People v. Hine

• Citation: 467 Mich. 242,650 N.W.2d 659
• Decision Date: 17 September 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 120484.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Edward HINE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

650 N.W.2d 659

467 Mich. 242

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Edward HINE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 120484.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

September 17, 2002.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John A. Hallacy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer Kay Clark, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Battle Creek, MI, for the people.

State Appellate Defender by Peter Jon Van Hoek, Detroit, MI, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

I

The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(b), and first-degree child abuse, M.C.L. § 750.136b. The defendant was sentenced to terms, respectively, of life without the possibility of parole and ten to fifteen years. The defendant appealed as of right. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions because of the perceived error in admission of other acts evidence against the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court.¹ This Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court for reconsideration in light of People v. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43, 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000). 463 Mich. 926, 620 N.W.2d 308 (2000). On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the trial court.²

On application for leave to appeal by the prosecutor, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for consideration of the remaining issues of the defendant that have not yet been addressed. The Court of Appeals erred in its determination that evidence of defendant's assaultive behavior toward three women was inadmissible under Sabin. We hold that the evidence was admissible to establish the common scheme, plan, or system of the defendant in perpetrating a particular type of physical assault. From that evidence the jury could properly have inferred that the charged acts were committed, and were committed by the defendant. Sabin, supra at 66-67, 614 N.W.2d 888.

II

On November 7, 1996, paramedics were called to a home in Battle Creek, Michigan, because of a report that a child was choking. The paramedics found Caitlan McLaughlin, a two-and-a-half-year-old girl who was not breathing, had no pulse, and appeared to be dead. After communication with physicians at the nearby hospital emergency room, Caitlan was officially pronounced dead. An autopsy determined that the child had several internal injuries including a subdural hematoma, a healing tear of the liver, hemorrhage in the region of the pancreas, another area of bleeding in the colon (near the appendix), and a large amount of fluid in the abdomen. Caitlan had numerous circular bruises on her abdomen and a bruise across the bridge of her nose. The injuries were of varying ages, from less than half a dozen hours up to five to seven days old. The cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. The pathologist opined that the aggregate of the injuries caused Caitlan's death, and that the death was not accidental.

The week before Caitlan died, defendant had been her sole care provider while her mother was at work. Defendant denied any wrongdoing in connection with Caitlan's death.

The defendant was charged with open murder, M.C.L. § 750.316, felony murder on the basis of perpetration or attempted perpetration of child abuse, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(b), and first-degree child abuse, M.C.L. § 750.136b. The prosecutor notified the defendant of her intent to introduce other acts evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the proposed other acts witnesses testified.³ Three of the witnesses were former girlfriends of the defendant and included the child's mother. Although the prosecutor referred to alternate theories of admissibility under MRE 404(b),⁴ the theory before us is proof of a common scheme, plan, or system. One witness testified that she dated defendant in 1996, the year before Caitlan's death. She described incidents in which the defendant grabbed her arms, put his hands in her mouth, and stretched her lips. This resulted in bruises on her gums. The witness attributed the violence to the defendant's irritation with her. She also described other incidents involving being threatened with a metal folding chair with and having her eyes blackened.

Another witness testified that during the time she was involved with the defendant, she was assaulted by him at least once a week. Defendant "head-butted" her, a movement described as defendant hitting his forehead on the witness' nose. One incident caused bleeding from both her nostrils. The witness described being picked up and thrown down by the defendant. Although the defendant never punched her, the witness said the defendant would grab, throw, and shove her.

Another witness was Caitlan's mother. She described the beginning of her relationship with the defendant in late 1995 and their leasing of a residence together in the fall of 1996. She testified that the defendant would pin down her arms with his knees when he was angry, causing bruises on her arms. The defendant would push and shove her. Once, the defendant kneed her in her mouth, which caused her lips to become swollen and bruised. The defendant poked her in the forehead and chest with enough force that it hurt. Caitlan's mother gave the descriptive name of "fish-hook" to the maneuver described by the first witness in which the defendant put his fingers or hand inside her mouth and forcefully pulled. Caitlan's mother also described several head-butting incidents.

Additionally, the prosecutor summarized the evidence that would be presented by the forensic pathologist and the expert in child abuse.

The trial court ruled on the prosecutor's motion on the first day of trial. The court looked to this Court's decision in People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993), and relied upon its four-pronged analysis:

In VanderVliet, supra at 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114, we adopted the approach to other acts evidence enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-692, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). That approach employs the evidentiary safeguards already present in the rules of evidence. First, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct or propensity theory. MRE 404(b). Second, the evidence must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b), to an issue of fact of consequence at trial. Third, under MRE 403, a "`determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice [substantially] outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decision of this kind under Rule 403.'" VanderVliet, supra at 75, 508 N.W.2d 114, quoting advisory committee notes to FRE 404(b). Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105. [Sabin, supra at 55-56, 614 N.W.2d 888.]

The trial court held that the evidence was not being offered to show the defendant's propensity to commit the criminal act. Rather, the other acts evidence was offered to show defendant's scheme, intent, system, or plan in committing the acts and to show the lack of accident.⁵ The court specifically noted the testimony regarding episodes of head-butting and mouth-grabbing committed by the defendant. The court ruled that the evidence was relevant to show who inflicted the injuries on the child and the intent with which they were done. The court also found the other acts evidence to be highly probative. It recognized the danger of unfair prejudice, but held that the prejudice was diminished because the other acts evidence involved women, not children, and the women gave no testimony about the defendant harming children. Finally, the court stated that it would give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of the other acts evidence.

At trial, an expert on child abuse opined that some of the bruises on Caitlan's jaw were likely five days old and resembled a fingernail imprint. Another mark on Caitlan's jaw was described by the expert as typical of the mark left when picking up and shaking a child in a certain way. The witness also described poking injuries sustained by Caitlan that could not have been accidental. The expert opined that the head injuries had been inflicted on the day the child died.

The defendant testified. He attributed several of Caitlan's injuries to a fall on a bathtub and falls on toy boxes that occurred while she was in his care. He denied he kicked or punched Caitlan on the day she died. He admitted he spanked her two days previously, but said he had "swatted" her only once.⁶

The jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and first-degree child abuse. The defendant was acquitted of open murder.

III

The Court of Appeals has twice reversed the defendant's convictions. In its first opinion, the Court looked to VanderVliet, supra, and People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998), and found that the other acts evidence made none of the facts in dispute at defendant's trial more or less probable. The Court held that substantial dissimilarities existed between the assaults on the other acts witnesses and the injuries sustained by the victim in this case. The Court stated its concern that the evidence had been used to show the defendant's propensity to commit a criminal act and concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any marginal probative value the evidence possessed.

We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals after the prosecutor sought leave to appeal in this Court. On remand for reconsideration in light of Sabin, the Court of Appeals again reversed, reasoning that the other acts evidence was used to prove the "very act" that was the object of proof. Perceiving that a higher degree of...