Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Parole

Decision Date31 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–3916.,10–3916.
Citation95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44414,18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1467,161 Lab.Cas. P 35989,44 NDLR P 156,667 F.3d 408
PartiesDebra HAYBARGER, Appellant v. LAWRENCE COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE; County of Lawrence; William Mancino, in his individual and official capacities.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gregory G. Paul, Esq. (Argued), Morgan & Paul, Sewickley, PA, for Appellant Debra Haybarger.

Edmond R. Joyal, Jr., Esq. (Argued), Nadia V. Lazo, Esq., Law Office of Joseph S. Weimer, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee William Mancino.

Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

Debra Haybarger appeals the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to William Mancino on her claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Haybarger contends that the District Court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, Mancino was not her “employer” under the FMLA. As a threshold matter, we hold on an issue of first impression in our Court that a supervisor in a public agency may be subject to individual liability under the FMLA. We further hold that there exists a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Mancino is himself subject to such liability. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand the matter to the District Court.

I.

In 1988, Debra Haybarger began working as an office manager for Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole (Lawrence County Probation), an agency of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas. Beginning in 2001, her supervisor was William Mancino, the Director of Probation and Parole. Mancino reported to Michael Occhibone, the court administrator, who reported to Judge Dominick Motto, the President Judge of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas.

Haybarger has Type II diabetes, heart disease, and kidney problems, which forced her to miss work frequently to seek medical attention. Haybarger testified that Mancino expressed dissatisfaction with her absences despite recognizing that they were due to illness. Most notably, Mancino repeatedly wrote in his annual performance evaluations that Haybarger needed [t]o improve her overall health and cut down on the days that she misses due to illness.” (A.73, 78.) She also testified that he asked her why she breathed heavily and why she needed to visit the doctor so often, and advised her that she needed to “start taking better care of [her]self.” (A.135.)

On March 23, 2004, Mancino formally disciplined Haybarger by placing her on a six-month probationary period that required weekly informal progress assessments and monthly formal meetings. Mancino alleged in his discipline letter that Haybarger's “conduct, work ethic[,] and behavior [were] non-conducive to the Adult Probation Office.” (A.92.) He further alleged that she demonstrated a “lack of leadership,” “no clear understanding of the subordinate positions” that she supervised, and “a lack[ ] [of] empathy to subordinate workers.” (A.92.) Mancino testified during his deposition that he consulted with Occhibone before issuing the discipline letter, but that he had the independent authority to issue the letter on his own and did not require Occhibone's approval.

Approximately six months later, Mancino informed Occhibone and Judge Motto that Haybarger's job performance had not improved since he disciplined her in March 2004. Mancino claims that he did not have authority to terminate Haybarger's employment, but he admits that he advised Judge Motto to dismiss her. Further, he wrote in a summary of Haybarger's dismissal to Lawrence County Probation's Human Resources department (“Human Resources”) that after two meetings with Occhibone concerning Haybarger's performance, he “told [Occhibone] that [he] had decided that [he] had no other alternative at this time but to terminate her employment.” (A.96.) According to Occhibone, Judge Motto agreed with Mancino's recommendation, believing “that Mr. Mancino took all measures to help Ms. Haybarger retain employment and that unfortunately ... termination was necessary.” (A.98.) Accordingly, Mancino wrote in his summary to Human Resources that Judge Motto “permitted [him] to terminate her.” (A.96.)

Mancino, Occhibone, and Judge Motto informed Haybarger of her termination at a meeting in the courthouse on October 4, 2004. Additionally, Mancino wrote Haybarger's termination letter on the same date, stating that [u]pon final review of your probationary period, I feel that no progress or [sic] has been made by you, further, that you are incapable of performing at the level necessary to complete your assigned duties as the Office Manager in my office.” (A.99.) He further stated that [a]fter conferring with the District Court Administrator, Michael Occhibone, and the President Judge, Dominick Motto, we are in agreement that your termination ... is necessary and in the best interest of the overall operations of the Adult Probation Office.” (A.99.)

Haybarger sued Lawrence County Probation, the County of Lawrence, and Mancino under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”), 43 Pa. Const. Stat. § 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the FMLA. On March 14, 2007, the District Court dismissed all of Haybarger's claims against the County of Lawrence; Haybarger's ADA, FMLA, and PHRA claims against Lawrence County Probation; Haybarger's FMLA claims against Mancino in his official capacity; and Haybarger's ADA claim against Mancino in both his individual and official capacities. There thus remained pending the Rehabilitation Act claim against Lawrence County Probation and the FMLA and PHRA claims against Mancino in his individual capacity.

After limited discovery, Lawrence County Probation moved for summary judgment based on the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied Lawrence County Probation's motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir.2008).

On remand, Lawrence County Probation moved for summary judgment on Haybarger's Rehabilitation Act claim, and Mancino moved for summary judgment on Haybarger's FMLA claim.1 The District Court denied summary judgment on Haybarger's Rehabilitation Act claim, and Lawrence County Probation and Haybarger subsequently settled the Rehabilitation Act claim.

As to the FMLA claim against Mancino in his individual capacity, the District Court held that, while the FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies, Haybarger failed to present sufficient evidence to hold Mancino liable. The District Court reasoned that an individual supervisor is an “employer” for FMLA purposes only if he or she has “sufficient control over the [employee's] conditions and terms of employment.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, No. 06–862, 2010 WL 2787921, at *9, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421, at *27 (W.D.Pa. July 13, 2010) (quoting Kilvitis v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp.2d 403, 413 (M.D.Pa.1999)). The District Court then stated that an employer has adequate control if he or she “has the authority to hire and fire.” Id. (quoting Narodetsky v. Cardone Indus., No. 09–4734, 2010 WL 678288, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16133, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)). Because Mancino lacked final authority to fire Haybarger, the District Court concluded that Mancino did not have sufficient control over Haybarger's employment for liability to attach and granted Mancino's motion for summary judgment. Haybarger filed her instant appeal, contending that a genuine dispute of material fact remains concerning whether Mancino was her employer under the FMLA.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We exercise plenary review over district court decisions granting summary judgment. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates that there is no “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is [a] fact[ ] that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For an issue to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Id. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)).

III.

Although Haybarger challenges only the District Court's holding that Mancino was not her employer under the FMLA, and Mancino concedes in his brief that supervisors at public agencies are subject to liability under the FMLA, we have not yet decided whether supervisors at public agencies are subject to liability under the FMLA. Because we necessarily must decide whether supervisors at public agencies are subject to liability before determining whether the District Court erred in holding that Mancino was not Haybarger's employer, we first address whether the FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies.3 We then consider whether the District Court erred in holding that Mancino was not an employer under the FMLA.

A.

We look first to the FMLA's language to ascertain whether Congress intended to permit individual liability under the FMLA. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (analyzing congressional intent to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits suits against officers in their personal capacity). The FMLA defines an “employer” as follows:

(A) In general. The term “employer”

(i) means any person engaged in commerce or in any...

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