Mixon v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-221,83-221
• Citation: 281 Ark. 202,663 S.W.2d 713
• Parties: Carlton MIXON and Evelyn Mixon, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION; C.B. Jelks and Harold Jelks D/B/A Jonesboro Motor Company, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 713

663 S.W.2d 713

281 Ark. 202

Carlton MIXON and Evelyn Mixon, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION; C.B. Jelks and Harold Jelks D/B/A Jonesboro Motor Company, Appellees.

No. 83-221.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 16, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1984.

Lambert & Brown by Don R. Brown and Stewart K. Lambert, Cherokee Village, for appellants.

Barrett, Wheatley, Smith & Deacon, Jonesboro, for C.B. Jelks and Harold Jelks.

Davis, Cox & Wright, Fayetteville, for Chrysler Corp.

PURTLE, Justice.

On April 8, 1983, the trial court entered an order granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no genuine issue of any material fact and also found that answers to appellants' outstanding interrogatories to appellee Chrysler could have no bearing on the motion for summary judgment.

For their appeal the appellants argue that there was a genuine issue of fact and that the court erred in denying appellants' motion to compel discovery. We do not agree with appellants on either argument.

On December 19, 1977, Carlton Mixon was driving his 1976 Plymouth Volare automobile along Arkansas highway 58, with his wife, Evelyn Mixon, as a passenger, when he became unable to control the vehicle. It crashed down an embankment, thereby damaging the vehicle beyond repair and inflicting injuries upon both appellants. The vehicle was purchased new from Jonesboro Motor Company in February, 1976. At the time of the occurrence the odometer reading was approximately 30,000 miles. There had been no repairs to the steering mechanism nor had it been found defective. After the occurrence the brakes were inspected by representatives of the appellants and by their collision insurance carrier. No defect was discovered. Therefore, no notice was given to either appellee. By the time appellants sought to inspect the steering mechanism the wreckage had been disposed of.

Appellants filed a complaint against the appellees on July 16, 1979. The complaint alleged: 1) negligent design or manufacture; 2) breach of implied warranties; 3) failure to properly prepare and inspect prior to delivery; and 4) res ipsa loquitur. Appellants submitted interrogatories to Chrysler on February 3, 1983. Chrysler filed a motion for summary judgment on February 15, 1983. Subsequently the other appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 23, 1983, appellants' motion to compel discovery was filed. Summary judgment in favor of both appellees was entered on April 8, 1983, and in the same order the court refused to compel Chrysler to answer interrogatories on the ground that the answers would have no bearing on the case.

Were there genuine issues of any material fact to be determined? This is the test to be used in considering summary judgments. Leigh Winham, Inc. v. Reynolds Ins. Agency, 279 Ark. 317, 651 S.W.2d 74 (1983). The proof must be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Talley v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 620 S.W.2d 260 (1981). In the present case the vehicle is not available for inspection or testing. No tests were performed on the steering mechanism prior to destruction of the salvaged vehicle. Appellants made no complaint and had no services performed on the steering system during the 21 months after it was purchased. Appellants have not submitted, by affidavit or otherwise, any evidence that the steering system was defective at any time, much less at the time of delivery. The doctrine of strict product liability, which has been accepted in Arkansas, does not relieve the proponent of a defective product claim from the burden of proof as to the existence of a defect. Southern Co. v. Graham Drive-In, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980). Strict liability eliminates the need to show both privity and negligence. But a plaintiff still must prove injury and that it was caused by the product. The possibility that the product may have been defective is not enough. The proponent of a products liability claim must produce evidence from which the trier of fact may reasonably conclude that it is more probable than not that the injury resulted from a defective product. Southern Co., supra.

It is not necessary that a plaintiff prove the defect by direct proof. However, in the absence of direct proof the plaintiff must negate other possible causes of the injury, thereby raising a reasonable...