Briscoe v. LaHue
| Decision Date | 27 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | 79-1279 and 80-1484,Nos. 78-2378,s. 78-2378 |
| Citation | 663 F.2d 713 |
| Parties | Carlisle W. BRISCOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sgt. Martin LaHUE, Defendant-Appellee. Charles TALLEY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James D. CROSSON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Chris P. VICKERS, Sr. and James N. Ballard, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sgt. James W. HUNLEY, Individually and in his capacity as an agent or employee of the Cedar Lake, Indiana Police Department, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Edmund B. Moran, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Harriet Lipkin, Bloomington, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, KUNZIG, Judge, * and CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.
These three consolidated cases present several issues concerning the scope of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1976). The common thread in these cases is the question whether police officers can be sued under § 1983 for testifying falsely in criminal proceedings. In each case, judgment was entered for defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The facts in the cases before us are as follows.
Carlisle W. Briscoe alleges in his pro se complaint that defendant Martin LaHue, a member of the Bloomington, Indiana, police force, violated Briscoe's federal due process rights by falsely testifying at several judicial proceedings in the course of a state prosecution against Briscoe.
Briscoe had been charged in 1976 with committing first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, and assault. LaHue was called as a witness at two probable cause hearings and at Briscoe's criminal trial. He testified at each proceeding that a latent three-point fingerprint he discovered at the scene of the crime could be linked to Briscoe. Briscoe alleges that this testimony was false, because LaHue had received an F.B.I. analysis of the fingerprint lift which stated that no latent prints of value were present on the lift.
On October 3, 1978, the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, granted LaHue's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint did not suggest that LaHue testified falsely concerning the latent fingerprints found at the scene of the crime, (2) allegations of perjury alone are insufficient to state a claim for violation of due process rights, (3) LaHue was not acting under color of state law when he testified at the criminal proceedings, and (4) Briscoe is collaterally estopped from asserting that LaHue testified falsely at the criminal trial. 1
In June, 1978, Charles Talley, Jr., was tried in the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for aggravated kidnapping, rape and armed robbery. Although Linda Gay, the alleged victim of these crimes, had initially testified at trial that Talley had abducted her from the street into his automobile as a prelude to the alleged rape and armed robbery, she recanted that portion of her testimony concerning the alleged abduction after the close of the state's case, and was allowed to testify in rebuttal that she voluntarily entered Talley's vehicle and drank with him. This revised testimony led to a contemporaneous dismissal of the aggravated kidnapping charge. Talley was, however, found guilty of rape and armed robbery.
Talley alleges in his pro se complaint that the defendants named in the complaint conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection and effective assistance of counsel, and that this conspiracy was motivated by his race and his status as a convicted felon.
Talley charges in his complaint that defendant Albert J. Jordan, an investigative officer in the Chicago Police Department, testified perjuriously regarding statements Talley allegedly made about the identity of the alleged victim of the crimes and Talley's purported recognition of the alleged victim at a pre-trial identification proceeding.
Defendant Linda Gay is alleged to have perjured herself at Talley's trial by stating that Talley kidnapped, raped and robbed her when, in fact, according to Talley, he did not kidnap her but instead gave her money for having sexual relations with him.
Defendant William Benson was an Assistant Cook County state's attorney who prosecuted Talley and who allegedly knowingly used perjured testimony at Talley's trial and later sought and obtained substantial sentences against Talley at a hearing at which both Talley and his defense attorney were absent. Defendants Robbins, Lee T. Hettinger and John J. Cronin, assistant Cook County state's attorneys involved in certain post-conviction proceedings brought by Talley, are alleged to have withheld material evidence and information from Talley so as to deprive him of the opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on his post-conviction petition.
Defendant Bernard Carey, state's attorney for Cook County, is alleged to have knowingly used perjured testimony at Talley's trial and to have failed in his obligation to prevent his assistants from violating Talley's constitutional rights.
Defendant James D. Crosson, the presiding judge at Talley's trial, is alleged to have violated Talley's rights by using perjured testimony and entering judgments against Talley beyond the scope of his jurisdiction.
Defendant Thomas E. Lief, apparently the court reporter at Talley's trial, and John Doe No. 1, alleged to be a court reporter at certain of the proceedings related to Talley's prosecution, are claimed to have altered and deleted portions of the transcripts of the proceedings against Talley so as to adversely affect Talley's position in the criminal proceedings.
Defendant Cyrus Yonan, Jr., Talley's trial counsel, and defendants James W. Reilley, Jordan Bell, Marshall R. Weinberg and Zelma L. Berger, attorneys retained by Talley to represent him after his conviction, are alleged to have acted or failed to act in such a way as to have deprived Talley of the effective assistance of counsel. Reilley, Bell, Weinberg and Berger are also alleged to have deprived Talley of his right to have his conviction reviewed by means of a direct appeal or a post-conviction proceeding and any further appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief.
In orders without opinions dated August 7, 1978, and August 14, 1978, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the motions to dismiss of Yonan, Reilley, Bell, Berger and Weinberg. On February 22, 1979, the district court granted the motions of the remaining defendants to dismiss the complaint. The court found the "allegations of conspiracy as conclusory as those (contained in plaintiff's complaint) to be of questionable sufficiency to state a cause of action under (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 (1976)), even within the rule of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652) (1972)." The court also dismissed Carey, Benson, Robbins, Cronin and Hettinger on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Crosson, Lief and Doe were similarly found to have absolute immunity for acts performed in what was characterized as their judicial roles.
In dismissing the claims against Gay and Jordan, the district court suggested that they were protected by witness immunity and that, in any event, plaintiff was estopped from relitigating the issue of Gay's and Jordan's credibility since those issues necessarily had been adjudicated adversely to plaintiff at his criminal trial.
Chris P. Vickers, Sr., and James N. Ballard charge in their pro se complaint that defendant James W. Hunley, an officer of the Cedar Lake, Indiana, police department, violated their federal constitutional rights to due process and to trial by an impartial jury by testifying falsely as a witness at their joint criminal trial in Indiana state court.
The subject matter of the testimony alleged to be perjured related to circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation of Vickers and Ballard by the Cedar Lake police shortly after their arrest. Purportedly, Vickers and Ballard had each made similar exculpatory statements during that interrogation, and Hunley is alleged to have falsely testified that these statements were given contemporaneously and after the two men had been together following their arrest. In fact, defendants contend, Hunley knew that the statements were made some two hours apart, and before Vickers and Hunley had the opportunity to collaborate with respect to their exculpatory statements.
On February 13, 1980, Hunley's motion to dismiss was granted by a federal magistrate because Hunley's testimony was not given under color of state law. The magistrate also determined that, as a witness, Hunley was entitled to absolute immunity. Additionally, the magistrate found that plaintiff's complaint did not allege that his federal constitutional rights were violated, since the false testimony of a witness at trial does not constitute a due process violation unless it is knowingly used by the prosecutor to obtain a conviction. On March 25, 1980, the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, affirmed the magistrate's dismissal of the complaint. The court agreed with the magistrate that Hunley was not acting under color of state law when he testified at trial.
Defendants LaHue, Gay, Jordan and Hunley claim that, as witnesses, they are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any...
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