Grandberry v. Bonner, 80-3778

Citation653 F.2d 1010
Decision Date20 August 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-3778,80-3778
PartiesRoosevelt GRANDBERRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jesse BONNER, Sheriff of Coahoma County, Mississippi, Respondent-Appellee. . Unit A
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Tyree Irving, Greenville, Miss., for petitioner-appellant.

Karen Gilfoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before RUBIN, RANDALL and TATE, Circuit Judges.

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

On February 19, 1980, petitioner, Roosevelt Grandberry, filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. In his petition, Grandberry alleged that he was being detained by Respondent Bonner pending a scheduled retrial on a murder charge and that this detention was unlawful because his first trial on this charge had ended when the trial judge, sua sponte, declared a mistrial in the absence of any manifest necessity for such action. Grandberry claimed that a retrial would, therefore, place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense in violation of the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy.

The district court, after finding that Grandberry had exhausted all available state remedies, considered his petition on the merits and denied habeas relief. After reviewing the record of the events which prompted the declaration of a mistrial at Grandberry's first trial, we have concluded that the district court erred in determining that these circumstances constituted manifest necessity for a mistrial. Therefore, we reverse and order that the writ issue.

I. THE STORY OF GRANDBERRY'S FIRST TRIAL

Grandberry's first trial on the murder charge began on February 11, 1980 in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County, Mississippi. The following evening at approximately 9:00 p. m., the case was submitted to the jury, which had been sequestered during the trial. After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury indicated to the bailiff that they were as yet unable to reach a verdict. The trial judge then conferred with the district attorney and Grandberry's counsel in chambers. In the course of this conference, the trial judge proposed to inquire of the jury whether further deliberations on the following day would be helpful. Neither party objected to this proposal, however, Grandberry's counsel emphasized that: "(i)t is just our understanding that you are going to inquire as to whether or not coming back in the morning will aid them." The court replied "... I don't intend to release them, of course."

The court then reconvened, the jury returned to the courtroom and the following colloquy occurred:

BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, have you been able to agree on a verdict?

(Jurors shake heads to the left and right.)

BY THE COURT: Will someone speak up?

BY A BLACK, FEMALE JUROR: No, sir. We have not.

BY THE COURT: You have not been able to agree on a verdict?

BY THE SAME JUROR: No, sir, not at this time.

BY THE COURT: I realize that it has been a long period of time.... I will ask you is it the opinion of the jury that you are hopelessly deadlocked, or do you feel that if the Court permitted you to recess and to stay overnight and reconvene your deliberations tomorrow morning, if that would be any help to you in your deliberations?

BY THE SAME FEMALE JUROR: Yes, sir, it would be. I think we need to stay overnight.

BY THE COURT: All right, Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I stated, I realize it has been a long time for you. In view of the announcement that has been made, the Court will very shortly return you to the jury room and will direct that you recess from your deliberations....

Shortly thereafter, the bailiff reported to the trial judge that one of the jurors was ill. Petitioner, his attorneys and the assistant district attorney then returned to the courtroom where the trial judge questioned one of the jurors, Roosevelt Noah, about his condition. The exchange between the court and Mr. Noah formed the predicate for the declaration of a mistrial, therefore, we think it important to relate it in full.

BY THE COURT: ... Has a juror reported ill?

BY MR. ROOSEVELT NOAH: Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT: And this is Mr. Roosevelt Noah?

BY MR. NOAH: Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT: Mr. Noah, it is necessary for the Court to know if you in your own opinion are ill to the extent that you need medical treatment or that you would not be able to participate in further deliberations.

BY MR. NOAH: Well, Your Honor, I just need my high blood pressure pills and I will be okay.

BY THE COURT: The Court cannot be sending a doctor for you and such as that. I don't know where your pills are. I assume that you sent for your medicine last evening.

BY MR. NOAH: Well, my pills at my house.

BY THE COURT: Yes, sir, but did you not send home or give a note to the bailiffs for your medicine and other needs to brought here last night?

BY MR. NOAH: No, sir, not last night.

BY THE COURT: Well, you stayed here last night.

BY MR. NOAH: Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT: Is anyone at your home?

BY MR. NOAH: Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT: Do you understand that if the Court orders that someone call your home and those are brought here then this courthouse will be locked up for the rest of the night, and the Court does not want to enanger the health of anyone on this jury.

BY MR. NOAH: Well, if somebody go get me my pills, I imagine I will be okay.

BY THE COURT: Well, you say you imagine you will be okay. Do you understand that you will be here with the courthouse locked up?

(Juror mumbles)

BY THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir.

BY MR. NOAH: I say I don't know about that, about the courthouse being locked up because I could get a little worser.

BY THE COURT: That's the point that the Court is making. When we recess again, in fact, most people had already left, and when we recess again, the courthouse will be locked up and it will just be the twelve jurors and the two bailiffs here, Mr. Noah.

BY MR. NOAH: Well, Judge, I don't want to be here if I get a little worser and locked up and I can't get out no way.

BY THE COURT: All right, sir. I understand your position. Ladies and gentlemen, based on the statement that Mr. Noah has made to the Court, it is further on the Court and, of course, the officers of the court having concern for the health of anyone on the jury and further on the fact that the jury has deliberated since 9:05 this evening and it was 11:08 when the jury came in and said they had been unable to reach a verdict, but particularly on Mr. Noah's condition at this time and his reluctance to be left in the courthouse overnight without immediate availability of medical assistance, the Court does not feel it has any alternative but to declare a mistrial in this case. By doing so you will be discharged from service at this time, and the matter will be handled further as provided by law. In view of this ladies and gentlemen, what the Court has said, you may now return to the jury room. You may pack your bags. You are discharged. The Court will mail your check to you for your service. You have the appreciation of the Court and all the court officers for your public service as serving as jurors. Neither the Court nor anyone connected with the Court is critical of your being unable at this time to reach a verdict. I realize that the matter is serious as you realize, but the Court also realizes the health of one person on the jury is also a serious matter of concern and will not require the jury to continue to be sequestered overnight under the circumstances that medical help may not or probably would not be readily available. So with that statement, ladies and gentlemen, the Court will declare a mistrial in the case of State versus Roosevelt Grandberry. It will proceed as provided by law. You may go to the jury room, pack your bags and you will be discharged.

After the jury returned to the jury room to gather their belongings, Grandberry's attorney approached the bench and asked for an opportunity to be heard regarding the propriety of the mistrial. The court deferred defense counsel's presentation until after the jury had left the courthouse, apparently because the jurors had to pass through the courtroom on their way out of the building. After the jury left, defense counsel objected to the declaration of a mistrial and to the court's failure to allow defense counsel an opportunity to be heard on the question prior to the discharge of the jury. 1

On February 15, 1980 the circuit court held a hearing on Grandberry's "Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss Indictment for Double Jeopardy." At that hearing, Grandberry's counsel argued to the court that it had erred in declaring a mistrial during the first trial because Mr. Noah's condition was not so serious as to constitute a "manifest necessity." Grandberry's counsel contended that the court could have arranged for Mr Noah to get his medication and deferred any action until sufficient time had passed to determine whether Mr. Noah's condition would improve or consulted with counsel about the possibility of allowing deliberations to proceed with only 11 jurors. In the course of this hearing, the judge noted that his decision to declare a mistrial was prompted not only by Mr. Noah's assessment of his own condition but also by Mr. Noah's appearance at the time. The judge stated that Mr. Noah "was in a slouched position in his chair, almost horizontal, was perspiring profusely, and had a rather ashen look about him." Grandberry's counsel stated that he did not concur in the judge's description of Mr. Noah's condition.

Following this hearing, the circuit court judge denied Grandberry's motion. Thereafter, Grandberry exhausted the state remedies available to him by seeking review of the denial of his motion in the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied him any relief.

II. THE STANDARD OF MANIFEST NECESSITY

The...

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