Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-1493,79-1493
• Citation: 664 F.2d 904
• Parties: AMSTAR CORPORATION (a Delaware Corporation), Appellee, v. S/S ALEXANDROS T., her engines, boilers, tackle, appurtenances and apparel, etc.; Nava Shipping Co., Ltd. (a foreign corporation), Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 904

664 F.2d 904

AMSTAR CORPORATION (a Delaware Corporation), Appellee, v. S/S ALEXANDROS T., her engines, boilers, tackle,

appurtenances and apparel, etc.; Nava Shipping

Co., Ltd. (a foreign corporation), Appellants.

No. 79-1493.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 3, 1981.

Decided Nov. 10, 1981.

Kieron F. Quinn, Baltimore, Md. (M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr., Ober, Grimes & Shriver, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellants.

Donald A. Krach, Baltimore Md., George F. Chandler, III, New York City (Robert P. O'Brien, Niles, Barton & Wilmer, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

David R. Owen, Baltimore, Md., David J. Sharpe, Washington, D.C., George Washington University Law School, John W. Sims, New Orleans, La., Gordon W. Paulsen, New York City, Graydon S. Staring, San Francisco, Cal., on brief), for The Maritime Law Association of the United States, amicus curiae.

Before BUTZNER, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and W. EARL BRITT, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:

Rule C for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as implemented by rule E, provides, among other things, for the arrest of a vessel in an in rem action to enforce a maritime lien. Upon the filing of a complaint and the clerk's issuance of a warrant, the marshal is authorized to take custody of the vessel. ¹ The primary question raised in this appeal is whether the district court erred by holding that rule C is constitutional. The second issue is whether the district court properly assessed damages for cargo loss. Finding no error of law or fact, we affirm the judgment of the district court. ²

I

At the outset, we reject the suggestion that the district court's judgment must be affirmed because inferior courts lack the power to adjudicate the constitutionality of rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. Of course, inferior courts are required to adhere to the Court's decisions. Rule making, however, is a legislative or administrative function rather than an act of adjudication. ³ Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated: "The fact that this Court promulgated the (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency." ⁴ The duty to consider a rule's validity is not limited to the Supreme Court. A district court can refuse to apply a rule when it concludes that "the Advisory Committee, (the Supreme) Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." ⁵ The district court, therefore, did not err when it adjudicated the challenge to the rules' constitutionality.

II

Amstar Corporation, alleging cargo damage, brought this action in admiralty against the vessel ALEXANDROS T., in rem and against its owner, Nava Shipping Co., Ltd., of Nicosia, Cyprus, in personam. Pursuant to rule C, the marshal arrested the ship in the in rem proceeding. Pursuant to rule B, he attached it in the in personam proceeding. Protesting that rules B and C are unconstitutional, the ALEXANDROS T. and Nava, appeared specially and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Before the court heard this motion, the parties agreed that the vessel should be released from custody in consideration of a letter of undertaking from Nava's insurance carrier. Subsequently, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the rules, denied the motion to dismiss, and after trial awarded Amstar damages in the amount of $150,882.06 against both appellants.

Nava contends that the court did not obtain either personal or subject matter jurisdiction because (1) rules B, C, and E are facially unconstitutional, (2) they were unconstitutionally applied, and (3) Amstar did not comply with them. Relying on cases that dealt with the constitutionality of state laws governing the seizure of a debtor's property before judgment, ⁶ Nava asserts that the rules deprived it of the use of its vessel without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment. On appeal Nava emphasizes its claim that the rules are facially unconstitutional, particularly complaining that the district court did not address this issue.

For reasons adequately stated by the district court in its opinion, we hold that the rules, if facially constitutional, were constitutionally applied and that Amstar complied with them in the institution and prosecution of its action. Consequently, we will discuss only Nava's claim that the rules are facially unconstitutional. Moreover, if rule C is constitutional, the district court was empowered to grant Amstar full relief in the in rem proceeding. Therefore, we need not examine the constitutionality of rule B or the question of in personam jurisdiction over Nava. Mindful that a judgment on a constitutional issue should not be unnecessarily broad, we will confine our decision to the constitutionality of the provisions of rule C, as implemented by rule E, dealing with in rem proceedings against a vessel. ⁷

The catalog of the constitutional defects that Nava perceives in rule C is drawn from the deficiencies exposed in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. and related cases. ⁸ It includes the following: no court order is required for the arrest of a vessel; the clerk has no discretion to refuse to issue process if the complaint is in proper form and the necessary fees are tendered; the marshal also lacks discretion to refuse to execute process; no provision is made for either a pre-arrest or post-arrest hearing; notice need not be given for 10 days and then only by publication; no bond is required for the arrest of the vessel; the owner, however, must give bond or procure consent for its release before liability is adjudicated; if security is not furnished, the vessel may be sold prior to trial. ⁹

III

We have little doubt that rule C would be invalid if its constitutionality were to be measured solely by the principles explained in Sniadach and the other cases on which Nava relies. ¹⁰ Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether Sniadach and other cases involving common law procedures apply to rule C.

Congress and the Court have always recognized that maritime law differed from the common law. In the Act that granted the Supreme Court its authority to promulgate procedural rules, Congress provided: "(T)he forms of writs, executions and other process ... (in suits of) ... admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, (shall be) according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts ... of admiralty ... as contradistinguished from courts of common law ...." ¹¹ Although rule C was promulgated in its present form in 1966, ¹² its provisions for the arrest of a vessel in an in rem action can be traced through the Admiralty Rules of 1920 ¹³ and 1844 ¹⁴ with little change. ¹⁵ This procedure, moreover, was used long before it was embodied in the rule. ¹⁶ Its purpose has always been to provide a means for enforcing a maritime lien, which is the central element of an in rem proceeding. ¹⁷ Maritime liens, however, are not created by the rule. They are an integral aspect of substantive, rather than procedural, maritime law. ¹⁸

A maritime lien is an essential predicate for the arrest of a vessel in a private in rem action. Maritime law, with exceptions not pertinent to this case, gives a maritime lien to the owner of cargo that has been damaged aboard a vessel. ¹⁹ Quite different from a common law lien, a maritime lien is not simply a security device to be foreclosed if the owner defaults. The vessel itself is viewed as the obligor whether or not the owner is also obligated. ²⁰ Substantive maritime law confers on the holder of a maritime lien a sufficient interest in the vessel to detain it for security and ultimately to subject it to condemnation and sale for satisfaction of the lien. ²¹ The arrest of the vessel in the proceeding in rem is to accomplish this end. "The lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correlative-where one exists, the other can be taken, and not otherwise." ²²

These principles were developed to meet the special needs of persons engaged in many aspects of maritime commerce. ²³ By enforcing maritime liens through the arrest of vessels in in rem proceedings, admiralty enables people engaged in maritime commerce to obtain redress for certain kinds of injuries caused by the vessel and its crew without seeking compensation abroad from the vessel's owner. The owner, moreover, is not exposed to unlimited liability. ²⁴

Sniadach and other cases invalidating state garnishment, attachment, and replevin statutes dealt exclusively with common law concepts rather than the unique concerns of maritime law. Neither in these cases nor in a closely related case upholding a sequestration statute based on civil law, ²⁵ did the Court advert to maritime law and practice. The omission is significant. The Court relied on precedents from many areas of the common law, ²⁶ but it found no occasion to refer to its decisions, written over a period of nearly two centuries, involving admiralty suits in rem. We, too, must give effect to the significant differences between the common law and admiralty. The constitutionality of rule C must be determined in the light of the nautical background from which it evolved and with due regard to the substantive maritime law it serves. ²⁷ Constitutional principles governing creditors' rights at common law cannot be applied mechanically to test the validity of rule C. Therefore, we cannot accept Nava's argument that Sniadach and related cases provide controlling precedent for this appeal.

Also, we cannot accept Amstar's argument that forfeiture cases, including some prosecuted in accordance with rule C, provide controlling precedent for upholding the rule's constitutionality. ²⁸ These cases dealt with the right of the...