Bingham v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 02 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–10349.,09–10349.
• Citation: 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 364,654 F.3d 1171
• Parties: Randall BINGHAM, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Darlene THOMAS, Officer, Paula Isom, Officer, Marty Allen, D/W of Security, Christopher Railey, D/W of Care and Treatment, Jim Rigsby, D/W of Administration, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

654 F.3d 1171

23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 364

Randall BINGHAM, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Darlene THOMAS, Officer, Paula Isom, Officer, Marty Allen, D/W of Security, Christopher Railey, D/W of Care and Treatment, Jim Rigsby, D/W of Administration, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09–10349.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 2, 2011.

Paul A. Mezzina (Court–Appointed), King Spalding, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC, Courtland L. Reichman (Court–Appointed), King & Spalding LLP, King and Spalding (Court–Appointed), Attention: Courtland Reichman, Atlanta, GA, Erin M. Hawley, University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.Matthew F. Boyer, State Dept. of Law, Devon Orland, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants–Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.Before HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges, and VINSON,^* District Judge.PER CURIAM:

Randall Bingham, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's sua sponte dismissal, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. On appeal, Bingham argues that the district court erred in dismissing the following claims: (1) that the defendants, 13 Georgia Department of Corrections officials at Autry State Prison in Pelham, Georgia, deliberately ignored his requests for dental treatment and left him in serious pain constituting cruel and unusual punishment; (2) that the prison nurse, Laquetia Fowler, denied him prescribed aspirin; (3) that he was denied a prison rule book, which violated his right to understand the grievance procedures; (4) that the prison had inadequate grievance procedures; and (5) that prison guards opened his cell to allow inmates to steal his property.¹ After careful review, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

We review de novo a district court's interpretation and application of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement. Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir.2005). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir.2004). We review a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint based on frivolity, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for abuse of discretion. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.2008). A district court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1100 (quotations omitted).

Previously, we have held that we accept allegations in a complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir.1999). In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court held that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. “ Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys” and are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998).

Procedurally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... by a prisoner ... until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). “An inmate incarcerated in a state prison, thus, must first comply with the grievance procedures established by the state department of corrections before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983.” Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir.1999).

The Supreme Court has held that the “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). A complaint may be dismissed if an affirmative defense, such as failure to exhaust, appears on the face of the complaint. See id. at 215, 127 S.Ct. at 921. Otherwise, exhaustion and other affirmative defenses must be raised in a responsive pleading. See id. at 211–14, 127 S.Ct. at 921.

Substantively, “[t]o prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that the defendant deprived [him] of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir.1998). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1288 n. 20. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to include “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Every claim by a prisoner that he did not receive medical treatment, however, is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291.

To prevail on a claim of inadequate medical treatment, a prisoner must satisfy an objective and a subjective requirement.Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.2000). The plaintiff must show an “objectively serious deprivation” of medical care by demonstrating (1) “an objectively serious medical need ... that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that the prison official's response “to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law.” Id. (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (quotations omitted).

A prisoner must also show a prison official's subjective intent to punish by demonstrating that the official acted with deliberate indifference. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258. To satisfy this requirement, a prisoner must show the prison official's: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir.2004). Conduct that is more than mere negligence includes: (1) grossly inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of treatment; and (3) medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all. Id. A “complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292.

A complete denial of readily available treatment for a serious medical condition constitutes deliberate indifference. Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir.1994). Likewise, a defendant who delays necessary treatment for non-medical reasons may exhibit deliberate indifference. Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). An Eighth Amendment violation may also occur when state officials knowingly interfere with a physician's prescribed course of treatment. Young v. City of Augusta, Ga., 59 F.3d 1160, 1169 n. 17 (11th Cir.1995).

First, we agree with Bingham—and the state concedes—that the district court erred in dismissing without prejudice Bingham's dental treatment claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), on the basis that it was “clear from the face of the complaint” that Bingham had not exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to this claim. In the complaint, Bingham alleged that he had filed several grievances with prison officials and sent appeals to Atlanta. In light of these allegations, we do not think it is clear whether Bingham in fact exhausted his administrative remedies, and vacate and remand for the district court to conduct further proceedings with respect to this claim, including an assessment of the sufficiency of the claim itself.²

However, we find no merit in Bingham's remaining claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Bingham's denial of prescribed aspirin claim as frivolous, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, on the basis that Bingham failed to state a medical condition or plead an injury from being denied the aspirin. The allegations in the complaint surrounding this claim fail to specify his pain or medical condition, plead any injury, or explain the circumstances surrounding the denial of the aspirin by Nurse Fowler. Accordingly, Bingham failed to allege the sort of medical need necessary to establish a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim. See Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that a “bare, conclusory allegation ... [was] insufficient, without more, to warrant further evidentiary consideration”).

To the extent Bingham seeks to assert a separate and independent claim for damages for denial of his own copy of the...