Anderson v. Celebrezze

Decision Date04 November 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-3513,80-3513
Citation664 F.2d 554
PartiesJohn B. ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Jr., in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Ohio, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Ohio, Joel S. Taylor, Deputy Chief Counsel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

James E. Pohlman, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Dixon Miller, Robert W. Trafford, Columbus, Ohio, Mitchell Rogovin/Vicki Jackson, George T. Frampton, Jr., Rogovin, Stern & Huge, Washington, D. C., Arthur Eisenberg, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City, Bruce Campbell, ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before ENGEL, KENNEDY and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Ohio requires independent candidates for the Presidency to file a statement of candidacy with the Secretary of State some seven and one-half months before the general election in November. Partisan candidates for President are required to file at the same time in order to run in Ohio's preferential primary. Political parties are permitted to choose their presidential candidates as late as the middle of August. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the early deadline for independents violates the first amendment and equal protection rights of appellees, an independent presidential candidate and his supporters. 1 The Secretary of State of the State of Ohio appeals. We find Ohio's laws to be within the limits set by the Constitution and reverse.

On June 8, 1979, Congressman John B. Anderson, Jr. of Illinois began his campaign to become the Republican Party candidate for the Presidency in the November, 1980 general election. Between June 9, 1979 and April 24, 1980, he raised over $7,700,000 and arranged to appear in 27 Republican primaries, actually appearing in nine. The results of these nine primaries showed that Anderson's attempt to become the Republican party nominee was doomed to failure. On April 24, 1980, Anderson announced that he would instead campaign as an independent. He requested those states in which he was still scheduled to appear in a Republican primary, including Ohio, to remove his name from the primary ballot, and began the formidable task of complying with the various state requirements for placing an independent candidate's name on the November general election ballot.

Ohio offers alternative routes to the general election ballot. Candidates who pursue the independent path are governed by Ohio Rev.Code § 3513.257, which requires that a statement of candidacy and nominating petitions bearing the signatures of 5,000 qualified voters be filed by the 75th day before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June immediately preceding the general election. Thus, Congressman Anderson had to have filed no later than March 20, 1980 in order to appear on the November, 1980 general election ballot. Candidates who chose instead to vie for a political party's nomination for the Presidency by seeking delegates to the national convention in Ohio's June primary had to file, also by March 20, a declaration of candidacy and nominating petitions bearing signatures from 1,000 members of the candidate's party. Ohio Rev.Code § 3513.05.

Political parties must earn the right to field presidential candidates by complying with Ohio Rev.Code §§ 3513.01 et seq. and 3517.01 et seq. Parties that captured at least 5% of the vote in the last preceding gubernatorial or presidential election are automatically entitled to a spot on the general election ballot. New or small political parties are required to file 120 days before the primary election a statement of intent to participate in the June primary, plus nominating petitions signed by qualified electors equal to 1% of the number of electors who voted in the last gubernatorial or presidential election. Hence, a new party's nominating petitions had to bear approximately 28,000 valid signatures, 23,000 more than required for an independent candidate, and be filed by February 4, 45 days earlier than an independent candidate was required to file.

Ohio does not require that the person ultimately chosen as a political party's presidential nominee have participated in the state's June primary. Thus, while an independent must declare his candidacy by March 20, theoretically at least a partisan candidate need take no action and make no commitment until after his party's convention (or 75 days before the general election in the case of a minor political party-Ohio Rev.Code § 3505.01). As a result, the official deadline for a partisan candidate's announcement is approximately five months after an independent must declare his or her candidacy.

Anderson gathered approximately 16,000 signatures for his nominating petitions in Ohio between May 10 and May 15. He tendered the nominating petitions and a statement of candidacy to the Secretary of State's office on May 16, but appellant refused to accept them or to put Anderson's name on the ballot solely on the ground that the petitions and statement were not timely filed under section 3513.257.

Anderson brought this action on May 19, challenging the March 20 filing deadline for independent candidates as a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. Also named as plaintiffs were a registered voter in Ohio who wished to cast her vote for Anderson in the 1980 general election; a registered voter in New Jersey who feared that the value of his vote for Anderson in the general election would be diminished if Anderson were ineligible for Ohio's electoral votes; and an individual who desired to appear in the general election as an elector pledged to Anderson.

In a thoughtful opinion the District Court found that by excluding Anderson from the general election ballot Ohio's early filing deadline substantially burdened appellees' first amendment and fundamental rights by: (1) preventing Anderson from using his political campaign in Ohio as a means of disseminating ideas; (2) preventing Anderson and those who would vote for him from associating to advance their political beliefs by denying them the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice; (3) restricting the right to vote of those who would vote for Anderson in Ohio; (4) diluting the voting rights of Anderson voters in other states by denying their candidate access to the sixth largest pool of electoral votes in the country. The District Judge noted that the burden on constitutional rights was all the greater because of the large amount of support that Congressman Anderson enjoyed in Ohio and nationwide. The District Court also found that requiring independent candidates to declare their candidacy in March, but not mandating like action by partisan candidates until after their party's nominating convention, invidiously discriminated against independent candidates.

The District Court ruled that only a compelling interest could justify this burden on appellees' first and fourteenth amendment rights. Ohio argued that the deadline advanced its interest in political stability, by forcing potential independent candidates to disaffiliate themselves from political parties at an early date, thus preventing candidates from doing exactly what Anderson did here-beginning a power struggle within their party, then carrying that struggle on as independents once it became clear that they would not be successful within the party.

The District Court accepted the interest in political stability as compelling, and recognized that in the context of state elections the Supreme Court has approved disaffiliation requirements to accomplish this goal. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). However, the District Court held that the March 20 filing deadline acted as a disaffiliation provision only by happenstance, where an independent candidate who sought to file after March 20 had also sought a party nomination. The court noted that Ohio's law would keep off the ballot an independent candidate who filed after March 20 although he never associated with a political party. The court refused to accept the proposition that Ohio's interest in preserving the integrity of political parties through a disaffiliation provision is as great in a national election as in state elections. 2 The District Court also noted that another section of Ohio's election law addressed the same concern that Ohio claimed to be addressing through its early filing deadline. Ohio Rev.Code § 3513.04 contains a "sore loser" provision, which prohibits a candidate from seeking a place on the general election ballot as an independent if that person's name has appeared on the primary election ballot. 3 The District Court concluded that the filing deadline combined with the existing sore loser provision did not form a rational and narrowly drawn legislative scheme to promote political stability, and accordingly did not warrant the burdens imposed on or the discriminatory treatment of independents. See also Greaves v. State Board of Elections of North Carolina, 508 F.Supp. 78, 83 (E.D.N.C.1980) (where a state already has a "sore loser" statute, an early filing deadline for independent candidates cannot be considered necessary to accomplish the same goal). On July 17 the District Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction, ordering that Anderson's name be placed on the general election ballot. 4

Congressman Anderson's late decision to run as an independent caused him to miss similar early filing deadlines in New Mexico, Maryland, Maine, and Kentucky. 5 In New Mexico, Maryland, and Maine Anderson raised challenges similar to those he raised in Ohio. He prevailed in all three states for substantially the reasons relied on by the District Court in this case. See Anderson v. Morris, ...

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6 cases
  • Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.E.R.C.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
    • August 27, 2001
    ...by Supreme Court does not necessarily reflect agreement with the opinion of the court whose judgment is appealed); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 558-60 (6th Cir.1981) aff'd in relevant part, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (to reach any other conclusion......
  • Anderson v. Celebrezze
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1983
    ...to protect the parties from "intraparty feuding" and may actually impair the State's interest in preserving party harmony. Pp. 796-806. 664 F.2d 554, George T. Frampton, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioners. Joel S. Taylor, Columbus, Ohio, for respondent. Justice STEVENS delivered the opi......
  • Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, C82-135-L.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of New Hampshire
    • May 17, 1982
    ...challenges presented" are of such moment as to upset the lower court's judgment. As the 6th Circuit stated in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 558-559 (6th Cir. 1981): In light of the narrow effect to be given summary dispositions, appellant has construed the quoted sentence from Mande......
  • Lamone v. Schlakman
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 1, 2017
    ...once again be considering the constitutionality of pre-primary filing deadlines for independent candidates, see Anderson v. Celebre z ze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted[456] U.S. [960, 102 S.Ct. 2035, 72 L.Ed.2d 483] 50 LW 3975 (May 4, 1982), existing case law would support the......
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1 books & journal articles
  • "NO RIGHT IS MORE PRECIOUS": COMMON GOOD SOLUTIONS TO BALLOT ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE.
    • United States
    • Ave Maria Law Review No. 20, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...499 F. Supp. 121, 139 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783-84. (152.) Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786. (153.) Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 1981). As it happened, the State did not request a stay in their appeal of the District Court's ruling and Anderson was therefor......

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