Culligan Intern. Co. v. Wallace, Ross, & Sims

• Citation: 208 Ill.Dec. 871,273 Ill.App.3d 230,650 N.E.2d 565
• Decision Date: 04 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1-94-0949,1-94-0949
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 208 Ill.Dec. 871 CULLIGAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALLACE, ROSS, & SIMS, f/k/a Wallace, Ross, & Harris, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 565

650 N.E.2d 565

273 Ill.App.3d 230, 208 Ill.Dec. 871

CULLIGAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALLACE, ROSS, & SIMS, f/k/a Wallace, Ross, & Harris Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-94-0949.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fourth Division.

May 4, 1995.

O'Connor, Schiff & Myers, Chicago, for appellant (Elliot R. Schiff, Loretta M. Griffin, and Ana Maria L. Downs, of counsel).

Steven H. Mora of Mora & Baugh, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.

Justice CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

We address the exercise of jurisdiction by Illinois courts over a West Virginia law firm retained by an Illinois resident to defend a law suit filed in West Virginia. When the suit settled, the Illinois resident, Culligan International Company, sued the West Virginia law firm, Wallace, Ross, & Sims, in Illinois for malpractice. Wallace was served with summons in West Virginia. Wallace then filed a special and limited appearance to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied the motion to quash, but certified the following question for appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 308(a)): "Whether a nonresident attorney representing an Illinois resident in a lawsuit filed in West Virginia is subject to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court for activities asserted in plaintiff's complaint."

We denied leave to appeal. The supreme court entered a supervisory order directing this court to consider the matter on its merits. We do so and affirm the trial court.

A court's assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the United States Constitution when it comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95.) Courts consider three criteria to determine whether a trial court's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process: (1) whether the nonresident defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum State such that it had "fair warning" that it may be required to defend there; (2) whether the action arose out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum State. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 472-78, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182-85, 85 L.Ed.2d 528.

Due process under the Illinois Constitution requires that jurisdiction be asserted only when it is: "fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois." Rollins v. Ellwood (1990), 141 Ill.2d 244, 275, 152 Ill.Dec. 384, 565 N.E.2d 1302.

Wallace contends that none of the criteria for due process are met because the underlying action was filed in West Virginia, Wallace never appeared in an Illinois court, and no depositions were taken in Illinois. Wallace asserts that the "only contact with Illinois is the fact that Culligan is an Illinois resident." But Wallace concedes that a Wallace attorney wrote letters and made telephone calls to Culligan in Illinois and traveled to Illinois and discussed the law suit with Culligan officials at its Northbrook headquarters on November 25, 1992.

The fair warning requirement is satisfied if defendant purposefully directed its activities at Illinois residents, or purposefully derived benefits from the interstate activities. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-78, 105 S.Ct. at 2181-85; Ores v. Kennedy (1991), 218 Ill.App.3d 866, 872-73, 161 Ill.Dec. 493, 578 N.E.2d 1139.

In Ores, an Illinois plaintiff sued an Illinois law firm for legal malpractice; the law firm impleaded Golden, a Texas lawyer. The evidence showed that the Illinois law firm retained Golden on plaintiff's behalf to admit an estate to probate in Texas. Golden wrote letters and made telephone calls to the plaintiffs, to attorneys at the defendant law firm, to the trust department at the First National Bank of Chicago, and also sent a letter to the Continental Bank in Chicago. Golden billed the plaintiffs directly for these telephone calls and letters. This court held that Golden had fair warning he might be required to defend himself in Illinois because of his conduct and connections with Illinois and because he "purposefully directed" his activities at Illinois residents. The court also noted that he derived a financial benefit from the activities directed at Illinois residents.

We find nothing in the facts of this case that distinguishes the conduct of Wallace from that of the Texas lawyer in Ores. Wallace "purposefully directed" activities and intentionally provided legal services to an Illinois resident in Illinois. Unlike the attorney's legal work in Yates v. Muir (1986), 112 Ill.2d 205, 209-10, 97 Ill.Dec. 394, 492 N.E.2d 1267, which was "performed exclusively in Kentucky," Wallace undertook legal activities in Illinois. A Wallace attorney traveled to Illinois and discussed the pending litigation with his client's officers in their Illinois offices. He also made telephone calls and sent letters to Culligan. Wallace tailored its representation--which consisted of a visit, telephone calls, and letters--to the needs of its client, Culligan. Wallace also derived financial benefit from its activities. It billed Culligan for time spent on calls, correspondence, and the visit to Illinois.

Wallace points out that the underlying law suit filed in West Virginia did not arise out of activities in Illinois. But the essence of this malpractice action is the nature...