Litchfield v. Sewell

Citation66 N.W. 104,97 Iowa 247
PartiesEDWARD H. LITCHFIELD, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER SEWELL AND ELIZABETH SEWELL
Decision Date06 February 1896
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Appeal from Webster District Court.--HON. D. R. HINDMAN, Judge.

SUIT in equity to quiet the title to certain lands, which were included in what is known as the "Des Moines River Land Grant." The defendants pleaded the statute of limitations, and claim title by adverse possession. They also interposed a counterclaim, asking that the title be quieted in them. The plaintiff denied the adverse possession, and pleaded that defendants' possession had at all times been with open recognition of plaintiff's title and ownership. The cause was tried to the court, and a decree was rendered quieting the title to one forty acres in dispute, in plaintiff, and the other in defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Gatch Connor & Weaver for appellant.

R. M Wright for appellees.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

It is practically conceded that plaintiff is the owner of the patent, or paper, title to the land in controversy, by virtue of certain mesne conveyances from the United States government through the Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Company, and that he is entitled to a decree quieting his title unless the defendants have established a title thereto through adverse possession; and the only question for our determination is, whether defendants have established their defense as to one forty acres of land, known as the "North 40." There is no question that defendants had been in possession of this land for more than ten years prior to the commencement of this suit, and that their possession was actual, open, and notorious. It is argued on behalf of appellant, however, that their possession was not adverse, for that it was neither under color of title nor claim of right, and that, if they had color of title to occupy the land as of right, they, upon two occasions, during the last ten years, disclaimed ownership to plaintiff's representatives, and without reservation offered to purchase the land, and openly recognized plaintiff's title. The evidence shows that defendant received a quitclaim deed for the "forty" in dispute, from one G. Y. Boyd, in June, 1880, the consideration being a mare and twenty-five dollars in money. At the time defendant purchased the land, there were some improvements upon the land, which had been erected by Boyd at an expense of more than eighty dollars. Boyd says he went upon the land, supposing it was government land, and that he transferred his interest in the land to Sewell, "as it might appear," and that the deed was drawn up in that way. Boyd says he claimed the land under the head of a homestead, and that he expected to get his title from the government. Sewell did not record his deed, and has never paid any taxes on the land. He says that he understood the land was in litigation when purchased from Boyd, and that he thought the government would get it, and then he would get title. When Boyd sold to Sewell, he explained to him that he thought it was government land, and that it was in litigation, and that he expected, in the end, to get title from the government, as he believed the settlers would win; and he transferred to Sewell, he (Boyd) says, the improvements, and Boyd's chance to get title to the land from the government. Thus matters stood until the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in January, 1892, confirming the title in the land company. It then became apparent that Sewell could not get title from the government, and he wrote to an attorney with reference to his rights in the land, and was advised that he could hold the land by virtue of his possession under the deed from Boyd. He then claimed the land under the Boyd deed. Before this time Sewell did not claim to own the land, but expected to stay on it as long as he could, and to get a title to it from the government, if it was successful in its litigation with the land company. Sewell did not disclose to any one the fact that he had a deed from Boyd, until after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and frequently, and to many persons, disclaimed having any interest in the land, other than as a squatter, until he heard from the attorney to whom he wrote sometime early in the year 1892. In the year 1889, Sewell tried to purchase the land from the representatives of the appellant. He offered, at one time, eight hundred dollars for the eighty acres, and one thousand dollars at another. This last amount was near, if not quite, the value of the land at the time the offer was made. Litchfield did not wish to sell the land at these prices, however, and the offers were refused.

We have stated our conclusions, from the evidence, rather than the testimony, from which they are derived, as the ultimate facts only are material to a proper determination of the case; and we turn now to the law, which should be applied to these facts. It may be stated, as a general rule, "that the law is stringent in requiring strict proof of the facts requisite to constitute adverse possession. Among these is the material and essential one, that the occupancy must have been with the intention to claim title. In other words, the fact of the possession, and the quo animo, with which it was commenced, and continued, are the true and only tests; and, as showing this intent, it is clearly competent to show, by the declarations of the occupant, that he did not hold adversely. McNamee v. Moreland, 26 Iowa 96. We have seen that Sewell, when he took the deed from Boyd, knew that Boyd had no title; that he thought the land was government land, and expected to get title from the government. Now, while it is true, that a void deed, or one given without right or title, by the grantor, or even a tax deed, void on its face, may be sufficient to give color of title, yet, such a rule has no application to one who actually knows that he has no claim, or title, or right to a title. Adverse possession must be in good faith. Jones v. Hockman, 12 Iowa 101; Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503; Smith v. Young, 89 Iowa 338 (56 N.W. 506); Snell v. Mechan, 80 Iowa 53 (45 N.W. 398). It seems to be well settled, that there can be no such thing as adverse possession, where the party knows he has no title, and that, under the law, he can acquire none by his occupation. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392 (6 S.Ct. 95, 29 L.Ed. 423). Moreover, it appears to us, that Sewell did not rely upon the Boyd deed, as giving him title, until after ...

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