666 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2012), 11-11512, Edwards v. Shanley
| Citation | 666 F.3d 1289 |
| Opinion Judge | MARTIN, Circuit Judge: |
| Party Name | Colin A. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bryan C. SHANLEY, City of Orlando Police Officer, Justin E. Lovett, City of Orlando Police Officer, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Attorney | Michael P. Maddux, Michael P. Maddux, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Austin L. Moore, Orlando, FL, for Defendants-Appellees. |
| Judge Panel | Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and HILL, Circuit Judges. |
| Case Date | January 12, 2012 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
This appeal considers whether clearly established federal law prohibits police officers from allowing a police dog to conduct a five- to seven-minute attack against a person who ran from his car after a traffic stop, where he is lying face down with his hands exposed, no longer resisting arrest, and repeatedly pleading with the officers to call off the dog because he surrenders. We conclude that clearly established law does not permit this level of force. As a result, we reverse the decision by the District Court granting qualified immunity to the officers, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
" We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity and apply the same legal standards as the district court." Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.2004). " We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts." Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted). " We recognize that facts, as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the case ..." Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 901 (11th Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless " we approach the facts from the plaintiff's perspective because the issues appealed here concern not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly established law." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2009).1
Reading the record in this light, on the evening of December 17, 2008, Edwards
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drove his wife's car despite having a suspended license. While driving, he approached a stop sign and noticed a police car sitting in an adjacent lot. Edwards failed to properly stop at the stop sign, and then observed the police car driving behind him with its sirens and lights engaged. Expecting to be passed, Edwards moved his car to the right, but the police car remained behind him. Edwards then drove " a little bit down" the road and made a right turn into a library parking lot, where the police car followed.
After stopping his car, Edwards got out and ran. Officer Lovett, the driver of the police car, chased Edwards on foot. Edwards first ran toward the street, but Officer Lovett interrupted, causing Edwards to about face and run towards a nearby fence. Edwards scaled the fence, which separated the parking lot from a wooded area, but had difficulty because of the thickness of the surrounding brush. He made it " not even half a mile into the bush," and then laid down on his stomach in an open area.
Officer Lovett did not immediately pursue Edwards into the woods, and instead called for backup. Officer Shanley responded to this call, and soon thereafter came to the scene with his K-9 partner, Rosco. The officers then both announced their presence and warned that they were going to use the dog if Edwards did not surrender. Hearing no response, and after a second warning, the officers entered the wooded area. The dog lead the officers to Edwards, who remained lying on his stomach with his hands exposed. Officer Shanley saw Edwards lying on his stomach and again announced the presence of the K-9 unit. Although he saw their flashlights, Edwards did not hear or respond to Officer Shanley's announcements.
As the officers got closer, Edwards heard them command him to show his hands. Because his hands were already visible, Edwards made no movement. Instead, he shouted: " [Y]ou got me. I only ran because of my license." Yet as Edwards finished making that statement, the dog, which had been released by Officer Shanley, began biting Edwards's leg. As the dog bit him, Edwards shouted " I'm not resisting" and begged the officers to call off the dog.
According to Edwards, the dog repeatedly bit his leg for somewhere between five and seven minutes.2 Edwards did not resist. The officers did not instruct him to take any further actions demonstrating compliance with their commands. Yet they neither handcuffed nor arrested Edwards, and instead stood over him while the dog maintained its bite. Eventually, one of the officers placed his knee into Edwards's back, and secured handcuffs onto both of Edwards's hands. Once handcuffed, Officer Shanley gave the dog a verbal command to release the bite.
Edwards suffered serious injuries resulting from the dog attack. Again, according to Edwards, upon seeing his leg following the attack, one of the officers
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described his leg as looking like filet mignon, and joked that is why the police do not feed their dogs. Edwards was then transported via ambulance to the hospital. The treating physician diagnosed him with " significant damage to [his leg's] muscles and tendons" resulting from a " very, very complex injury" that included the loss of " a large area, large chunks of full-thickness tissue along ... [his] leg." He received " urgent surgery" and was required to remain in the hospital for six days, and upon release underwent extensive follow-up care.
Edwards was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, driving with a suspended license, resisting an officer without violence, and striking a police dog. Edwards pleaded no contest to the felony charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, and all remaining charges were dismissed.
In April 2010, Edwards brought this action against Officers Shanley and Lovett seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Edwards alleged that Officer Shanley's use of a police dog constituted excessive force, and further that Officer Lovett failed to intervene and stop the dog attack, both in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity. This appeal followed.
II.
We begin with the District Court's determination that qualified immunity shields Officer Shanley from liability for his use of the dog to track and subdue Edwards. Edwards advances two theories for relief. First, he contends that Officer Shanley violated the Fourth Amendment through the mere use of a police dog. Second, Edwards argues that even if some initial use was constitutional, Officer Shanley committed a distinct constitutional violation when he allowed the dog to bite Edwards for five to seven minutes while Edwards pleaded to surrender. In response, Officer Shanley argues that qualified immunity shields him from liability for either act.
We analyze Edwards's claims under qualified immunity's familiar two-step analysis. " Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages for torts committed while performing discretionary duties unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right." Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.2008). It is undisputed that Officers Shanley and Lovett were acting within their discretionary authority while tracking and arresting Edwards.
" Once discretionary authority is established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity should not apply." Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2009). In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step process for resolving qualified immunity claims. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The first step is to " determine [ ] whether the [defendant's] conduct amounted to a constitutional violation." Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291. The second step is to determine " whether the right violated was ‘ clearly established’ at the time of the violation." Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156). This two-step analysis is not mandatory, but is the " often appropriate" manner through which to analyze qualified immunity claims. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
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Under both theories of liability, Edwards claims that Officer Shanley violated the Constitution's prohibition on excessive police force. We analyze such claims " under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard," Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197, 125 S.Ct. 596, 598, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004), asking " whether the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1290 (quotation marks omitted). Under this framework, " [t]he ‘ reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); see also Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir.2009).
As a result, " [t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Instead, " its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case," Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct....
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