Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 August 1981
• Docket Number: 80-2844,Nos. 80-2792,s. 80-2792
• Parties: 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1025, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,042 Trudy UNGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Counter-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, Counter-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 909

657 F.2d 909

26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1025,

26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,042

Trudy UNGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Counter-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, Counter-Appellee.

Nos. 80-2792, 80-2844.

United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 28, 1981.

Decided Aug. 14, 1981.

David J. Parsons, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant, counter-appellee.

John A. Cook, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee, counter-appellant.

Before SPRECHER, Circuit Judge, and MARKEY, Chief Judge, ^* and CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from the district court's judgment that, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from employment because of her sex and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission ("FEPC") alleging sex discrimination. These appeals present questions as to: 1) the collateral estoppel effect in Title VII actions of prior state proceedings; 2) the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the findings of sex discrimination and retaliatory firing; 3) the proper measure of damages; and 4) the propriety of the district court's judgment denying plaintiff attorneys' fees for her unsuccessful efforts in the state proceedings.

I

Plaintiff, Trudy Unger, was employed from 1962 to October 16, 1972, as a sales representative by Sirena, Inc. ("Sirena") and subsequently, by Consolidated Foods Corporation. ¹ Sirena manufactures and distributes women's swimwear. Until her first termination, effective July 31, 1972, plaintiff was the exclusive Sirena sales representative for Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio ("Midwest territory"). As such, she was entitled to commissions on all sales of Sirena swimwear to customers in the Midwest territory. In a letter of May 31, 1972, from Sirena, plaintiff was terminated as sales representative in the Midwest territory effective July 31, 1972. Prior to her termination, plaintiff was the only female sales representative in Sirena's ten year history. She was replaced by John A. (Tony) Herrmann, Jr.; no women were interviewed for her position. On June 30, 1972, plaintiff was rehired by Sirena and was appointed sales representative for Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois (excluding Chicago) ("Prairie territory") beginning August 1, 1972.

On October 2, 1972, plaintiff filed a charge of sex discrimination, pursuant to the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, § 851 et seq., with the FEPC based on her discharge from the Midwest territory. On October 13, 1972, Sirena received notice of the FEPC complaint. On October 13 and October 16, plaintiff received telephone calls from Maurice Newman, Vice President and National Sales Manager of Sirena, and Arnold Seckler, President of Sirena, urging plaintiff to either drop her suit or resign and telling plaintiff the suit would cost her a lot of money and just make the lawyers rich. Plaintiff refused to drop her complaint or resign. On October 16, 1972, Seckler sent plaintiff a letter terminating her employment. On October 27, 1972, plaintiff filed a second claim with the Illinois FEPC asserting that the second termination was in retaliation for filing her first charge. ²

Plaintiff's state charges were heard before a Hearing Examiner appointed by the FEPC. He recommended to the FEPC a finding in favor of Sirena on the charge of sex discrimination and against Sirena on the charge of retaliatory discharge. The FEPC reviewed the record, reversed the finding of retaliatory discharge, and affirmed the finding of no sex discrimination.

Plaintiff sought review of the FEPC's adverse decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, § 274 et seq. The Circuit Court concluded that the FEPC's action was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed the FEPC's judgment, and found that Sirena's first discharge was discriminatory and the second retaliatory.

Sirena appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which reversed the Circuit Court and reinstated the FEPC's findings that the discharges were non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory. Unger v. Sirena Div. of Consol. Foods Corp., 60 Ill.App.3d 840, 18 Ill.Dec. 113, 377 N.E.2d 266 (1978). Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied.

During the pendency of the Illinois proceedings, plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and, on February 2, 1977, filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiff alleged discriminatory discharge on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ³ and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. ⁴ A trial de novo was held before Judge Perry, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Perry entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law finding for plaintiff on the issues of sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge. The court awarded plaintiff $141,190.82 as back pay and ordered Sirena to pay plaintiff for her costs and attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting the federal suit.

Sirena appeals from the district court's conclusion that Sirena violated Title VII in discharging plaintiff from either the Midwest or Prairie territories. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the court's judgment limiting back pay to $141,190.82 and barring plaintiff's recovery of costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the state proceedings.

II

Sirena argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. Sirena argues that plaintiff is precluded, under the principles of either collateral estoppel or election of remedies, from relitigating the issue of plaintiff's discharge that was decided adversely to her by the FEPC and the Illinois Appellate Court. We reject Sirena's attempt to undermine the effectiveness and independence of de novo federal judicial review of Title VII claims.

In Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975), this Circuit "rejected the application of the doctrines of election of remedies and res judicata to Title VII actions where plaintiffs had litigated their charges to final adjudication in state proceedings. There is a strong Congressional policy that plaintiffs not be deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for adjudication of their federal claims under Title VII." The court reasoned further that "if federal actions are barred by the application of election of remedies and res judicata, then the statutory scheme of deferral to state proceedings will be frustrated by requiring that the plaintiff, who desired to bring an action in federal court, first commenced state proceedings but abandon them quickly before an adjudication is made." Id.

Our reasoning in Batiste is reinforced by the Supreme Court's analysis in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). There, the Supreme Court held that the submission of an employee's complaint of racial discrimination to final arbitration pursuant to the non-discrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement did not preclude the employee from seeking a trial de novo in federal district court under Title VII. The Court stressed that "federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII." 415 U.S. at 45, 94 S.Ct. at 1018. Analyzing Title VII's relationship to other remedies against discrimination, the Court stated that:

Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums .... And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.

415 U.S. at 47-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1019 (footnotes and citations omitted).

With the exception of the Second Circuit's brief per curiam opinion in Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 488, 62 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), ⁵ every court to address the question of the relationship between federal judicial proceedings under Title VII and related state proceedings concerning employment discrimination has used reasoning consistent with our Batiste analysis and has refused to give preclusive effect to the state proceedings. See Smouse v. General Electric Co., 626 F.2d 333, 336 (3rd Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966, 100 S.Ct. 2942, 64 L.Ed.2d 825 (1980); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1972); Kralowec v. Prince George's County, 503 F.Supp. 985, 990-93 (D.Md.1980).

Sirena attempts to distinguish Batiste and the other cited decisions on the ground that, in those cases, it was not the plaintiff-complainant who had sought state judicial review of the state administrative proceedings. In the present case, however, plaintiff elected to seek state judicial review of the FEPC's decision rather than to immediately pursue her right to seek a trial de novo in federal court pursuant to Title VII. Sirena reasons that plaintiff's decision to pursue state judicial review constitutes an election of remedies and precludes relitigation of the issues involved in the state proceedings.

We find Sirena's distinction to be without significance. Regardless of which party seeks state judicial review of administrative proceedings, foreclosure of Title VII's federal judicial remedy would serve to discourage plaintiffs from...