U.S. v. Strini, 81-1161

• Citation: 658 F.2d 593
• Decision Date: 09 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-1161,81-1161
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leo Eugene STRINI, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 593

658 F.2d 593

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leo Eugene STRINI, Appellant.

No. 81-1161.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 19, 1981.

Decided Sept. 9, 1981.

Jerry D. Patchen, Gerald M. Birnberg (argued), Houston, Tex., for appellant.

Roxanne Barton Conlin, U. S. Atty., Ronald M. Kayser, Amanda M. Dorr (argued) Asst. U. S. Attys., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Leo Strini appeals his conviction ¹ under 21 U.S.C. §§ 812; 841(a)(1); & 841(b)(1)(A) for possession with intent to distribute approximately thirteen ounces of cocaine. Strini entered into a stipulation of facts with the government and the matter was submitted to the court for decision. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the execution of a search warrant on the grounds that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant contained deliberate falsehoods by the affiant of such magnitude that there was not enough truthful information remaining to establish probable cause. We affirm the district court.

On August 28, 1980, federal and state agents searched the home of Terry Bregar in Jamaica, Iowa, in culmination of an approximately two-year long investigation. Drugs were seized and Bregar was arrested. On September 3, following several unsuccessful attempts to unravel Bregar's activities, Bregar produced names and places relating to his involvement with illegal drug activities, including the name of defendant Leo Strini as his source of supply for cocaine and marijuana. The agents verified Bregar's statements with information obtained independently.

By September 24, 1980, Bregar agreed to become an informant. Thereafter, in exchange for Bregar's aid as an informant, his testimony before the grand jury and his assistance in apprehending violators, the prosecution agreed to give Bregar immunity and entered into a plea agreement with him on pending charges.

Bregar initially contacted defendant Strini on September 10, 1980. On September 24, Strini offered to sell Bregar twelve to thirteen ounces of cocaine. Bregar and Strini agreed the exchange would occur at the Des Moines, Iowa, airport. Strini said he would be flying in from Denver, Colorado, that night. Law enforcement officers monitored the telephone calls of September 10 and 24, 1980, between Bregar and defendant Strini.

Using the information he had gathered from his investigation and the information supplied by Bregar, Federal Agent Overbaugh drafted an affidavit to present to a judge the evening of September 24, 1980, in order to obtain a search warrant. The agent was concerned for Bregar's safety and his effectiveness in other on-going investigations should his identity be revealed. The agent drafted the affidavit so that Bregar was characterized as a "third unnamed confidential informant." The information Later on September 24, Agent Overbaugh delivered the proposed search warrant and accompanying affidavit to Judge William Stuart who issued the warrant between 8:00 and 8:30 on that evening. Judge Stuart did not inquire into the identity of the "informant" and the agent did not volunteer it. After Strini disembarked from the 10:00 p. m. flight from Denver, four agents met him at the Des Moines airport; executed the warrant; searched him, his luggage and his shoulder bag; and seized approximately thirteen ounces of cocaine. Strini was arrested and on September 30, the grand jury returned an indictment on one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.

given by this "third informant" (Bregar) related to transactions between Bregar and Strini. For example, the affidavit recited that affiant was contacted by a third reliable confidential informant who related that defendant Strini was flying to Des Moines on September 24, 1980, with a large quantity of cocaine for Bregar. The affidavit was presented to the United States Attorney late that afternoon.

On November 21, Strini entered a plea of not guilty and on December 2, he filed a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the warrant pursuant to which the evidence was seized was faulty. The government resisted the motion. On December 22, Judge Harold D. Vietor held a hearing on the motion and subsequently denied it.

On the date set for trial, December 29, Strini waived his right to a jury trial and, with the government, entered into a stipulation of facts to be offered into evidence. The government's exhibits 1 through 14 were also stipulated into evidence subject to defendant's objections and motion to suppress as reserved in the stipulation and in the "trial objection." Defendant offered no evidence. The matter was then submitted to the court and the court entered a finding of guilty.

In denying the motion to suppress, the district court held that in order to justify suppression a statement must be false or recklessly made in regard to a substantive matter. Judge Vietor concluded such was not true in the present case.

(This) falsity does nothing more than create what I will call a fictional conduit, a conduit through which the hard information was allegedly passed on to the affiant, the law enforcement officer who was the affiant on the search warrant.

This falsity of creating a fictional conduit does not go to the falsity of the substantive or the hard information provided. There still was a confidential informant.

True, there was a masking over to try to shield him from being identified as the confidential informant, and that was done by this device of making it appear as if there were some third-person conduit, but none of that goes to the substance of the information provided.

We are satisfied that the district court's findings and conclusions are warranted by the record. ²

Strini appeals his conviction claiming the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit in support of the warrant contained a deliberate falsehood by not disclosing Bregar's name and characterizing him instead as a "third confidential informant." Strini concludes that when that material was removed, there was insufficient remaining content to support a finding of probable cause. As a result, the fruits of the search should not have been admitted into evidence.

The government contends that there was no deliberate falsehood because there was a confidential informant Terry Bregar. The government first publicly revealed his identity in the government's resistence to Strini's motion to suppress. The government The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the characterization of Bregar in the affidavit ³ as a "third confidential informant" constituted a deliberate falsehood requiring the "assertions" attributed to that informant to be set aside, thus mandating an examination of the remaining information to determine the existence of probable cause.

argues that the affidavit was drafted to conceal Bregar's identity as the third confidential informant in order to protect him and to assist the government in using Bregar in on-going investigations. It insists that there was no intent to deceive or mislead the court.

The standard to be applied in this case was set out by the United States Supreme (W)here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.

Court in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). ⁴ The Court stated:

We affirm the district court's finding that the failure to disclose the identity was not a false statement within the contemplation of Franks, supra. While we do not condone the action, this was not an attempt to enhance the contents of the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant. Rather, it was a measure used to mask the identity of the informant which was necessary for his safety and for his usefulness in on-going investigations.

We can therefore distinguish cases such as King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1960), wherein the purported affiant did not, in fact, make the affidavit. Our present case is unlike King because here there was no false name of the informant given nor, for that matter, was there any intent to deceive the judge when submitting the affidavit.

Furthermore, even if the statement was a "false statement" within the contemplation of Franks, supra, the district court did not err in concluding the evidence should not be suppressed. The Franks rule requires that the perjured information be set aside. Then, the remainder of the information can be examined to determine whether there is probable cause. If there is probable cause, the search warrant will not be invalid.

In the present case, the falsity, if any existed, related to the identity of the informant. Assuming, then, that we would set aside the identity of the informant, we would be faced with the question of whether there was sufficient information remaining in the affidavit to establish probable cause. In essence, what would remain is the typical situation of an affiant reciting information given by an unnamed informant. Our case is rendered more unusual because the informant...