State v. Engle

Decision Date14 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 94-2042,94-2042
Citation74 Ohio St.3d 525,660 N.E.2d 450
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ENGLE, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Gregg Marx, Assistant Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Kort Gatterdam and David Hanson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.

WRIGHT, Justice.

When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Kercheval v. United States (1927), 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012; Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 508-509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 443; Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658; Crim.R. 11(C).

In State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 2 O.O.3d 467, 358 N.E.2d 601, this court reversed a conviction for aggravated murder where the defendant's lawyers had prepared a written statement which withdrew pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity and which entered a no contest plea. The statement also recited that the defendant understood his rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2). In Caudill, the trial court asked whether the defendant had read everything in the statement, but neither personally informed him of his rights nor personally informed him of what he was giving up. Paragraph two of the syllabus states: "Adherence to the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires an oral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enables the court to determine fully the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea of guilty or no contest."

In the instant case, the prosecutor, in explaining the plea bargain to the court, made no fewer than six references to an appeal by the defendant in a colloquy that covers only seven sentences in the trial transcript. Defense counsel, noting that the defendant had earlier been deemed incompetent to stand trial, asked the court to determine whether Engle's pleas were voluntary. Based on the prosecutor's statements to the court, it is beyond doubt that defense counsel had explained to his client the strategy of pleading to reduced charges and appealing the trial court's adverse rulings, rather than proceeding with a defense that had been stripped of its key elements.

The trial court listened without uttering a word of correction. The judge did inquire about the defendant's understanding of her pleas as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2). The record reflects that all the parties, including the judge and the prosecutor, shared the impression that appellant could appeal rulings other than a pretrial motion. Crim.R. 12(H). In fact, at the sentencing hearing, the judge advised the defendant: "I want to be sure that you understand that you have the right to appeal the decision of this Court."

Judge Hoffman noted in his dissent below, "[a]ppellant's agreement to the plea bargain implies her understanding that she could appeal those issues. Likewise, though the trial court did not expressly confirm the prosecutor's representation of the availability of appeal on those issues, its failure to advise the prosecutor, defense attorney and/or the defendant to the contrary would be considered by most defendants to be a tacit affirmation/recognition of her ability to appeal those very issues."

Although the trial court may have followed the letter of Caudill, it did not follow its intent. There can be no doubt that the defendant's plea was predicated on a belief that she could appeal the trial court's rulings that her counsel believed had stripped her of any meaningful defense. Therefore, her plea was not made knowingly or intelligently. Consequently, we remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that Mrs. Engle be given the opportunity to withdraw her plea and proceed to trial. The state, of course, is also free to reinstate the original charges. In light of this decision, appellant's second and third propositions of law are rendered moot.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.

MOYER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, RESNICK and COOK, JJ., concur separately.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice, concurring.

I reluctantly concur in the majority's judgment and opinion. Because of the serious nature of the offenses committed in this case, I find it difficult to reverse the convictions. However, I believe we are compelled to reach such a result because of what appears to be a grave misunderstanding of the law on the part of the trial court, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. This case presents the issue of whether a defendant's plea of no contest precludes appellate review of the merits of pretrial motions in limine and for judgment of acquittal. The confusion in this area is somewhat understandable, since this issue has never been clearly addressed by this court. I therefore write separately because I do not believe the majority adequately sets forth the law applicable to this situation.

In Ohio, a defendant's plea of no contest does not preclude appellate review of the merits of a pretrial motion to suppress. Crim.R. 12(H); State v. Ulis (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 83, 600 N.E.2d 1040; Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 573 N.E.2d 32, syllabus; State v. Renalist, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 276, 281, 10 O.O.3d 408, 411, 383 N.E.2d 892, 896, fn. 4. Where the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress is dispositive of the action, judicial economy is served by allowing the defendant to plead no contest and then to appeal the evidentiary ruling rather than completing the trial. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d at 4, 573 N.E.2d at 35; State v. Malinovsky (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 20, 23, 573 N.E.2d 22, 25. In such a case, the denial of the motion to suppress is dispositive because it eliminates all possible defenses to the charge. Likewise, judicial economy is served by allowing an appeal, after a plea of no contest, of a trial court's denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss based on a violation of the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial. Montpelier v. Greeno (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 171-172, 25 OBR 212, 213, 495 N.E.2d 581, 582, fn. 2; State v. Luna (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 57, 58, 2 OBR 615, 615-616, 442 N.E.2d 1284, 1285.

The Kretz court distinguished motions in limine from motions to suppress:

"A motion in limine is tentative and precautionary in nature, reflecting the court's anticipatory treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial. In deciding such motions, the trial court is at liberty to change its ruling on the disputed evidence in its actual context at trial. Finality does not attach when the motion is granted. State v. Grubb (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 201-202, 28 OBR 285, 288, 503 N.E.2d 142, 145." Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d at 4, 573 N.E.2d at 35.

Judicial economy could not be served by an appeal of such a ruling after a plea of no contest. Rather, it is more efficient for the case to proceed to trial and for the evidentiary issue to be finally determined at trial. A plea of no...

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