Chester v. Grane Healthcare Co., s. 11–2573

• Decision Date: 07 December 2011
• Docket Number: 11–2978.,Nos. 11–2573,s. 11–2573
• Citation: 666 F.3d 87,192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161,161 Lab.Cas. P 10429
• Parties: Robert W. CHESTER, Regional Director of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for Region Six, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board v. GRANE HEALTHCARE CO., and/or Ebensburg Care Center, LLC, d/b/a Cambria Care Center, Single EmployerGrane Healthcare Co., and/or Ebensburg Care Center, LLC, d/b/a Cambria Care Center, Single Employer, Appellant in No. 11–2573Robert W. Chester, Appellant in No. 11–2978.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

161 Lab.Cas. P 10,429

192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161

666 F.3d 87

Robert W. CHESTER, Regional Director of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for Region Six, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board

v.GRANE HEALTHCARE CO., and/or Ebensburg Care Center, LLC, d/b/a Cambria Care Center, Single EmployerGrane Healthcare Co., and/or Ebensburg Care Center, LLC, d/b/a Cambria Care Center, Single Employer, Appellant in No. 11–2573Robert W. Chester, Appellant in No. 11–2978.

Nos. 11–2573

11–2978.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Sept. 21, 2011.Filed: Dec. 7, 2011.

Richard J. Antonelli, Esq. (Argued), Rebecca J. Dick–Hurwitz, Esq., John A. McCreary, Jr., Esq., Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellants & Cross–Appellees Grane Health Care and/or Ebensburg Care Center, LLC.

Judith I. Katz, Esq., Steven L. Sokolow, Esq., Laura T. Vazquez, Esq. (Argued), National Labor Relations Board, Washington, DC, for Appellee & Cross–Appellant Robert W. Chester.

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

This matter comes before us on cross-appeals from the District Court's ruling on a petition for interim injunctive relief sought by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) pursuant to § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). For nearly forty years, since Eisenberg ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir.1975), we have held that to award interim injunctive relief under § 10(j) “a federal district court must merely find ‘reasonable cause’ to believe an unfair labor practice has occurred and must determine that the relief sought is ‘just and proper.’ ” Kobell v. Suburban Lines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1076, 1078 (3d Cir.1984). The District Court in this case, following a thoughtful discussion of pertinent precedents, determined that our two-prong approach was inconsistent with pronouncements of the Supreme Court dating back nearly thirty years, to Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). See Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Grane Healthcare Co., 797 F.Supp.2d 543, 551–560 (W.D.Pa.2011). Applying the familiar four-factor test applicable to generic preliminary injunction motions—likelihood of success on the merits; imminent threat of irreparable harm; balance of equities favoring interim injunctive relief; and the public interest being served by the interim relief—the District Court granted the requested interim bargaining order but denied the requested interim hiring of several aggrieved individuals. Having carefully considered the matter, we conclude that the Supreme Court decisions upon which the District Court relied, having arisen in completely different contexts and involving statutory schemes unrelated to the NLRA, do not warrant abrogation of our two-prong approach to § 10(j) petitions. Furthermore, we will affirm the interim bargaining order issued by the District Court, as plainly compelled under the two-prong approach. As to the requested interim hiring orders, however, we believe that the District Court should, in the first instance, determine whether such relief is appropriate under our two-prong approach.

I. Facts and Proceedings

Prior to January 1, 2010, Cambria County, Pennsylvania owned and operated Laurel Crest Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (“Laurel Crest”), a facility located in Ebensburg, Pennsylvania. All of the employees of Laurel Crest were employed by Cambria County, who as a public employer was subject to the Pennsylvania State Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”), 43 P.S. § 1101.301(1). Since its certification in 1971 by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the Professional and Public Service Employees of Cambria County a/w Laborers' District Council of Western Pennsylvania, Local 1305 (“Local 1305”) was the collective-bargaining representative of a unit of nonprofessional employees employed by Cambria County at Laurel Crest. Cambria County recognized Local 1305 as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit, and entered into a series of collective-bargaining agreements with Local 1305, the most recent of which ended in December, 2008.

In September, 2009, Appellant Grane Healthcare Co. (“Grane”), a private entity that owns and manages several Pennsylvania nursing facilities, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Cambria County to purchase Laurel Crest. On January 1, 2010, the purchase became final, and Grane assumed operations of Laurel Crest.¹ In December, 2009, Grane officials conducted the initial hiring, and retained most, but not all, of the individuals who had been employed at Laurel Crest by Cambria County and who applied to be hired by Grane. Among the former Laurel Crest employees not hired by Grane were several Local 1305 officers, including Sherry Hagerich, who was the Local 1305 president, and Mark Mulhearn, who was a business manager of Local 1305.

In December, 2009, in anticipation of the impending sale, Local 1305 requested by email that Grane recognize Local 1305 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the nonprofessional employees at Laurel Crest. By letter dated January 11, 2010, Grane refused the Local 1305 request. Local 1305 then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.

In May, 2010, following an investigation of the charge, the Board's General Counsel, through Robert W. Chester, the Acting Regional Director of Region 6 (“Director”), issued a complaint and notice of hearing against Grane, asserting multiple unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (5). The complaint contended, inter alia, that: (1) Grane's refusal to recognize and bargain with Local 1305 as the collective-bargaining representative of a bargaining unit of employees was a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act; and (2) Grane's failure to hire certain applicants, including Mark Mulhearn and Sherry Hagerich, was a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.² Grane denied all of the alleged violations of the Act.³ In July and August of 2010, Administrative Law Judge David I. Goldman (“ALJ Goldman”) conducted hearings on the unfair labor practice charges.

On August 26, 2010, the Director petitioned the District Court for temporary injunctive relief pursuant to § 10(j) of the Act. The Director requested, in pertinent part, that the judge order Grane to: (1) recognize and bargain in good faith with Local 1305; and (2) reinstate Hagerich and Mulhearn.

The District Court decided the petition on the basis of the record developed by ALJ Goldman in the administrative proceeding below—including the testimony and exhibits produced at the hearings as well as the parties' factual stipulations—supplemented by testimony and arguments adduced at an evidentiary hearing the District Court conducted. In December, 2010, well before the Court ruled on the § 10(j) petition, ALJ Goldman issued his decision in the administrative proceedings.⁴ The District Court observed that it was “not bound to follow [ALJ] Goldman's conclusions,” and explained that “[t]his administrative record and decision is, at best, characterized as persuasive.” Chester, 797 F.Supp.2d at 561. Applying the four-factor test governing preliminary injunction motions, the District Court granted the interim bargaining order but denied the interim instatement of Hagerich and Mulhearn.

Both parties now appeal. Grane appeals the temporary bargaining order, contending that the District Court committed error in concluding that the four-factor test was satisfied. The Director cross-appeals on two grounds. First, he contends that the District Court erred by rejecting our established two-part test and applying the four-part test instead. Second, he argues that the § 10(j) petition qualified for injunctive relief under either the two-part or four-part test, and that the District Court therefore erred by declining to grant the interim instatement order.

II. Standard for § 10(j) Injunctive Relief

A.

We begin our analysis by addressing the threshold issue of whether the District Court erred in concluding that Supreme Court precedent vitiates our established two-part test for § 10(j) relief. “The issue of whether a district court applied the correct legal standard is a legal question, which this Court reviews de novo.” Ahearn v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 F.3d 226, 234 (6th Cir.2003).

B.

Congress vested primary jurisdiction over the elaboration of labor policy and the adjudication of labor disputes in the NLRB. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96, 77 S.Ct. 643, 1 L.Ed.2d 676 (1957) (“The function of striking [the] balance [between conflicting legitimate interests] to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 194, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941) (“The exercise of the process [of administering the Act] was committed to the Board, subject to limited judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy.”). The NLRA provides for the adjudication of alleged unfair labor practices through an administrative process that involves initial fact-finding and determination of the charges by an ALJ, whose decision is reviewable de novo by the Board. The Act vests Courts of Appeals—and in certain circumstances the District Courts—with judicial review of final Board decisions under a standard that requires considerable deference to various Board determinations. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).

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