65 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 1995), 94-2196, Joler v. Scott Paper Co.
| Citation | 65 F.3d 160 |
| Party Name | Linda L. JOLER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SCOTT PAPER COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. |
| Case Date | August 31, 1995 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
Page 160
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA1 Rule 36 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
D.Me.
AFFIRMED.
David G. Webbert with whom Law Offices of Phillip E. Johnson was on briefs for appellant.
William J. Kayatta, Jr. with whom B. Simeon Goldstein and Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster were on brief for appellee.
Before SELYA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
Linda Joler, a supervisor at Scott Paper Company's paper mill in Winslow, Maine, was discharged In March 1992 as part of a "downsizing" that eliminated 35 percent of the salaried employees. Charging gender discrimination, Joler sued Scott in the district court, primarily under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. Joler also claimed under the Maine Human Right Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4571-72, but the parties have not sought to distinguish the state claim from the federal claim.
After discovery, Scott moved for summary judgment. In a written decision the magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted. On October 31, 1994, the district judge adopted the findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge without elaboration. Joler now appeals. Joler's most substantial claim on appeal is factual, namely, that she offered enough evidence of discrimination to justify a trial.
The framework for evaluating the evidence in a Title VII case depends on whether the charge is one of intentional discrimination or of disparate impact, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); in this case, only the former is alleged. Indeed, the layoff actually increased the percentage of female first line supervisors remaining. Joler's claim, therefore, depends on a showing that gender bias was the motive, or at least a motive, in selecting her for discharge. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc, 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir.1994).
In Title VII cases, once the employee makes out a "prima facie " case, the employer must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747-56 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). But neither burden is a heavy one and, for purposes of this appeal, Scott seemingly concedes that a prima facie case was made out and Joler concedes that Scott did articulate the required explanation.
While the burden to prove Scott's improper motive remained with Joler, she could avoid summary judgment simply by showing that substantial evidence supported her position. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993). In evaluating the evidence tendered, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Joler as the party opposing summary judgment, and we review de novo the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. Id. The bare facts are these:
Joler began working at the mill in 1975, advanced several steps up the ladder, and in 1987 became the first female supervisor in the mill's Recycling Department. In fall 1991, Scott ordered the mill's management to cut the salaried work force by about 35 percent. The mill's management, who made the selection using guidelines from Scott's headquarters, comprised the mill manager, its human resources director, and the heads of each department. Every member of this team was a male.
The team divided all salaried employees into job groups made up of those who, regardless of their department, needed similar skills for their jobs; Joler, for example, was grouped among 27 operating floor leaders throughout the mill. Each employee was then graded numerically based on job skills, versatility and length of service. The employees in each job group were then ranked in order of the their scores and those with the lowest scores were selected for discharge.
Joler's score placed her as number 23 among the 27 operating floor leaders. Scott discharged the 10 lowest scoring operating floor leaders, comprising nine men and one woman (Joler). After the downsizing, 17 such leaders remained, of whom four were women, one having been promoted. Thus, the proportion of female leaders in the mill actually rose; but in the Recycling Department, the number of leaders changed from three men and one woman (Joler) to five men, two of the men being...
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