Lakoski v. James

• Decision Date: 03 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-60010,94-60010
• Citation: 66 F.3d 751
• Parties: 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,748, 103 Ed. Law Rep. 652 Joan M. Lakoski, Ph.D., et al., Plaintiffs, Joan M. LAKOSKI, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Thomas M. JAMES, M.D., et al., Defendants, The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 751

66 F.3d 751

66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,748, 103 Ed. Law Rep. 652

Joan M. Lakoski, Ph.D., et al., Plaintiffs Joan M. LAKOSKI, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Thomas M. JAMES, M.D., et al., Defendants The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

No. 94-60010.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 3, 1995.

James C. Todd, Blake O. Brodersen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for appellants.

David T. Lopez, Houston, TX, for appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Rather than seek redress under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., Dr. Joan Lakoski sued the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that the University intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex in denying her tenure. After a jury trial, the district court granted judgment to Lakoski and awarded her $150,000 in damages, plus attorneys' fees. The University appeals, claiming that Title IX does not provide a private right of action for employment discrimination either directly or derivatively through 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Dr. Lakoski cross-appeals the district court's remittitur of damages and fee award. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal from a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We are persuaded that Title VII afforded Dr. Lakoski the exclusive means of relief, and we reverse and render judgment for the University.

I.

In 1984, Dr. Lakoski joined the University's faculty as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Pharmacology. Under its tenure policy, the University reviewed junior faculty members for tenure by the beginning of their eighth year at the latest. Lakoski sought and was denied promotion three times: in 1988, 1989, and 1990. In February 1991, the department's tenure committee recommended that Dr. Lakoski not be considered for tenure in the future. The University offered Lakoski another position with a significant salary increase, but she rejected the offer. Cary Cooper, the departmental chairman, later informed Dr. Lakoski that her 1991-1992 appointment was her last at the University.

Less than a month before her final appointment was to expire, Dr. Lakoski sued the University and three University officials, alleging that the denial of tenure and her termination constituted intentional sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and state tort law. Although Lakoski's complaint was not clear on this point, her Sec. 1983 claims were evidently based upon both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. Significantly, Dr. Lakoski did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, nor did she plead that the University violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.

Upon filing the suit, Dr. Lakoski sought a preliminary injunction preventing her scheduled termination. Under an agreement with the University, Dr. Lakoski remained on the faculty pending the outcome of the trial. She later accepted a tenure-track position at Pennsylvania State University.

The defendants moved to dismiss Lakoski's suit. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity and the University argued that there was no implied private right of action under Title IX for damages for employment discrimination. A magistrate judge rejected both contentions but dismissed the Sec. 1983 claims against the University, noting that although the Sec. 1983 claims appear to be asserted only against the individual defendants, "insofar as [Lakoski] asserts a Sec. 1983 cause of action against UTMB, that claim must be dismissed" because of the Eleventh Amendment. The magistrate judge did not distinguish between a Sec. 1983 claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and a Sec. 1983 claim based upon Title IX. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations and dismissed Lakoski's Sec. 1983 claims without elaboration.

At trial, Lakoski presented evidence suggesting that the University, in evaluating her for promotion and tenure, employed standards by which male faculty members were not judged. The University countered that it denied Lakoski tenure because of the paucity of her peer-reviewed articles and her inability to sustain collegial relationships in her department.

At the close of Lakoski's case, the district court dismissed all the claims against the individual defendants, leaving only the University to defend the Title IX claim and, apparently, the Sec. 1983 claim based upon Title IX. Though not entirely clear, the record indicates that the district court presented these two claims to the jury as a joint claim, even though the earlier dismissal of Lakoski's Sec. 1983 claims had not explained whether the Sec. 1983 claim asserting rights secured by Title IX was included in the order of dismissal. The jury found that the University intentionally discriminated against Dr. Lakoski on the basis of sex and awarded her damages of $250,000. The court later reduced the damages to $150,000 plus attorneys' fees. The University now appeals the resulting judgment, and Dr. Lakoski appeals the remittitur and fee award.

II.

Critical to our resolution of this case is the fact that, although Dr. Lakoski possessed a colorable claim of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, she chose not to pursue the remedy made available by Title VII. Title VII provides an administrative procedure in which an aggrieved individual must first pursue administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5. Dr. Lakoski chose to circumvent this procedure and immediately assert her rights under Title IX both directly and derivatively through 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

We are not persuaded that Congress intended that Title IX offer a bypass of the remedial process of Title VII. We hold that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions. We limit our holding to individuals seeking money damages under Title IX directly or derivatively through Sec. 1983 for employment practices for which Title VII provides a remedy, expressing no opinion whether Title VII excludes suits seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief.

III.

Dr. Lakoski argues that Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982), and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), sum to an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX for employment discrimination. Cannon held that a woman denied admission to a federally funded school because of her sex enjoys an implied private right of action under Title IX. 441 U.S. at 709, 99 S.Ct. at 1964. Bell upheld federal regulations issued under Title IX prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex at federally funded educational institutions. 456 U.S. at 530, 102 S.Ct. at 1922-23. Finally, Franklin held that a student harassed by her teacher may seek money damages in a private suit for the violation of Title IX. 503 U.S. at 63, 112 S.Ct. at 1031.

We must disagree with Dr. Lakoski's jurisprudential arithmetic. Unlike Dr. Lakoski's suit, neither Cannon nor Bell nor Franklin required the Court to address the relationship between Title VII and Title IX. Both Cannon and Franklin involved claims of prospective or current students at federally funded educational institutions; neither involved a claim of employment discrimination by an employee of those schools. Bell addressed Title IX's prohibition of employment discrimination in a challenge to the validity of administrative regulations terminating federal funding of educational institutions that discriminated on the basis of sex in their employment practices. Bell was not a claim by an individual for money damages for discrimination. In Bell, unlike here, a private remedy for aggrieved employees under Title VII did not affect, much less undermine, the validity of regulations for terminating federal funding. 456 U.S. at 535 n. 26, 102 S.Ct. at 1925 n. 26. In short, Cannon, Bell, and Franklin all presented legal questions in which Title VII hovered on the distant horizon, if it was implicated at all. Here, Title VII occupies center stage.

Given the availability of a private remedy under Title VII for aggrieved employees, we are unwilling to follow Dr. Lakoski's beguilingly simple syllogism that Cannon, Bell, and Franklin all add up to an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX for employment discrimination. Doing so would disrupt a carefully balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination by employers such as the University of Texas Medical Branch. We are unwilling to do such violence to the congressionally mandated procedures of Title VII. We hold that the district court erred in submitting Dr. Lakoski's Title IX claim for damages to the jury. ¹

IV.

Confusing both Lakoski and the University, the district court submitted to the jury Lakoski's Sec. 1983 claim based upon Title IX as well as her Title IX claim, at least the record so suggests. If true, the district court erred.

A.

Section 1983 encompasses claims based upon rights secured by federal statutes as well as by the United States Constitution. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). However, a statute may provide "remedial devices ... sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under Sec. 1983." Middlesex...