Wade v. Haynes

Decision Date09 November 1981
Docket NumberNos. 80-2120,80-2131,s. 80-2120
Parties9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 352 Daniel R. WADE, Appellee, v. Edward E. HAYNES, Director of Division of Corrections for Missouri; Walter David Blackwell, Superintendent of Missouri Intermediate Reformatory, William H. Smith, Corrections Officer, Appellant, William Schroeder, Officer, M.S.P., Fred Miles, Officer, M.S.P. Daniel R. WADE, Appellant, v. Edward E. HAYNES, Director of Division of Corrections for Missouri, Walter David Blackwell, Superintendent of Missouri Intermediate Reformatory, Appellees, William H. Smith, Corrections Officer, William Schroeder, Officer, M.S.P. and Fred Miles, Officer, M.S.P., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., argued, for appellant in No. 80-2120 and appellees in No. 80-2131.

Bradley H. Lockenvitz, Linn, Mo., for Daniel R. Wade.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

LAY, Chief Judge.

Daniel R. Wade, an inmate at the Algoa, Missouri reformatory brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three correctional officers, William H. Smith, William Schroeder, and Fred Miles; Edward E. Haynes, Director of the Missouri Division of Corrections and Walter Blackwell, superintendent at the reformatory. He claimed that on October 27, 1976, he was wrongfully placed in an administrative cell with two other prisoners where he was beaten and sexually assaulted. The district court directed a verdict in favor of Haynes and one of the correctional officers, Miles. Thereafter, the jury entered verdicts for Blackwell and Schroeder, but awarded Wade $25,000 compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages in his claim against Smith. Smith has appealed; Wade cross-appeals claiming the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict in his claim against Blackwell, the superintendent, and one of the correctional officers, Schroeder.

On appeal Smith challenges (1) the overall sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's instruction on cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the trial court's ruling on cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel and closing argument; (4) the exclusion of documentary evidence; (5) the use of expert testimony; and (6) the award of punitive damages. On cross-appeal Wade asserts that there was uncontroverted evidence warranting a directed verdict against Blackwell and Schroeder.

Smith's Claims.

Smith first challenges the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to take the case to the jury. He contends that as a prison official he was immune from liability unless there was evidence that he was guilty of gross negligence or reckless misconduct. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978).

The facts demonstrate sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict against Smith. At the time of the assault Wade was approximately 18 years old, five feet, eight inches tall and weighed approximately 130 pounds. He had previously spent some time in the reformatory's special treatment unit. The special treatment unit is an area secured from the general reformatory population and is used for housing those inmates susceptible to physical abuse from members of the general population. Wade spent some time in punitive segregation for rule violations which occurred during his stay in the special treatment unit; thereafter he was assigned to a cell in the administrative segregation unit of the prison. Schroeder, a correctional officer, placed Wade in a cell on the second floor of the administrative segregation unit with another prisoner from the general population. Later that evening Smith replaced Schroeder and subsequently put a third inmate from the general population in the cell with Wade and the other inmate. The third inmate had been sent to administrative segregation for fighting and it was recommended that he be separated from the general population for his own safety and that of others. Shortly after the third inmate was placed in the cell, Wade charges that both inmates began to harass him and eventually beat and sexually assaulted him. Wade alleges that defendants knew or should have known that he was likely to be assaulted under these circumstances, particularly in light of American Correctional Association standards which recommended single unit housing in administrative segregation units, and the availability of at least one other cell containing only one prisoner.

Smith's conduct was such that a jury could reasonably find that he either knew or should have known that the third prisoner, Thompson, had been ordered separated from the other inmates for his own safety and the safety of others. Smith made no effort to check whether another cell was available. Smith knew another prisoner had been beaten to death in his cell during that shift only a few weeks before. Dormitory six was a two-story dormitory with 26 cells on each floor. The cells on the second floor were approximately 65 square feet in size. The only access to the cells on the second floor was through steel doors, locked from the outside, with several small holes at the top of the doors. It was impossible for guards to see an entire cell without opening the door. A reformatory guard testified at trial that experience and common sense dictated that in dormitory six general population inmates and those inmates who had been housed in the special treatment unit be segregated.

The Official Immunity Defense.

It has been said of the immunity defense that:

It does not insulate an official who, although not possessed of any actual malice or intent to harm, is so derelict in his duties that he must be treated as if he in fact desired the harmful results of his inaction.

Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 412 (5th Cir. 1978).

We agree with the Seventh Circuit:

In order to state an eighth amendment claim resulting from an attack ... a prisoner must show that prison officials "deliberately deprived" him of his constitutional rights. Deliberate deprivation may result from actual intent to deprive him of his rights or from recklessness in ignoring known threats.

Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F.Supp. 155, 157 (E.D.Ill.1978). See Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977). We conclude there existed sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Smith recklessly and with callous indifference placed Wade into a dangerous situation.

On appeal Smith also challenges the court's instruction relating to the eighth amendment. The court's instruction reads in part:

As stated before, the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no cruel and unusual punishment may be inflicted. In order for an alleged physical injury to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the injury must constitute physical abuse of such base, inhumane and barbaric proportions as to shock the sensibilities.

The court also instructed the jury that they must find the defendant's conduct was either grossly negligent or was an egregious failure to protect the plaintiff and violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 1

The challenge made here is that the instructions misled the jury in focusing on the injury itself. Smith argues that the concern should be not whether the injury inflicted was an unnecessary and wanton infliction of punishment but whether there was an egregious failure to protect plaintiff. Thus it is urged that the nature of the injury is relevant only to the question of damages and not to whether there was in fact a constitutional violation by the infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment. Smith thus maintains that this instruction is also inconsistent with the other instructions relating to gross negligence and egregious failure to act. He also now complains that the court erred in defining gross negligence as equivalent to "callous indifference." Smith, relying on Bogard v. Cook, supra, 586 F.2d 399 urges that these terms fail to demonstrate intent as opposed to simple negligence. In sum, the defendants argue that these combined instructions relate to the nature of the injury which determines the cruel and unusual punishment rather than the conduct of the defendants.

We must disagree. 2 The instructions must be viewed in their entirety. Instruction number 5, the verdict director, read:

Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:

FIRST: Defendants knew or should have known that placing two or more inmates in the same cell in administrative segregation with only one guard on duty in that building made it highly foreseeable that some inmates, and in particular the plaintiff Daniel R. Wade, would be physically attacked and sexually abused, and

SECOND: Defendants' conduct was grossly negligent or an egregious failure to protect the plaintiff Daniel R. Wade, and

THIRD: Such acts of the defendants were done under the color of the law of the State of Missouri, and,

FOURTH: Such acts violated plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and,

FIFTH: As a direct result of such conduct, the plaintiff suffered injury.

Gross negligence as used in this instruction means a callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the consequences of one's act or failure to act.

Egregious failure to protect means a flagrant or remarkably bad failure to protect.

These instructions make it clear that for plaintiff to recover defendant's acts must have violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, defendant's action must have been more than negligent, his conduct must have been such that it was done with callous disregard of plaintiff's right not to be punished in an inhumane and base way. The mere placement of plaintiff in the cell with two others from the general population without further incident would not have given legal sustenance to his claim under the eighth...

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