United States v. Winfield

• Citation: 665 F.3d 107
• Decision Date: 17 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–5032.,10–5032.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Christopher WINFIELD, a/k/a Kristopher Orlando Winfield, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

665 F.3d 107

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Christopher WINFIELD, a/k/a Kristopher Orlando Winfield, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–5032.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Oct. 28, 2011.Decided: Jan. 17, 2012.

ARGUED: Elizabeth W. Hanes, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, Office of the United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Elizabeth S. Wilson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge GREGORY wrote the opinion, in which Judge SHEDD and Judge DAVIS joined.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

I.

Appellant–Defendant Christopher Winfield challenges the district court's jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to impose a second prison sentence for violations of his supervised release after the district court effectively revoked his supervised release and imposed a prison sentence in a prior hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.

II.

On November 8, 2004, Winfield pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). He was sentenced to fifty-one months' imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. Winfield's term of supervised release began on August 31, 2007.

On October 2, 2009, Winfield's probation officer filed a petition for violations of his supervised release. The petition alleged three violations: failing to follow the instructions of his probation officer, failing to work regularly, and twice testing positive for cocaine. The petition was amended two times to reflect further violations Winfield committed after the filing of the first petition. The first amendment alleged that Winfield was charged in state court with identity theft and forgery under Virginia law. The amendment also alleged that Winfield failed to notify the probation officer of his arrest for the state charges within seventy-two hours of being arrested. The second amendment alleged that Winfield had been charged with distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine under Virginia law.

On May 18, 2010, the district court held a hearing regarding the alleged violations. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the court should only proceed on the “technical” violations—charges not related to the commission of state offenses—and wait to hear the remaining “substantive” violations after their resolution in state court. After hearing the evidence, the district court found Winfield guilty of all technical violations. For these violations, the court sentenced Winfield to twelve months' imprisonment. Notably, the district court's order imposing the sentence did not explicitly revoke Winfield's supervised release.

On September 17, 2010, the district court held the second hearing on the remaining violations. Winfield admitted that he had been convicted in state court of distribution of cocaine on July 1, 2010, and of forgery and identity fraud on July 12, 2010. For these violations, he requested that he receive no additional term of imprisonment. The district court found him guilty of these violations and imposed a twelve-month sentence.¹ At this time, the court explicitly revoked Winfield's supervised release. The district court did not impose an additional term of supervised release to begin upon completion of Winfield's imprisonment. Winfield timely appealed.

III.

We review de novo a challenge of a district court's jurisdiction to rule upon alleged violations of supervised release. United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 491 (4th Cir.1994).

A.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) governs a district court's authority to revoke, extend, modify, or terminate a defendant's term of supervised release. Under subsection (e), a district court may (1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release ...

(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release ...

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release ... or

(4) order the defendant to remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours and, if the court so directs, to have compliance monitored by telephone or electronic signaling devices....

Further, under § 3583(h), a district court may require the defendant to serve an additional term of supervised release following re-incarceration.

Winfield contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 3583(e)(3) to conduct the second violation hearing and impose the additional twelve-month sentence. He reasons that when the district court imposed the twelve-month sentence at the May 18 hearing, it effectively revoked his term of supervised release. He argues that the act of revocation has the following legal significance: “it ends the period of supervision, and with it, the district court's power to further adjudicate violations or impose additional prison time.”

We first address the meaning of the term “revoke” under § 3583(e)(3) and whether a district court's effective revocation of a defendant's term of supervised release also ends the court's supervision over the release when the term has not expired.

In Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706–07, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed whether, under § 3583(e)(3), a district court has the authority to impose a new term of supervised release following re-incarceration for violations of the original supervised-release term. The defendant argued that the district court lacked such authority because the revocation terminated the court's jurisdiction over his supervised release.² Id. at 698, 120 S.Ct. 1795. The Supreme Court determined that a revoked term of supervised release does not terminate the release, but instead “recall[s],” “call[s] or summon[s] back” the release during the defendant's imprisonment for violations of the release. Id. at 706, 120 S.Ct. 1795. The Supreme Court examined the language of § 3583(e)(3), which at that time provided that a court could “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release....” ³ Id. at 704, 120 S.Ct. 1795. The Supreme Court reasoned that the re-incarceration “is not a ‘term of imprisonment’ that is [ ] be[ing] served, but all or part of ‘the term of supervised release.’ ” Id. at 705, 120 S.Ct. 1795. The Court continued, “If ‘the term of supervised release’ is being served, in whole or part, in prison, then something about the term of supervised release survives the preceding order of revocation.” Id. Thus, “unlike a ‘terminated’ order of supervised release, one that is ‘revoked’ continues to have some effect.” Id. at 705–06, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (emphasis added). The Court held that because the revocation of a term of supervised release under § 3583(e)(3) does not “terminate” the release—or the district court's jurisdiction to oversee the supervised release past the re-incarceration—a district court had the authority to impose an additional term of supervised release after the completion of the prison sentence. Id. at 712–13, 120 S.Ct. 1795.

In an unpublished case nearly identical to the one before us, the Third Circuit applied the reasoning in Johnson and held that a district court's revocation of a term of supervised release and imposition of a prison sentence did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hold a second violation hearing and impose additional prison time for violations committed prior to the revocation of the release. United States v. Johnson, 243 Fed.Appx. 666, 668 (3d Cir.2007). As here, the parties agreed to hold bifurcated hearings, the second of which would be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the defendant's state criminal charges of burglary, cocaine possession, resisting arrest, and assault on a police officer. Id. at 667. At the second hearing, however, the defendant argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to further revoke, modify, or extend that same period of release because it had previously revoked and sentenced him in the first hearing. Id. The Third Circuit determined that because a revoked term of supervised release continues to have some effect post-revocation, the district court retained its authority to alter and extend the defendant's punishment during his re-incarceration for supervised-release violations. Id. at 668 (citing Johnson, 529 U.S. at 712, 120 S.Ct. 1795).⁴

B.

Applying the foregoing logic to Winfield's appeal, we find that the district court had jurisdiction to hold the second violation hearing on September 17, 2010, and to impose the twelve-month sentence for supervised-release violations arising from Winfield's state convictions.

First, we assume, without deciding, that the district court effectively revoked Winfield's supervised release when it imposed the twelve-month sentence at the May 18 hearing.⁵

Next, we hold that the district court's revocation...