial object and end-- must pertain to navigation, or be connected with transactions performed by vessels on the sea, to become maritime in its nature, and be clothed with the privilege of a remedy in admiralty courts; and it appears to me that an agreement acquires this maritime quality only when the matters performed or entered upon under it pertain to the fitment of a vessel for navigation, aid and relief supplied her in preparing for and conducting a voyage, or the freighting or employment of her as an instrument of a voyage. Collateral contracts with or assistance by services or advances to an owner or master, incidentally benefiting a voyage, acquire no special property thereby which renders them maritime.'

In Gurney v. Crockett, Abb. Adm. 490, Fed. Cas. No. 5,874, the same learned judge said:

'The line of discrimination between cases which are maritime in their nature and those not so is exceedingly dim and vague, and in the contested state of admiralty jurisdiction in respect to these border subjects it is most desirable to keep within the limits of the clear powers of the court. Manifestly not every contract in relation to maritime matters falls within the cognizance of maritime courts, and, without attempting to define with strictness the terms within which the jurisdiction of admiralty courts is circumscribed, it may be safely asserted that, to impart a maritime character to a subject relating to personal services in vessels, it must be connected with the reparation or betterment of the vessel, or be rendered in aid of her navigation, directly by labor on the vessel, or in sustenance and relief of those conducting her operations at sea.'

The libelant, we have seen, rendered the service of a ship keeper in the home port of the vessel. He was hired particularly to take care of the engine and boilers, and also to look after the vessel in general. In this he was assisted by a deck watchman. How his duties, assuming them to have been efficiently rendered, contributed to the navigation of the Sirius, it is difficult to see. The vessel was not then engaged in navigation. She could not do so, being out of commission. She was laid up, without cargo, or even master and crew. Giving the libelant's claim the most favorable consideration, it can only be said that his services tended to the preservation of the vessel, so that when she should be enrolled as an American vessel she might be fitted out for a voyage less expensively and more expeditiously. But such service did not contribute to the navigation of the vessel. Merely keeping a vessel in safe custody, protecting it from the depredations of thieves or the danger of fire, or preserving her machinery from unnecessary decay and deterioration, does not, of itself, constitute a maritime service. It must be connected with the navigation of the...