U.S. v. Taylor

Decision Date24 October 2011
Docket Number10–4054.,Nos. 09–5152,s. 09–5152
Citation659 F.3d 339
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Daryl TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Antwan Thompson, a/k/a Darrell Thompson, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Joanna Beth Silver, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland; Jonathan Alan Gladstone, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellants. Cheryl L. Crumpton, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ joined. Judge DAVIS wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Daryl Taylor and Antwan Thompson of being felons in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after they were caught with a loaded handgun on a Baltimore street. The district court imposed an eight-year sentence on Taylor and a fifteen-year sentence on Thompson because his prior convictions qualified him for the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We now affirm.

I.
A.

While on street patrol in an unmarked van on the night of May 30, 2008, members of the Baltimore Police Department spotted Taylor standing near the passenger side of an Acura. Taylor's location was illuminated by multiple streetlights as well as the headlights of the van. Shortly thereafter, one of the officers, Detective Jermaine Cook, saw Taylor reach into his waistband, pull out a silver handgun, and pass it to Thompson through the Acura's passenger side window. Detective Cook instantly alerted the other three detectives in the van, none of whom were looking in the Acura's direction at the time.

The van promptly came to a stop. The officers got out of the vehicle and Cook put Taylor under arrest. Thompson, on the other hand, fled from the Acura and was pursued by two of the other detectives. During the chase, one of the officers saw a silver handgun fall out of Thompson's shorts. The detective recovered the loaded weapon, which had been reported stolen prior to its discovery that evening. Thompson was apprehended soon thereafter.

A jury subsequently convicted both Taylor and Thompson of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm. Because the handgun was stolen, Taylor's Pre–Sentence Report (“PSR”) recommended a two-point offense level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). When added to Taylor's base offense level of twenty-four points and his Criminal History Category of IV, this enhancement resulted in a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. At his sentencing hearing, however, Taylor argued for a lesser punishment. Specifically, he objected to the two-point enhancement because he was unaware that the handgun was stolen. He then contended that a number of mitigating circumstances such as his lack of a history of violence and his efforts to turn his life around also mandated a lesser sentence. Noting that this was “certainly a very serious offense,” the district court rejected Taylor's contentions and imposed a ninety-six month sentence.

B.

In Thompson's case, the PSR recommended a fifteen-year minimum sentence under the ACCA because he had previously been convicted twice for controlled substance offenses and once for second-degree assault. Under the ACCA, anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies] or “serious drug offense[s] must serve a sentence of at least fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). To avoid this mandatory minimum, Thompson argued that his Maryland second-degree assault conviction was not a “violent felony.”

In support of this sentence, the government submitted a transcript of Thompson's plea colloquy for his assault conviction. According to this transcript, after being informed of his rights, Thompson's attorney asked him if “it is still your intention to plead guilty?” He responded, “Yes, ma'am.” Following this answer, the prosecutor read a statement of facts supporting Thompson's plea.

According to the prosecution's report at the plea colloquy, on the night of May 10, 2002, Officers Bateem, Geolamas, and Guzman of the Baltimore Police Department tried to arrest Thompson at a corner store for his involvement in a drug deal. When they approached Thompson, however, he threw a Styrofoam cup filled with liquid at Officer Geolamas, “striking him in the chest area,” “punched Officer Bateem in the mouth,” and “then attempted to flee.”

Officer Guzman was able to grab a hold of the suspect, however, and the two other officers assisted him by “taking [Thompson] down to the ground.” A struggle followed on a concrete sidewalk as the three officers tried to gain control of Thompson's hands. During the struggle, Thompson swung his arms and kicked his feet and repeatedly attempted to draw his handgun from the waistband of his pants. Despite Officer Guzman's eventual use of a burst of pepper spray, the officers and Thompson “continued to fight.” Thompson then attempted to grab Guzman's firearm from his holster, at which point Officer Geolamas put his hands over Thompson's hands in order to prevent him from acquiring the weapon. “Backup units eventually arrived at the scene and assisted the officers at hand, cuffing Mr. Thompson who continued to struggle in his duress.”

When the prosecutor finished reading this statement, the state judge asked Thompson's attorney whether she had [a]ny additions or corrections,” to which she replied, “No, Your Honor.” The court then ruled, “Based on that statement of the facts, Mr. Thompson, I find you guilty of ... assaulting Officer Geolamas.” Thompson's attorney then turned to her client and asked, [I]s there anything that you would like to say to the judge? I have spoken on your behalf this morning. You have an opportunity to speak if you'd like to or you can remain silent. Is there anything else you'd like to say?” Thompson replied, “No, ma'am.” During the entire plea colloquy, neither Thompson nor his counsel protested his innocence, disputed his guilt, or disagreed with the prosecutor's statement of the facts.

After reviewing this document, the federal district court held that the transcript “clearly show[s] a physical assault involving the use of force or violence against a police officer by Mr. Thompson.” It consequently rejected Thompson's challenge to his ACCA status and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of fifteen years imprisonment.

C.

On appeal, Taylor challenges both his conviction and sentence. He claims that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), that the lack of a mens rea requirement renders the stolen firearm sentencing enhancement invalid, and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Thompson, on the other hand, objects only to his sentence under the ACCA by contending that his Maryland assault conviction does not constitute a “violent felony.” We shall address each appellant and his arguments in turn.

II.
A.

We begin with Taylor and his claim that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In brief, Taylor contends that there was not enough evidence presented at trial to prove that he actually possessed the stolen handgun. To prove the point, he launches an extended attack on Detective Cook's credibility. He contends that Cook's testimony regarding when he first saw Taylor, when the handoff of the gun occurred, and where the van came to a stop results in an incoherent and impossible timeline of events that cannot be squared with the narratives of the other officers. Given that Cook was the only officer who saw the handoff that night, Taylor insists his conviction must be overturned.

As an initial matter, any sufficiency claim bears a heavy burden. We cannot set aside a jury's verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 956 (4th Cir.2010). Fatal to Taylor's case is the fact that on appeal, we are not entitled to assess witness credibility, and we assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence in the prosecution's favor.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 565 (4th Cir.2009). At trial, Taylor challenged Cook's testimony on grounds strikingly similar to those he now presses on appeal. But at the end of the day, the jury rejected Taylor's arguments in favor of Cook's testimony.

Moreover, there was ample evidence here to establish Taylor's possession of the firearm. According to the testimony, multiple detectives saw Taylor standing near the Acura's passenger side in a well-lit area. While the other officers were looking in another direction, Detective Cook observed Taylor pass a silver handgun to Thompson through the Acura's window. The other detectives confirmed that Cook immediately alerted them to the handoff. As soon as the officers exited the van, Thompson fled from the Acura and then dropped a silver handgun during his unsuccessful attempt to escape. This evidence would plainly allow a reasonable jury to find Taylor guilty of unlawful possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

B.
1.

Apart from his challenge to his conviction, Taylor raises two objections to the length of his sentence. He first contests the district court's application of the Guidelines' two-point enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) of the Guidelines instructs courts to increase a defendant's offense level by two points if the firearm involved in a section 922(g) offense was stolen. This enhancement “applies...

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