Allison, In re

Decision Date28 March 1967
Docket NumberCr. 10257
Citation425 P.2d 193,57 Cal.Rptr. 593,66 Cal.2d 282
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 425 P.2d 193 In re Charles ALLISON on Habeas Corpus. . In Bank

Charles Allison, in pro. per., and Ralph D. Drayton, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Petitioner, an inmate of San Quentin Prison, complains by this application for habeas corpus of the conditions of his confinement. The allegations of the petition, prepared in propria persona, may be construed as charging that he has been denied the right to communicate with counsel and the opportunity to engage in legal research, and that he has been subjected to harassment and acts of brutality by prison personnel.

The writ of habeas corpus may be sought by one lawfully in custody for the purpose of vindicating rights to which he is entitled even in confinement. (In re Riddle (1962) 57 Cal.2d 848, 851, 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304, and cases cited.) We issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel to represent petitioner in this proceeding. Upon examining the thorough documentation appended to the Attorney General's return, however, we have concluded that petitioner has in fact suffered no deprivation of rights and hence that no relief is warranted.

Right to communicate with counsel. Petitioner was convicted in the Sacramento Superior Court on two counts of forcible rape, two counts of oral copulation accomplished by threats of great bodily harm, one count of assault with intent to rape, and three counts of burglary. He appealed from the judgment, and Laurence L. Angelo, a Sacramento attorney, was appointed to represent him. Petitioner alleges that on July 7, 1966, while confined in San Quentin, he received a letter from Mr. Angelo asking him 'to let him know about several errors in the Attorney General's brief, before July 11, 1966'; that the only way a reply would have been timely was by telegram; and that a prison official refused him permission to send such a telegram, saying that petitioner was a 'writ writer' and that he wasn't sending anything for a writ writer. Petitioner alleges the official further told him that three letters petitioner had directed to Melvin Belli, a San Francisco attorney, had not been sent out of the prison. Finally, petition alleges that on September 1, 1966, while in isolation, he addressed a letter to Mr. Angelo, but that the letter was returned to him on September 7, with the notation, 'postage denied.'

In In re Chessman (1955) 44 Cal.2d 1, 9, 279 P.2d 24, 29, we reaffirmed the rule that 'a prisoner is entitled to, and habeas corpus is available to enforce * * * (his) right, at reasonable times, to consult privately with his counsel In preparation for trial (In re Rider (1920), 50 Cal.App. 797, 799, 195 P. 965; In re Snyder (1923), 62 Cal.App. 697, 699, 217 P. 777; In re Qualls (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 330, 331, 136 P.2d 341).' (Italics added.) The right to consult includes the right, at reasonable times, to communicate with counsel by mail and, when necessary in the circumstances, by telegram. These rights attach not only while preparing for trial, but also during the pendency of an appeal. When a prisoner is represented by an attorney of record, moreover, it is not unreasonable to limit his exercise of such rights to consultation with that attorney, and to deny him access to other attorneys not of record. (Ibid.) But when the appeal has been decided the attorney of record is ordinarily relieved of further duties in the case, and this fact may not be used to deprive the prisoner of the right to thereafter communicate with other counsel for the purpose of interesting them in whatever collateral remedies he may have. As we observed in In re Ferguson (1961) 55 Cal.2d 663, 667, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 761, 361 P.2d 417, 425, 'it is manifest that the right of a prisoner to petition a court for redress of alleged illegal restraints on his liberty is unreasonably eroded if the prison authorities may be allowed to deny a prisoner the opportunity of procuring counsel, so that his petition for writ of habeas corpus or other mode of redress always must be presented in propria persona. * * * Therefore, it is an abuse of discretion for prison regulations to be utilized so as to deny an inmate the opportunity to procure with reasonable promptness, or to communicate with in a reasonably prompt manner, a member of the Bar on matters pertaining to alleged violations of the prisoner's legal rights allegedly suffered as a direct result of incarceration, even though the letter to the attorney may be critical of the prison authorities. (Fn. omitted.)'

Here, however, petitioner has been accorded full measure of his right to communicate and consult with counsel. The prison mail records disclose that during the pendency of his appeal, i.e., until December 1966, letters from petitioner to Mr. Angelo were sent from the institution on at least 23 separate occasions, and replies were received with similar frequency. Contrary to petitioner's allegation that a prison official refused him permission to send a telegram to Mr. Angelo by July 11, 1966, such a telegram was sent on that date; in it, petitioner instructed Mr. Angelo to 'handle those errors the best way you see fit,' and indicated his confidence in his counsel. Other prison records show that during this same period Mr. Angelo made three visits to San Quentin from Sacramento to consult in person with petitioner. As a result of Mr. Angelo's efforts, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment against petitioner as to the three burglary counts, while affirming the remainder. (People v. Allison (1966) 245 A.C.A. 590, 54 Cal.Rptr. 148.)

Indeed, petitioner has abused his right to communicate with counsel. Even though Mr. Angelo was his active attorney of record until the denial of a petition for hearing in this court on December 7, 1966, petitioner continued to write letters of unspecified content to other attorneys throughout his appeal. Thus the prison records show letters, which generally went unanswered, mailed for petitioner to such unauthorized attorney recipients as Melvin Belli, Vincent Hallinan, and Marshall Krause; and on July 11, 1966, the same day petitioner expressed his 'confidence' in Mr. Angelo, he was allowed to send a telegram to Mr. Belli, offering to pay all expenses 'for an interview at San Quentin Prison.'

Opportunity to engage in legal research. Petitioner alleges that he was denied the use of the prison law library from May 25 to June 10, 1966, while his privilege card was suspended, and for the first two weeks of September 1966, while he was in isolation. He charges that on June 6, 1966, his cell was searched and his 'legal papers were scattered' and 'All the research peti tioner had pertaining to his case on appeal was destroyed.' Finally, he complains generally of the inadequacy of the legal materials in the prison library and the hours at which he is permitted to use them. He prays that the warden be restrained from confiscating 'any and all papers and legal materials' in his possession and from suspending his privilege card, and show cause why he is depriving petitioner of his 'legal rights' to 'Daily use of the law library,' 'Access to any and all legal reference volumes necessary to aid petitioner on his appeal,' and in the event these facilities prove unsatisfactory, 'use of the Marin County Law Library twice weekly, all day. * * *'

The fundamental right in issue here is that of reasonable access to the courts. Denial or undue restriction of this right is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed to state prison inmates by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Cochran v. State of Kansas (1942) 316 U.S. 255, 257--258, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 86 L.Ed. 1453; Ex parte Hull (1941) 312 U.S. 546, 549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034; DeWitt v. Pail (9th Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 682, 685; Hatfield v. Bailleaux (9th Cir. 1961) 290 F.2d 632, 636.) The primary function of the right is to insure full and timely judicial review, if desired by the prisoner, of his judgment of conviction; hence 'the State has no power to deny a person the right to file in any court a petition or other document which purports to seek some remedy or relief relating to The offense for which he was imprisoned.' (Italics added.) (In re Robinson (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 626, 629, 246 P.2d 982, 984; accord, In re Chessman (1955) supra, 44 Cal.2d 1, 9, 279 P.2d 24; People v. Howard (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 638, 642--643, 334 P.2d 105; In re Malone (1952) 112 Cal.app.2d 631, 246 P.2d 984.) A secondary function has developed coincident with the expansion of the scope of relief available to a prisoner on habeas corpus; in this respect the right of access permits the prisoner to bring to the attention of the courts alleged violations of his post-conviction rights 'suffered as a direct result of incarceration,' such as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in prison (In re Riddle (1962) supra, 57 Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304; In re Jones (1962) 57 Cal.2d 860, 22 Cal.Rptr. 478, 272 P.2d 310; In re Cathey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 679, 694, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 361 P.2d 426) or the imposition of unreasonable restrictions on his religious freedom (In re Ferguson (1961) supra, 55 Cal.2d 663, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417.)

In the present case the exhibits demonstrate that petitioner has not been denied access to the courts for either of the foregoing purposes. Manifestly he has obtained full judicial review of his judgment of conviction: a timely notice of appeal was filed, and through his attorney he filed opening and closing briefs, argued the case, and filed petitions for rehearing and hearing in this court. During the same period, moreover, the has been permitted to institute in propria persona a variety of...

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  • Arias, In re
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    • California Supreme Court
    • 9 octobre 1986
    ...103 Cal.Rptr. 849, 500 P.2d 873; In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675, 682, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640; In re Allison (1967) 66 Cal.2d 282, 285, 57 Cal.Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193; In re Riddle (1962) 57 Cal.2d 848, 851, 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304.) There are significant statutory and cons......
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
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  • People v. Villa
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    • California Supreme Court
    • 16 mars 2009
    ...related not to the petitioner's underlying conviction but instead to his or her actual confinement. (In re Allison (1967) 66 Cal.2d 282, 285, 57 Cal.Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 ["The writ of habeas corpus may be sought by one lawfully in custody for the purpose of vindicating rights to which he......
  • People v. Wells
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
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    ...is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed to state prison inmates by the Fourteenth Amendment.' (In re Allison (1967) 66 Cal.2d 282, 288, 57 Cal.Rptr. 593, 596, 425 P.2d 193, 196.) The primary purpose of the latter right is to assure full and timely judicial review of the prisoner's ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Reading Law in Prison
    • United States
    • Sage Prison Journal, The No. 48-1, April 1968
    • 1 avril 1968
    ...F. 2d 632 (7th Cir., 1961 ), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 862 (1961) reversing Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (1959); In reAllison, 57 Cal. Rptr. 593, 425 P. 2d 193 (1967); In re Schoengarth, 57 Cal.Rptr. 600, 425 P. 2d 200 Matter of Chessman v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P. 2d 24 ......

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