Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills

• Citation: 66 Me. 420
• Parties: ANN SHANNY, per pro ami, v. ANDROSCOGGIN MILLS. 1876.
• Decision Date: 21 November 1876
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

66 Me. 420

ANN SHANNY, per pro ami, v. ANDROSCOGGIN MILLS.

1876.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

November 21, 1876

ON EXCEPTIONS AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

CASE for an injury to the plaintiff, October 9, 1875, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants in failing to keep a certain portion of their machinery, upon which the plaintiff worked, properly covered.

The declaration, after setting out matters of inducement alleged that " the defendants knowingly, carelessly negligently, and wrongfully permitted said machinery and gearing, to be improperly, defectively, and insufficiently covered, and for want of a proper and sufficient covering for said machinery and gear, all of which was unknown to the plaintiff, but was well known to the defendants, the plaintiff who was then and there in the said employment of said defendants, and by their special direction was with due care, cleaning said machinery and gear, then and there without any fault of her own, and by reason of said improper defective, and insufficient covering of said machinery and gear, was caught by her right hand in said machinery and gear, and thereby the said hand of the plaintiff was greatly injured and damaged, so that the plaintiff entirely lost two fingers of her said hand, and lost the use of the third finger of said hand," & c., & c.

Plea, the general issue.

It was not denied that the plaintiff, in the employ of the defendants, was hurt to the degree alleged, and that it occurred by her fingers being caught in the gearing, while wiping the ends of the machinery when in motion.

It appeared that the covering or fencing had been broken a few weeks before, and that the new castings which were necessary for repairs were finished; and that it was through the negligence of a servant of the corporation, that they were not returned so that the repairs could be completed before the plaintiff was hurt.

As to the precise spot where her fingers caught, there was conflicting evidence; but by the findings of the jury, it was where there was a defect--a want of covering--for which the defendants were at fault.

It was in evidence, that even when the machinery was fenced, in the customary way, it was not free from danger, and that although it was the duty of the employees, such as this plaintiff was, to wipe the ends of the machinery, there was a time set apart for that purpose, and that they were expressly forbidden, by a rule of the corporation, to wipe those ends while the machinery was in motion, and that this plaintiff knew of the rule, and of the danger, and had once before been threatened with dismissal for stopping the machinery at an unreasonable time for the purpose of cleaning; that every Saturday at four o'clock, the machinery was stopped for this purpose, and that there was sufficient time after that, within working hours, to do the cleaning, and that this plaintiff was hurt on this Saturday afternoon, some fifteen minutes before four o'clock, while wiping the machinery then in motion.

The point was taken at the trial that the plaintiff, on account of her infantile age and inexperience, was not informed, made sensible of the danger and the degree of it. The evidence on this point was that she was some months more than fourteen years of age and that she had worked in cotton mills, in one capacity or another, more than four years.

The defendants at the trial, among other things, contended that if the jury found the alleged carelessness in the want of a proper covering for the machinery, and that the omission was occasioned by the carelessness of a fellow-servant whose duty it was to repair it, then the defendants were not liable.

The presiding judge, among other things to which no exceptions were taken, charged the jury as follows:

" It is a rule of law, that where there are different persons engaged in the same employment, so that they are what are called fellow-laborers or fellow-servants, if one of them is injured by the careless act of another, the master is not liable; that they take the risk upon themselves, when working together in their common employment; that while the person injured might have a remedy against the careless servant, he would have none against the master.

That is a well settled rule of law. But I instruct you, it does not apply to an omission on the part of the master or employer. It does not apply to the machinery and the putting of it into proper condition. It is the duty of the master, whether the master is a corporation or a natural person, to furnish suitable machinery for carrying on his work; and for any omission to guard it properly, the master is liable.

At any rate, this is not a case where the rule in relation to the carelessness of a fellow-servant applies: If some act of one of the laborers in the same room with the plaintiff--or if in doing their work one of the other girls employed in this mill, had done a careless act, and thereby injured the plaintiff, the defendants would not be liable.

But where the alleged carelessness relates to the machinery or the roads or bridges connected with a factory, and constituting a part of it, if there is an omission, it is the omission of the master or employer in contemplation of law; so that the doctrine in relation to the carelessness of fellow-servants does not apply."

The verdict was for the plaintiff; and the defendants seasonably filed a motion to set aside the verdict as against law and evidence, and for a new trial, and also alleged exceptions, to so much of the charge of the presiding judge as is set forth herein.

W. P. Frye, J. B. Cotton & W. H. White, for the defendants.

L. H. Hutchinson & A. R. Savage, for the plaintiff.

I. As to the exceptions:

A master is bound to provide safe and sound materials and accommodations for his servants and such appliances as are reasonable safe and necessary to insure their safety. Shearman & Redfield on Neg., pp. 119, 672. Buzzell v. Laconia Co., 48 Me. 113. Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad, 110 Mass. 240. Gilman v. Eastern Railroad, 10 Allen 233, and 13 Allen 433. Snow v. Housatonic Railroad, 8 Allen 441.

A master is liable to his servant for injuries resulting from a defect in his machinery, although the negligence of a fellow-servant contributes to the accident. Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray 274.

II. As to the motion.

The jury having heard the evidence and viewed the premises, have established the defendants' negligence beyond any reasonable question. Brown v. Moran, 42 Me. 44. Plaintiff was bound only to use ordinary care. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, pp. 35 and 36. An infant is held only to such a degree of care as is usual among children of his age. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, pp. 63, 127. Brown v. Railroad, 58 Me. 387. Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507, 512. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572.

The court will not interfere and grant a new trial, unless upon strong conviction that the jury have fallen into some error in regard to the nature and force of the evidence, or that justice has not been done. Smith v. Richards, 16 Me. 200. Marshall v. Baker, 19 Me. 402.

DANFORTH J.

This is an action by an employee against her employer to recover damages for a personal injury resulting from an alleged defect in the machinery provided for her use. It depends upon the obligations of the master to his servant while in his employment. The action has been submitted to a jury and comes before us upon exceptions and a motion for a new trial.

The presiding justice gave the rule of law contended for by the defendants so far as it relates to their liability for an injury to the plaintiff resulting from the negligence of a fellow-servant. But he further instructed them that " this is not a case where the rule in relation to the carelessness of a fellow-servant applies." He then states where the rule does apply, and goes on to say, " but where the alleged carelessness relates to the machinery or roads or bridges connected with a factory, and constituting a part of it, if there is an omission, it is the omission of the master or employer, in contemplation of law."

The first part of this instruction is clearly correct. The declaration alleges an omission and neglect on the part of the defendants. It sets out no other cause of action. Whatever may have been the facts, or whatever may be the law in relation to the liability of the master for the negligence of his servants, in this action, if the plaintiff can recover it must be on the ground set out in her writ, that of an omission amounting to culpable negligence on the part of the defendants. True this omission need not necessarily be personal--in the present case a corporation being defendant it could act only by servants or agents--but it must be such if on the part of an employee as to be imputable to or legally that of the employer.

From the remainder of the instructions the jury could only infer that the defendants would be directly responsible for all defects in the machinery furnished, and under the writ and the facts in the case not only to exercise the proper care in providing fit and suitable machinery for the purpose intended and that which is as reasonably safe as its use will permit but to use the same degree of care in keeping it in that condition. The degree of care requisite was undoubtedly explained to the jury, as no objections are raised upon that point. The objection seems to be that by the instruction, where in a case of this kind it is shown that through the want of such care of the machinery as the law requires it is permitted to become and remain in a dangerous state, the fault is imputable to the master or employer, and he cannot excuse himself on the ground that it was through the negligence of an agent...