Kaylor v. Fields

Decision Date19 October 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1996,80-1996
Citation661 F.2d 1177
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
PartiesWalter L. KAYLOR, Freda Moore, and Juanita Rowe, Appellants, v. Ron FIELDS, Appellee.

Fines F. Batchelor, Jr., Van Buren, Ark., for appellants.

Orville C. Clift, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee.

Before HENLEY and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and BECKER, * Senior District Judge.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Walter Kaylor and Freda Moore appeal the District Court's 1 dismissal of their civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against Ron Fields, the Prosecuting Attorney for the State of Arkansas, Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief was based on allegations of misconduct on the part of Ron Fields during his investigation of criminal activity in Crawford County, Arkansas. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Though our reasoning differs somewhat from that of the District Court, we affirm.

I.

This action was disposed of on a motion to dismiss, and thus the facts alleged in the complaint are to be taken as true. The complaint was filed on July 23, 1980, by three plaintiffs, Walter Kaylor, Juanita Rowe, and Freda Moore. Walter Kaylor, some 19 months prior to the filing of the complaint, had ended his term as County Judge of Crawford County, Arkansas. 2 Soon after Kaylor left office, several questions arose concerning missing county property and Kaylor's handling of county funds. Juanita Rowe and Freda Moore have also been employed by Crawford County in the past, some of which time was spent working under the direction of Judge Kaylor. The defendant, Ron Fields, is the local prosecuting attorney charged with the responsibility of investigating such areas of suspected criminal conduct.

The complaint is sketchy and generally short on specific facts. Taken as a whole, however, it alleges that Fields, by himself and through a conspiracy with other unnamed public officials, has done the following:

(1) made continual, baseless accusations of criminal activity without the filing of criminal charges;

(2) made accusations about the plaintiffs to the news media;

(3) disseminated accusations to the press in an attempt to deprive plaintiffs of their right to an impartial jury panel in the event of their being prosecuted;

(4) subjected plaintiffs to interrogation by the Arkansas State Police, the Crawford County Grand Jury, and the FBI;

(5) subpoenaed papers and documents belonging to the plaintiffs without probable cause;

(6) attempted, through use of the prosecutor's subpoena power, to compel plaintiffs to be witnesses against themselves; and

(7) threatened to prosecute plaintiffs in an attempt to punish them for their political beliefs and exercising their right to free speech.

The complaint asks for an injunction prohibiting Fields from engaging in any of these kinds of conduct. There is no prayer for damages.

Soon after the complaint was filed, on August 13, 1980, the defendant filed a timely motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Next, on August 18, 1980, according to materials in the designated record, Juanita Rowe was arrested and charged with the crime of theft of property. 3 Three days later, on August 21, the plaintiffs made a motion for an enlargement of time of approximately 90 days, suggesting that discovery was necessary to enable them to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss. This motion was denied on August 25, with plaintiffs given until September 15 to respond. Also on August 25, Fines F. Batchelor, who up to this point had represented all three plaintiffs, made a motion to withdraw as attorney for Freda Moore because of a conflict between Juanita Rowe and Freda Moore. This motion was granted, and Ms. Moore was given until September 15 to retain counsel and file a responsive pleading. It appears, however, that Ms. Moore did not file further pleadings or continue to participate in the lawsuit in any way. She has not appealed from the judgment entered below.

Thereafter, on September 15, counsel for Judge Kaylor and Ms. Rowe filed a response to the defendant's motion to dismiss and gave notice to take the deposition of Ms. Moore on September 25, 1980. Mr. Fields responded by way of a letter to the court on September 17, requesting a hearing on the motion to dismiss prior to the deposition or, in the alternative, an order prohibiting the deposing of Ms. Moore. The court responded by a letter to both parties dated September 18 setting a hearing date of September 23 for oral argument on the motion to dismiss. After oral argument, the District Court on the same day dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and filed a memorandum opinion setting out its reasons for the dismissal. Judge Kaylor and Ms. Rowe now appeal.

II.

Appellants make two principal arguments. First, they argue that their complaint does state a claim, and second, they say it was improper to rule on the motion to dismiss before any discovery. We reject these arguments for the reasons set out below.

As we have said, the complaint is made up of very general allegations and few specific facts. Nevertheless, what is contained in the complaint is to be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 208, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979). A complaint is not properly "dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted).

We begin with the claims that the defendant made continual, baseless accusations of criminal activity without filing any charges and made derogatory statements to the news media. The only injury involved in these allegations is the possible harm to plaintiffs' reputations. Such a defamation, without some resultant denial of a constitutional right, is not actionable under § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1975). Plaintiffs may, of course, have a state-law remedy.

Plaintiffs' next allegation is that the defendant disseminated accusations to the press in an attempt to deprive them of their right to an impartial jury panel in the event of a criminal prosecution. We recognize that this claim is arguably different from the ones discussed above, because it does charge a denial of a constitutional right-the right to an impartial jury in a criminal prosecution, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The claim is problematic in other respects, however. To the extent that this allegation presents an issue of whether Judge Kaylor is being denied a right under the Sixth Amendment, that issue is not ripe for adjudication in this action. For an issue to be ripe for adjudication we must be assured that the plaintiff will "sustain an immediate injury ... and that such injury would be redressed by the relief requested ...." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). We have no such assurance here. The right to be tried by an impartial jury, by its very nature, can only be afforded or denied in the context of a criminal trial. Judge Kaylor, to our knowledge, has not been charged with any crime, and until he is subjected to a criminal trial, we can only speculate as to whether his Sixth Amendment right is being denied. If he is charged, of course, he has ample means, including voir dire and a motion for change of venue, by which to vindicate this right in the state courts.

Ms. Rowe stands in a somewhat different posture as to this allegation, because, as we noted earlier, she has been arrested, charged with a crime, and tried once. The threat of harm to her is more immediate. We think, however, that the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), precludes the federal courts from affording any relief. The Younger doctrine prohibits the enjoining of a state criminal prosecution absent certain exceptional circumstances. Although the enjoining of the activity complained of here would not interfere directly with the state criminal proceeding, the exercise of our equitable powers is still inappropriate under Younger, where the plaintiff has an opportunity to assert her federal claim in the state proceeding. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2378, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979). Here Ms. Rowe is involved in an ongoing criminal proceeding, and she will undoubtedly have an opportunity to raise this claim at her trial, if the state seeks to try her again. "No more is required to invoke Younger abstention." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1218, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977).

The next of plaintiffs' allegations is that the defendant subjected them to interrogation by the Arkansas State Police, the Crawford County grand jury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are aware of no constitutional right that is implicated by this allegation. Being the object of a criminal investigation, whether rightly or wrongly, is just one of the burdens to which every citizen is exposed. Grand juries, the FBI, and the like are lawfully charged with investigation of suspected criminal activities. The fact that the plaintiffs are the objects of such an investigation, in and of itself, does not give rise to a federal claim.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant has subpoenaed papers and documents belonging to them without probable cause and has attempted to compel them to be witnesses against themselves. The Younger doctrine requires us to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over this allegation. As we said earlier, Younger prohibits interference with state-court criminal...

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