Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 143
Citation | 339 Md. 323,662 A.2d 256 |
Decision Date | 01 September 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 143,143 |
Parties | , 1995 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 30,908 BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY. , |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Eric Hemmendinger (Earle K. Shawe, Shawe & Rosenthal, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Jonathan R. Krasnoff (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.
This judicial review action arises under the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), Md.Code (1991 & 1994 Cum.Supp.), §§ 5-101 through 5-901 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE). The issue is whether, under a citation charging violation of the machine guarding requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1), the burden is on the employer to prove infeasibility of compliance as an affirmative defense. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that the burden was on the employer. Because, as reviewed infra, the great weight of federal authority confirms the intermediate appellate court's analysis, we shall affirm.
On August 21, 1991, an employee of Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Bethlehem) was fatally injured while working on a lathe in the tin mill machine shop at the Sparrows Point plant. The employee was polishing a Halogen line plater contact roll. These rolls are used as part of a conveyor line in order to roll steel plates through a chemical solution. Contact with the chemical solution causes deposits on the rolls which must be removed via a polishing operation. The polishing is performed on a Lodge & Shipley lathe by using a strip of emery cloth which an operator loops around the roll allowing the rotation of the lathe to polish the roll. The strip of emery cloth is held at both ends by the operator, and the operator's hands come in close proximity to the lathe's chuck jaws. 1
The accident occurred when the operator's glove became entangled in a keyway of the roll being polished. 2 The roll was rotating at 344 rpm, and the operator was pulled down under the roll, struck his head, and suffered fatal injuries. An inspector from the Commissioner of Labor and Industry's occupational safety and health staff (MOSH) investigated. No violation was charged concerning the immediate cause of death.
During the investigation the inspector observed the alleged violation involved in this case. The inspector issued a citation citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1) and charging specifically that "[m]achine guarding was not provided to protect operators and other employees from hazards created by rotating parts of lathe chuck jaws and shims." 3
Bethlehem contested the citation, and the hearing examiner affirmed. The examiner found, inter alia, that it was feasible to provide guarding and that it did not present a greater hazard to the operator during polishing than did unguarded chuck jaws.
On review before the Commissioner, Bethlehem argued that MOSH had not proved that guarding the chuck was feasible. The employer's position was that workers would have to place their hands under the guard in order to perform the polishing operation, so that employee safety would not be improved by any guarding mechanism. Lathe chuck guards are commercially available, and they are affixed to lathes at Bethlehem that are used for other functions. Chuck guards shield the worker from flying chips of solid material and from the splatter of liquids, but, Bethlehem submits, they do not abate the hazard in polishing. The Commissioner held that the "employer has the burden of proving as an affirmative defense that it is impossible to guard the machine in any fashion and that there are no alternate means for protecting employees." On that analysis, and because Bethlehem did not contend that it had established impossibility, the Commissioner upheld the citation of violation.
Bethlehem sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The allocation of the burden of proof concerning feasibility was the only question addressed by the circuit court. It reversed the Commissioner.
The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which reversed the circuit court. The intermediate appellate court agreed that the burden was on the employer under the standard in question, but held that the Commissioner had misstated that burden. Rather than proving that abatement was "impossible," the Court of Special Appeals held that the burden was one of "feasibility." Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to the Commissioner.
On Bethlehem's petition this Court issued the writ of certiorari in order to determine the allocation between the parties of the burden concerning feasibility of compliance to abate an alleged violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1). 4 There was no cross petition by the Commissioner, and no party before this Court treats the impossibility/infeasibility issue as embraced within the petition that we granted. 5
MOSHA and the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 through 678, are substantially similar. 6 When interpreting federal regulations enforced under MOSHA, we look to federal cases for guidance. J.I. Hass Co. v. Department of Licensing & Regulation, 275 Md. 321, 330, 340 A.2d 255, 260 (1975).
Both acts create two kinds of obligations, one under the "general duty clause," 7 and the other under the "specific duty clause." 8 It is well settled that, when undertaking to establish a violation of the general duty clause, the Commissioner has the burden of proving feasibility of compliance.
"[T]he Secretary must be constrained to specify the particular steps a cited employer should have taken to avoid citation, and to demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures."
National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C.Cir.1973); see also Faultless Div., Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 674 F.2d 1177, 1189 (7th Cir.1982); Ace Sheeting & Repair Co. v. OSHRC, 555 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir.1977); United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 680, 472 A.2d 62, 70 (1984). The rule of these cases is driven by the concern that, absent fair notice of what is required or prohibited, there may be a violation of due process.
Ace Sheeting & Repair, 555 F.2d at 441.
For burden of proof allocation purposes those standards that are treated in the same way as the general duty clause are referred to, in abbreviated fashion, as general standards. Conversely, for burden of proof allocation purposes, those standards that are not treated in the same way as the general duty clause are referred to as specific standards.
In the instant case, the issue then can be said to be whether, in the burden of proof context, § 212(a)(1) is general or specific. The entire standard, in relevant part, reads as follows: " § 1910.212 General requirements for all machines.
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"(iv) The following are some of the machines which usually require point of operation guarding:
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"(d ) Power presses.
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Both parties before this Court claim support for their positions in federal precedents. These include not only decisions of United States Courts of Appeal, but also of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent, quasi-judicial agency established by OSHA (the Review Commission or Commission). Bethlehem principally relies on Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir.1978). Review Commission and judicial decisions dealing with § 212 reveal that Diebold is out of the mainstream of federal precedent, to the extent, if any, that it holds that the burden concerning feasibility of compliance with §§ 212(a)...
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