Hancock v. Astrue, 11–1001.

Citation175 Soc.Sec.Rep.Serv. 332,667 F.3d 470
Decision Date05 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11–1001.,11–1001.
PartiesKaren Sue HANCOCK, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Jason Lee Wilson, H. Russell Vick & Associates, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gill Paul Beck, Office of the United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Susan Beller Donahue, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Judge SHEDD and Judge FLOYD joined.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

In 2004, Karen Sue Hancock filed an application for supplemental security income (“SSI”), alleging both physical and mental disability. After her claim was denied by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Hancock requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Court. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied her claim, and the Appeals Council likewise denied her request for review. Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Hancock filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hancock now appeals the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of her application for SSI. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

This Court is authorized to review the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the Social Security Act, [a reviewing court] must uphold the factual findings of the [ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). It “consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir.1996). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II.

The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production and proof in Steps 1–4. See Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.1992) (per curiam). At Step 5, however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner “to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform considering h[er] age, education, and work experience.” Id. If a determination of disability can be made at any step, the Commissioner need not analyze subsequent steps. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

In Steps 1 and 2, the ALJ found that Hancock had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of her application for SSI and that she suffered from severe impairments, including low back pain due to degenerative disc disease, status post myocardial infarction, intelligence in the mentally retarded range, and depression with anxiety. In Step 3, the ALJ found that Hancock did not have an impairment that met or equaled one of the listed impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1. Finally, in Steps 4 and 5, the ALJ found that Hancock could not return to her past relevant work but that other jobs existed in the national economy that she could perform. Based on these findings, the ALJ denied her application for SSI, concluding that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

The only issue on appeal is whether the ALJ erred by concluding that Hancock's level of cognitive functioning did not meet or equal the listed impairment for mental retardation, Listing 12.05.1 Listing 12.05 requires a showing of “deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22” (“Prong 1”). Listing 12.05 also requires the satisfaction of one of four additional requirements identified as Requirements A–D. At issue in this case was Requirement C, which requires [a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70” (“Prong 2”), as well as “a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function” (“Prong 3”).

The ALJ found that Hancock did not establish any of the three prongs of Listing 12.05C. Although Hancock argues that the ALJ erred with regard to his findings as to each of the three prongs, the Commissioner does not contest Hancock's ability to establish Prong 3. Therefore, we are left to consider whether substantial evidence existed to support the ALJ's findings with respect to Prongs 1 and 2. We address each contention in turn and begin with Prong 2.

III.

In an effort to satisfy Prong 2, Hancock underwent intelligence testing ordered by the ALJ. The examiner, Dr. Appollo, reported that Hancock had a verbal IQ of 66, a performance IQ of 67, and a full scale IQ of 63. He then concluded that Hancock was functioning in the mild level of mental retardation. At no point during Dr. Appollo's narrative report of the test results did he attest to the validity of the test results or opine that Hancock gave her best efforts.

The ALJ gave Dr. Appollo's opinions little weight and, as a result, found that Hancock did not establish Prong 2. Initially, the ALJ explained this finding only in terms of the failures of the examiner: “Even though Dr. Joseph P. Appollo found the claimant to have an ‘apparent’ valid IQ score of less than 70, the claimant does not satisfy the requirements of 12.05C since Dr. Appollo never stated that the IQ score was valid or that the claimant gave her best effort.” A.R.2 19. Later in his decision, however, the ALJ cited other reasons for discrediting the IQ scores:

I have specifically considered the medical opinion of the consultative psychologist Dr. Joseph Appollo that the claimant was restricted because of her purported low IQ. This is inconsistent with the claimant's actual adaptive functioning as outlined above and with the claimant's treating psychiatrist's notes. Therefore, I am assigning only very limited weight to the opinions of Dr. Appollo.A.R. 23.

Hancock argues that the ALJ's discrediting of her IQ scores was erroneous for two reasons: (1) the ALJ erred by discrediting the IQ scores based on the examiner's failure to attest to the validity of the results; and (2) the ALJ erred in considering the assessments of treating physicians in discrediting the IQ scores. We begin by examining the import of the examiner's failure to attest to the validity of the IQ scores.

A.

This circuit permits an ALJ to weigh conflicting IQ test results, see Murphy v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir.1987), but it has not addressed the ability of an ALJ to reject an IQ score that is the only such score in the record. Other circuits, however, permit an ALJ to do so in certain circumstances. See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (10th Cir.2007) (scores not accurate reflection of intellectual capabilities in light of other evidence); Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir.2003) (scores inconsistent with ability to care for oneself and perform activities of daily living); Clark v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir.1998) (scores derived from “first and only meeting” with examiner and were inconsistent with record of functional ability and prior medical record); Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789–90 (5th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (scores inconsistent with job history, past medical records, and showing of good memory; claimant unable to see during examination); Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499–1500 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (scores inconsistent with academic achievement; claimant trying to appear unfavorable). We agree with our sister circuits that an ALJ has the discretion to assess the validity of an IQ test result and is not required to accept it even if it is the only such result in the record.

Having determined that certain circumstances permit an ALJ to discredit an IQ score, we are left to decide whether sufficient circumstances existed in this case. Both parties presume that in discrediting the IQ scores based, in part, on certain failures of the test examiner, the ALJ relied on language in the introductory section to the Disability Listings for Mental Disorders. That language provides that “since the results of intelligence tests are only part of the overall assessment, the narrative report that accompanies the test results should comment on whether the IQ scores are considered valid and consistent with the developmental history and the degree of functional limitation.” 20...

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