Operating Engineers' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky

• Decision Date: 06 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-3373,79-3373
• Citation: 650 F.2d 196
• Parties: 2 Employee Benefits Ca 1563 OPERATING ENGINEERS' LOCAL $ 428 PENSION TRUST FUND, a Trust; and Larry Dugan, Jr.; Charles K. Featherstone; Logan Wilkins; James R. MacDonald; J. Snead Parker; Robert R. Showers, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Elizabeth K. ZAMBORSKY and the Honorable Morris Rozar, Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, Defendant-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 196

650 F.2d 196

2 Employee Benefits Ca 1563

OPERATING ENGINEERS' LOCAL $ 428 PENSION TRUST FUND, a

Trust; and Larry Dugan, Jr.; Charles K. Featherstone; Logan

Wilkins; James R. MacDonald; J. Snead Parker; Robert R.

Showers, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Elizabeth K. ZAMBORSKY and the Honorable Morris Rozar, Judge

of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona,

Defendant-Appellees.

No. 79-3373.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 9, 1981.

Decided July 6, 1981.

Richard Minne, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellants.

John M. Tomanek, Hash, Cantor & Tomanek, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before SKOPIL and FARRIS, Circuit Judges, and BELLONI ^*, District Judge.

BELLONI, District Judge:

This appeal presents issues arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Plaintiff-appellants appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona (Muecke, J.) refusing to enjoin enforcement of a state court's garnishment order requiring plaintiff-appellant Operating Engineers' Local $ 428 Pension Trust Fund to pay directly to defendant-appellee Elizabeth Zamborsky a portion of the pension benefits otherwise payable to her ex-husband Ernest Zamborsky. Jurisdiction was proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (e)(1) (1976). See Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

FACTS ¹

On April 1, 1971, in Cause No. D-117851 in the Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court, Elizabeth Zamborsky obtained a judgment and decree of divorce against Ernest Zamborsky. Additionally, the Maricopa County Superior Court ordered that Ernest Zamborsky pay to Elizabeth Zamborsky $200.00 per month. The Superior Court further ordered that Ernest Zamborsky be awarded, as his sole and separate property, several items of real and personal property, among which was "any and all benefits accruing as the result of defendant's employment."

Subsequently, Ernest Zamborsky retired and began receiving a monthly pension in an amount somewhat greater than $300.00 per month from Operating Engineers' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund (the Trust).

At some point thereafter, Ernest Zamborsky began to fail to pay spousal maintenance as required by the aforementioned decree. As a result, Elizabeth Zamborsky filed a motion in the Maricopa County Superior Court seeking an order directing the Trust to pay the pension benefits directly to her. On December 5, 1977, the Maricopa County Superior Court issued an order finding that Ernest Zamborsky was more than six months in arrears in his payments of spousal maintenance and ordering the Trust to pay to the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court the sum of $200.00 per month. It is uncontested that such an order was proper under section 25-323 of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (West 1980 Supp.).

The Trust did not make payments as directed. On April 18, 1978, after a hearing to show cause why it should not be held in contempt, the Honorable Morris Rozar, Judge of Maricopa County Superior Court, entered a judgment decreeing that the Trust pay to Elizabeth Zamborsky the sum of.$1000.00 representing accrued payments due, and thereafter pay to Elizabeth Zamborsky $200.00 per month as previously ordered.

In response to this order the Trust and its administrators filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking an injunction preventing enforcement of Judge Rozar's order. Both Judge Rozar and Elizabeth Zamborsky are named as defendants. Upon filing of the action, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendant-appellees from proceeding with the state court proceedings. However, subsequently, the District Court denied plaintiff-appellants' request for a similar permanent injunction. See Operating Engineers' Local $ 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 470 F.Supp. 1174 (D.Ariz.1979). Thereafter, this appeal was taken.

ISSUES

Plaintiff-appellants contend that ERISA pre-empts section 25-323 of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (West 1980 Supp.) insofar as it allows the garnishment of pension benefits due to an individual from an ERISA qualified and regulated pension trust fund. Mrs. Zamborsky contends that assuming that ERISA precludes garnishments generally ² an implied exception to ERISA's provisions allows a garnishment by an ex-spouse for the purpose of satisfying a court-ordered spousal maintenance obligation. Alternatively, she contends that the District Court was justified in refusing to issue the injunction enjoining the state court proceedings, because such an injunction is prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). ³

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff-appellants primarily rely upon two separate provisions of ERISA. First, they contend that section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), explicitly pre-empts the state law at issue. Section 514(a) provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan " Second, they contend that section 206(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976), conflicts with the state law at issue and, therefore, pre-empts it. Section 206(d)(1) provides that "(e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."

At the outset, we note that virtually every court which has addressed this issue has found that ERISA does not preclude the sort of garnishment at issue here. See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Cody v. Riecker, 454 F.Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y.1978), affirmed, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Parr, 480 F.Supp. 924 (E.D.Mich.1979); Senco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F.Supp. 902 (M.D.Fla.1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F.Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Western Electric Co. v. Traphagen, 166 N.J.Super. 418, 400 A.2d 66 (1979); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J.Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (1978); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc.2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup.Ct.1978); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc.2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fam.Ct.1978). The only case to address this precise issue and reach a contrary We recognize that plaintiff-appellants' argument has a certain logical appeal. Nonetheless, we agree with the cases cited above that the sort of garnishment at issue here is not pre-empted by ERISA. It is impliedly excepted from ERISA's pre-emption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), and it is not in conflict with ERISA's anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).

result ⁴ is General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F.Supp. 466 (E.D.Mich.1976). ⁵

SECTION 514(a)

For a number of reasons, it would be unreasonable to construe ERISA's pre-emption provision as precluding an individual from garnishing her or his ex-spouse's pension benefits in order to satisfy a court-ordered spousal maintenance obligation. Of primary importance is the fact that it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended such a result. First of all, both Congress and the courts have long recognized that "(t)he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 852-53, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890). It has often been stated that one should always "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Accordingly, courts generally interpret statutes with the presumption that Congress did not intend to interfere with state domestic relations law. For example, before Congress statutorily excepted spouse and child support obligations from discharge in bankruptcy, in Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 25 S.Ct. 172, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904), the Supreme Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Act as impliedly excepting such obligations. The Court stated in language which is particularly pertinent to the present case that

(u)nless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not presume a design upon the part of Congress in relieving the unfortunate debtor to make the law a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation moral and legal, devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to maintain and educate his children.

Id. at 77, 25 S.Ct. at 175. Moreover, within recent years the Court has reaffirmed these principles. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), the Court clearly sets out the standard by which this case must be judged:

"The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State and not to the laws of United States." On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that state law be pre-empted A mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family property law must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.

Id. at 581, 99 S.Ct. at 808. (Citations omitted.)

By enacting ERISA, Congress has not "positively required by direct enactment" that garnishments of the sort at issue here be pre-empted. Moreover, it cannot be said This conclusion is supported by two additional factors. First, the amicus curiae position of an agency charged with the principal enforcement of an act should be carefully considered. See Broadcast...