Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp..

Decision Date03 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–1368.,10–1368.
Citation112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1537,653 F.3d 532,94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44249
PartiesMatthew YANCICK, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.HANNA STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Sherman L. Cohn (argued), Attorney, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, Richard L. Steagall, Attorney, Nicoara & Steagall, Peoria, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.James B. Sherman (argued), Attorney, Wessels Sherman Joerg Liska Senescko, Minnetonka, MN, for DefendantAppellee.Before WOOD, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.TINDER, Circuit Judge.

Matthew Yancick brought a racially hostile work environment claim against Hanna Steel Corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hanna Steel moved for summary judgment; the district court ruled on Hanna Steel's motion without considering Yancick's response brief or exhibits. Yancick's response was non-compliant with local rules, and the court declined to permit him additional time to file a rule compliant response. The district court, after reviewing the record submitted by Hanna Steel, granted summary judgment in its favor.

Yancick, who is white, worked with Brad Johnson, who is African–American, at Hanna Steel. Johnson was a workplace bully; he was confrontational, rude, and disruptive in the workplace. Hanna Steel's workforce was predominantly white and Hispanic; out of the eighty workers, there was only one other African–American employee and he worked a different shift than Yancick and Johnson. In December 2005, Yancick was working with Johnson when a 940–pound steel coil fell on Yancick from a machine operated by Johnson, leaving Yancick with severe, permanent injuries. Yancick asserts that Johnson dropped the steel coil on him purposefully because of his race.

We affirm the district court's rulings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Yancick's response in opposition to summary judgment and based on the record submitted by Hanna Steel, Yancick's § 1981 claim fails. The record contains insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Johnson's offensive conduct before the accident was severe or pervasive. While Yancick's workplace injury was severe, no reasonable inference can be drawn that Johnson purposefully dropped the steel coil on Yancick because of race or that Hanna Steel was negligent in discovering the alleged racial harassment.

I. Procedural Issue
A. Background

On September 21, 2009, Hanna Steel filed its motion for summary judgment and on October 15, Yancick moved under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for additional time to respond so he could locate two witnesses, Adriel Novoa 1 and Scott Terrell. The district court granted Yancick's motion, but warned, Plaintiff will be allowed no further Rule 56(f) continuances or enlargements of time to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment.”

On Friday, October 30, 2009, at 4:56 p.m., four minutes before the filing deadline, Yancick filed a motion for leave to file his response with excess pages, attaching his response brief (which was about 1,500 words over the allowed word limit) but not the referenced exhibits. Yancick sought leave to file his exhibits after the motion for leave was granted. Yancick's concern was that under the electronic case filing (ECF) system, the response brief was going to be referenced as an exhibit to the motion for leave and the exhibits to the response (if attached) would be off-numbered and not accurately correspond to the numbering cited in the brief. Yancick reasoned in his motion that [s]ubmission of the exhibits as an attachment to this motion alters the ECF numbering system used when filing exhibits.” Hanna Steel objected, particularly because the response referred to, but did not attach, exhibits. Based on a review of Yancick's response brief, it appears he did not yet have a signed declaration from witness Adriel Novoa. The response brief stated that “Yancick's counsel is filing the unsigned declaration and will supplement it with the signed declaration as soon as it is received.”

On November 10, 2009, before the court ruled on Yancick's motion, Yancick filed a motion for leave to file a response within page limits, attaching a response that met the page and type limitations of Rule 7.1(D)(5) of the Local Rules of United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois (CDIL–LR). Again, Yancick did not file his exhibits. Counsel for Yancick filed this motion after he was alerted in another case that Judge McDade was not accepting responses with excess pages. Hanna Steel objected, noting that Yancick still had not filed his exhibits. On November 13, Yancick filed his exhibits two weeks late. One of the exhibits was Adriel's declaration, dated October 31, 2009.

The district court denied Yancick's motions for leave on November 16, reasoning that Yancick failed to meet the extended response deadline, which required a Local Rule-compliant response brief with any referenced exhibit attached by October 30. The court indicated that it had “generously granted” the earlier motion for continuance under Rule 56(f) and that Yancick's last minute filing “virtually ensured that the Court would not have an opportunity to rule on the motion for leave until after the response deadline.” The court also indicated that Yancick's failure to include exhibits was “particularly suspect” and led to the reasonable inference that counsel structured his 4:56 p.m. filing ... so as to buy himself additional time to prepare exhibits in support of his summary judgment response brief.”

Yancick moved to alter the November 16, order explaining that the exhibits were in fact ready to file before the October 30 deadline and providing reasons why he did not file them on that day, i.e., counsel did not believe he was entitled to file exhibits until the motion for leave was granted and he was concerned about the exhibit numbers not corresponding to the response brief. The court denied the motion, explaining, “The deadlines imposed in this case mandate action; they are not starting dates for intention or diligence. Plaintiff was required to file a complete and Local Rule compliant response by the deadline and failed to do so. Whether he intended to do so or worked diligently to do so is irrelevant.” The court declined to consider Yancick's response brief or his disputed factual contentions when ruling on Hanna Steel's motion for summary judgment. The court stated, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the contents of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2), and the Motion for Summary Judgment will be decided by the Court on the record now before it.” The court granted Hanna Steel's motion for summary judgment.

B. Order

We review the district court's decision not to consider Yancick's response in opposition to summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir.2006). Yancick was given an extension until October 30 to file his response; he was expressly told that no further Rule 56(f) continuances or enlargements of time to respond would be granted. On October 30, Yancick filed a motion for leave to file his response to defendant's motion for summary judgment with excess pages, attaching his proposed response brief without the referenced exhibits. Yancick's counsel incorrectly assumed that the district court would grant the motion and allow him to file his exhibits after the October 30 deadline.

Local Rule 7.1(D) states that [a]ll motions for summary judgment and responses and replies thereto must comply with the requirements of this rule. Any filings not in compliance may be stricken by the court.” CDIL–LR 7.1(D). This court has “routinely held that a district court may strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary judgment motions.” Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir.2010). Yancick's brief did not comply with the word limitations set forth in Local Rule 7.1, CDIL–LR 7.1(B)(4)(b)(1) and (D)(5), but more significantly, did not comply with the requirement that the non-movant support his response “by evidentiary documentation” and [i]nclude as exhibits all cited documentary evidence not already submitted by the movant[,] CDIL–LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Additionally, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the opposing party's response to be supported by “affidavits or as otherwise provided” setting out specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial and instructs that if the adverse party does not properly respond to a motion for summary judgment, “summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (2009). Accordingly, Yancick did not file a rule-compliant brief by the court-imposed deadline.

Yancick argues he was following this practice because other judges in the district routinely grant motions for leave to file excess pages and allow exhibits to be filed only after leave has been granted. This argument assumes that the motion for leave would be granted as a matter of course, which is at odds with the Local Rules, and incorrectly presumes that because other judges in the district routinely grant such motions, that all judges must. Yancick filed his motion within minutes of the deadline and by doing so, he risked the court denying the motion and deeming his response untimely.

Yancick argues that because his violation of the local rules was nonwillful, it should not cause him to lose his rights, citing to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 83 provides that [a] local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(a)(2). Rule 83 does not help Yancick. The requirement to file evidentiary matter in support of a response brief...

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