State v. Tovar
Citation | 656 N.W.2d 112 |
Decision Date | 23 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-1558.,01-1558. |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Felipe Edgardo TOVAR, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, Johnson County Attorney, and Victoria Dominguez, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The defendant, Felipe Tovar, challenges his conviction, after a bench trial, of third-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). He claims his first OWI conviction should not have been used to enhance the penalty for his current conviction because his prior conviction resulted from an uncounseled guilty plea, and he had not made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the guilty plea proceeding. The district court and the court of appeals rejected Tovar's argument.
Upon our review of the record and the parties' legal arguments, we conclude the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was not a knowing and intelligent waiver and, therefore, his prior conviction should not have been used for enhancement purposes in the present criminal proceedings. Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court's judgment of conviction. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was charged with OWI, third offense, a class D felony, and driving while license barred, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 321J.2, 312.561 (1999). The enhancement of the OWI charge to a third offense was based upon Tovar's two prior convictions for OWI.
Tovar pled not guilty to both of the current charges, and filed a motion to adjudicate law points asserting that his first OWI conviction could not be used to enhance the pending OWI charge. He argued his guilty plea in the prior proceeding had been uncounseled and there had not been a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to an attorney. The district court ruled Tovar's waiver of counsel in the prior case was valid, and consequently denied Tovar's motion.
The present case proceeded to trial before the court and Tovar was found guilty of both charges. After sentencing, Tovar appealed his OWI conviction, alleging the district court erred in allowing his first OWI conviction to be used to enhance his current conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on the defendant's motion to adjudicate law points, and this court granted further review.
The parties agree that a prior conviction resulting from an uncounseled guilty plea for which there was an invalid waiver of counsel may not be used to enhance a subsequent offense where the prior conviction resulted in incarceration. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 1587, 64 L.Ed.2d 169, 173-74 (1980)
(, overruled in part by )Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1928, 128 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1994) ( ); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984) ( ). There is also no disagreement that Tovar was not represented by an attorney when he pled guilty to his first OWI charge nor that he expressed the desire to waive his right to counsel at the guilty plea hearing. The dispute in this case centers on whether Tovar's waiver of his right to counsel at the time he pled guilty was valid under the Sixth Amendment.
Although our standard of review for constitutional issues is de novo, see In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001),
there is no factual dispute in this case. The only issue for our determination is whether the district court correctly determined that the undisputed facts established the defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel at the plea proceeding on his first OWI charge.
In 1996, Tovar, a college student in Ames, was brought before the Story County district court to plead to a charge of OWI, first offense. At the time, the district court was receiving guilty pleas from several defendants collectively. The judge engaged the defendant in the following discussion. References to the defendant's right to counsel are emphasized.
(Emphasis added.)
After this colloquy, the judge determined whether there was a factual basis for Tovar's guilty plea. He explained to the defendant that there were two elements to his offense: (1) operating a motor vehicle (2) while he was intoxicated. The court then informed the defendant that intoxication could be shown by an alcohol level of .10 or above or by evidence that "the consumption of alcohol has affected your judgment or your reasoning or your faculties or it has caused you to lose control in any manner." Tovar admitted driving a car and, although he did not contest his blood alcohol test results of .194, he denied feeling any effects of the alcohol. The judge concluded there was a factual basis for Tovar's guilty plea and then accepted the plea.
At a later sentencing hearing, Tovar again appeared pro se. The only discussion of Tovar's right to counsel was the following exchange:
The court then conducted essentially the same colloquy used at the guilty plea proceeding and pronounced sentence. Tovar's sentence included a brief stint in the county jail.
A. General legal principles. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This protection extends to state prosecutions. State v. Spencer, 519 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 1994).
To provide a framework for our consideration of whether this right was accorded to the defendant in his first prosecution for OWI, we quote the observations of the United States Supreme Court on the importance of the right to counsel:
The
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (citation omitted). As this discussion illustrates, the right to counsel is not solely a trial-related right; a...
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