Egan v. Bank

Decision Date06 October 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–1214.,10–1214.
Citation113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 801,94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44293,659 F.3d 639
PartiesBelinda EGAN, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.FREEDOM BANK, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Susan M. Brazas, Attorney, James J. Koepke (argued), Bolgrien, Ruth, Rentz, Mineau & Koepke, Beloit, WI, for PlaintiffAppellant.James S. Zmuda (argued), Attorney, Califf & Harper, Moline, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.Before MANION, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Only seven months after Freedom Bank recruited Belinda Egan to serve as one of its vice presidents, the bank fired her. She had no performance issues, no attendance problems, and no complaints against her. What she did have, though, was dinner shortly after she began with a member of the bank's board of directors. The board member told her the fantasies he had about her, and she declined his advances. Egan complained to the bank's Human Resources officer that the board member had sexually harassed her, and the board member resigned. Shortly after that, the person named as the bank's new president told its then-president that he heard Egan had done something that she should have been fired for. And about two months after the new president assumed office, Egan was fired. A jury might credit the bank's stance that the new president eliminated Egan's position simply to reduce inefficiencies. Or it might agree with Egan that the bank terminated her in retaliation for her claim of sexual harassment. We conclude that the conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the record require a resolution by a jury. Therefore, we reverse the entry of summary judgment against Egan on her retaliation claim.

I. BACKGROUND

As this appeal comes to us from the entry of summary judgment against her, we recount the narrative that follows by viewing all facts in the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Egan. Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2009). Greg Dempsey, then the president of Freedom Bank, contacted Belinda Egan in the spring of 2007 about a position at the bank. He already knew Egan, as the two had worked together at a different bank. Egan accepted Freedom Bank's offer to become its vice president of retail banking and began working there on July 17, 2007.

Egan met Don Burton, a member of the bank's board of directors, during her first week on the job. Burton came into the bank when he was onsite for a board meeting, and Egan asked his opinion about challenges Freedom faced in a particular market. They agreed to continue their conversation a week later over the lunch hour at Applebee's. After that meeting, Egan saw Burton several times over the ensuing months when he would occasionally stop in the bank. They agreed to meet again on September 13, 2007, and Burton asked her, “Do you want to meet at my place or somewhere else?” Egan named a restaurant. They met there at about 4:00 p.m., and Burton gave Egan feedback on a document she had requested that he review.

Egan saw Burton again when she attended a bank board meeting on September 18, 2007. Burton called her that week and said he wanted to meet with her to discuss her meeting with Larry Henson, the CEO of Freedom Bank's parent corporation, and they agreed to meet at a restaurant in the mid afternoon of September 20, 2007. That day, Burton and Egan discussed her meeting with Henson, and Burton told Egan that he had recommended to the board that they consider her to be the next president of Freedom Bank. Burton also said that the board of directors had the power to fire the bank's senior management team, which caused Egan to feel uncomfortable. The conversation did not only involve work matters, however. Burton told Egan that he fantasized about making love to her on a dance floor and wanted to take her to Las Vegas and other places around the world. Egan declined his advances, and Burton replied, “If you change your mind, I'll be home alone next Tuesday.” Wanting to leave, Egan secretly told her husband to telephone her, and, when the call came, she answered and informed Burton she needed to leave.

Egan told her friend Sheila Dempsey what had transpired and asked her not to tell her husband Greg Dempsey, the president of Freedom Bank at the time. The next day, Sheila apologized and told Egan that she had informed her husband what had happened. Egan and Greg Dempsey then discussed her conversation with Burton. On September 24, 2007, Egan complained to the bank's vice president of Human Resources, Rick Mineck, about what Burton had said to her at dinner. Mineck opened an investigation into Egan's complaint. Before Mineck could interview Burton, Burton resigned from the bank's board of directors. Mineck sent Egan a letter on October 2, 2007 stating that he had investigated Egan's complaint and that action had been taken to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar incident. The letter also stated that no adverse action or retaliation would occur as a result of the complaint and that if she believed she was the subject of adverse action or retaliation, she should immediately contact Larry Henson, the CEO of Freedom Bank's parent corporation.

Greg Dempsey was transitioning out of his role as bank president around this time. Dave Barajas, Jr. was ultimately hired to replace him. Henson told Egan that she had been a candidate for the president position but that another person had been chosen, and he said that if she was willing to commit the time, he was willing to fund her courses in a graduate school banking program.

Barajas and Greg Dempsey had various conversations as Barajas was considered for and prepared to become bank president. In a conversation critical to this case, according to Dempsey, during September or early October of 2007, Barajas told him that he had heard Egan “had done something that she should have been fired for.” Dempsey believed Barajas was referring to Egan's report that Burton said inappropriate things to her over dinner. Barajas denies making the statement to Dempsey.

Barajas officially began as president of Freedom Bank in early December of 2007. Egan's responsibilities initially increased because Barajas relied on her for day-to-day operations as he learned the job, but she said he refused to meet with her about plans for the future. Barajas did meet with others regarding the future, though, and he hired four new employees over the next several months. He hired Richard McCormick in January of 2008 as vice president of private banking, Pam Topper to serve as vice president of corporate services, Amy Young to assist McCormick and then later to handle daily branch management duties, and Lyle Spaulding as a commercial lender.

On February 22, 2008, Barajas wrote a letter to Egan advising her that he had decided to eliminate the position of vice president of retail banking, Egan's position. The letter gave no reason for this decision. Egan filed suit alleging retaliation, a hostile work environment, and discrimination on the basis of her sex. The district court entered summary judgment against Egan, and she appeals.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Rulings

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and we view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Egan, the nonmoving party. See Poer v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 433, 438–39 (7th Cir.2010). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for opposing a practice that Title VII forbids. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3; Poer, 606 F.3d at 439. A plaintiff may proceed under either the direct or indirect method to prove her claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII. Poer, 606 F.3d at 439. To proceed under the direct method as Egan does here, a plaintiff must show through either direct or circumstantial evidence that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. Id. at 439. If the plaintiff's evidence of retaliatory animus is contradicted,

[T]he case must be tried unless the defendant presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff anyway, “in which event the defendant's retaliatory motive, even if unchallenged, was not a but-for cause of the plaintiff's harm.”

Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir.2002)).

The parties agree that Egan's complaint to her Human Resources department that Burton had sexually harassed her constitutes statutorily protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). It is also clear that termination constitutes an adverse action. Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531. The issue, then, is whether Egan has introduced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that there is a causal connection between her protected activity and her firing. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”).

Freedom Bank maintains that Barajas and the bank simply made a business decision to eliminate Egan's position, and that her firing was not motivated in any way by her harassment complaint. Barajas testified in his deposition that Egan's tasks were...

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