Brown v. Sibley

• Decision Date: 16 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-3127,80-3127
• Citation: 650 F.2d 760
• Parties: 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1008, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,985, 1 A.D. Cases 254 Alfred BROWN, William King and Willie James Mallett, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert R. SIBLEY, etc. et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Unit A
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 760

650 F.2d 760

26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1008,

26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,985, 1 A.D. Cases 254

Alfred BROWN, William King and Willie James Mallett,

Individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert R. SIBLEY, etc. et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-3127.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

July 16, 1981.

Barry H. Powell, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jim R. Bruce, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., C. Bradshaw Farber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before INGRAHAM, POLITZ and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

INGRAHAM, Circuit Judge:

Named plaintiffs, visually impaired employees of Mississippi Industries for the Blind (MIB), brought a class action against that state agency and its officials alleging employment discrimination violative of sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (the Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (Supp. III 1979), and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court held that plaintiffs had no private cause of action under section 503 of the Act and ruled against plaintiffs on the merits of their individual and class discrimination claims under section 504 of the Act and under the fourteenth amendment. We affirm so much of the judgment as denies plaintiffs any private cause of action against these defendants under section 503, whether directly under that section or indirectly through that section coupled with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). We also affirm so much of the judgment as holds that plaintiffs failed to prove unconstitutional discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment. Because we conclude that named plaintiffs had no standing to bring this suit under section 504, either individually or as a class action, we vacate the remainder of the judgment and remand that portion of the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss.

I.

This cause was filed as a class action in December 1978 by named plaintiffs Alfred Brown, William King, and Willie Mallet. Named plaintiffs alleged employment discrimination against visually impaired employees at MIB. They specifically alleged that they had been denied promotion to supervisory and nonmanual labor positions at MIB because of their handicaps. They sought relief in the form of promotions to supervisory positions, back pay, damages, and attorney fees and costs. After discovery the district court certified a plaintiff class in June 1979 and defined it as follows:

All visually handicapped individuals qualified for supervisory and non-manual labor positions at Mississippi Industries for the Blind, but who solely because of their visual handicap, have been, are being, or will be prevented by defendants from advancing to such positions. ¹

In July 1979 defendants moved to dismiss the cause on the grounds, among others, that plaintiffs had no private right of action under section 503 of the Act and that section 504 of the Act was not applicable to the employment circumstances of these plaintiffs. In August 1979 the district judge denied defendants' motion, specifically finding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief under these two sections of the Act. The cause moved to trial under that order. By consent of the parties, trial was held before a United States Magistrate. In February 1980 the district judge adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the magistrate and entered final judgment. The court held that plaintiffs had no private cause of action under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and that they had failed to prove their claims of discrimination under section 504 of the Act and under the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs appeal that final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).

II.

MIB was established by the Mississippi Legislature for the purpose of providing training and employment to visually impaired persons. It receives no state appropriation or funding for its production operations. Instead, it operates almost entirely from the profits generated by the sale of its manufactured products to private businesses and through government procurement contracts. Employees in the production departments of MIB manufacture mail bags, postal straps, aprons, sponges, mops, brooms, mattresses, and havelocks. Approximately two-thirds of the sales of these products are made pursuant to federal procurement contracts allocated through the National Industries for the Blind.

MIB also operates certain programs that receive, via the Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare, funding that originates with the United States Department of Health and Human Services. There are at least two programs that seem to come within this description, namely, the Social Services Program and the Day Care Center. These programs are designed to meet various special needs of visually impaired persons generally, and the needs of employees of MIB and their children. ²

Plaintiffs Brown, King, and Mallet are employed in certain of the production departments at MIB. Brown, an employee since 1973 has been trained to operate every machine in the broom department, although he has also worked in the mattress and sponge departments. King, an employee since 1975, has spent most of his years in the sewing department, although he has also worked in the broom and mop departments. Mallet, who began part-time in 1973, has worked in the broom department, as well as in the sponge, candle, belt, and mattress departments. In the spring of 1977, they each applied for the position of supervisor of the broom department, which was soon to become vacant due to the retirement of the existing supervisor. The position was ultimately filled by a sighted employee having respectively seven, nine, and eleven more years of full-time seniority than the three named plaintiffs.

III.

We first address named plaintiffs' claims under section 503 of the Act. This analysis breaks down into two components: first, whether named plaintiffs have a private cause of action directly under section 503; and second, whether in the absence of any direct cause of action under that section named plaintiffs can nevertheless bring their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for a deprivation of rights secured by section 503.

The first prong of this section 503 analysis is controlled by our recent decision in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), decided after the district court entered its final judgment in the instant case. In Rogers we expressly held that by enacting section 503 Congress did not impliedly authorize a direct private cause of action through which plaintiffs such as these could bring suit in federal district court. The inquiry along this prong of the section 503 analysis need go no farther. We are bound by the Rogers panel.

Named plaintiffs contend that even absent a direct private cause of action under section 503, they can nonetheless bring their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for deprivation under color of state law of rights secured to them by section 503. This contention is posited upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), which held that section 1983 can be employed by an aggrieved person to secure redress for the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by federal statutes as well as rights secured by the federal Constitution.

It is essential, however, to focus clearly on the language of section 1983. As relevant here, that section provides that "(e)very person who, under color of (state law), subjects any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights secured by (federal) laws" may be held liable to the injured party. First, we must determine what right, if any, section 503 confers upon these named plaintiffs and others similarly situated. Next, we must determine whether plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of that right at the hands of someone acting under color of state law.

The language of section 503 speaks for itself. The right secured to a handicapped person by section 503 is that of filing with the Department of Labor a complaint stating his belief that a "contractor has failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals." Section 503(b), 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). The Department of Labor has promulgated an extensive set of regulations that provide, inter alia, for agency investigation, negotiation, conciliation, and, if necessary, judicial enforcement of agency sanctions. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to 60-741.54 (1980). ³ When Congress has provided a specific remedy, the federal judiciary should not expand that remedy beyond the limits where Congress was prepared to go. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 242, 247, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1979); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.Supp. 859, 861 (D.Ariz.1981). Cf. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1080 (section 503 obligates those who control federal contracts to make and enforce contracts containing the requisite clause; the handicapped may have simply the right to petition those who administer federal contracts to perform their duty); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980) (Congress apparently intended the filing of a complaint with the Department of Labor to be the appropriate means for a private individual to enforce the contractual obligations created by section 503).

It would appear that the only section 503 deprivation of which named plaintiffs could conceivably complain under section 1983 requiring as the latter section does (1) a state official, (2) who was acting under...