Ray v. Fedix Corporate Services, Inc.

Citation668 F.Supp.2d 1063
Decision Date31 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 07-2598 JPM-dkv.,07-2598 JPM-dkv.
PartiesJoe M. RAY, Jr., Plaintiff, v. FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

Maureen T. Holland, Holland & Associates, PLLC, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

John W. Campbell, Terrence 0. Reed, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JON PHIPPS McCALLA, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is FedEx Corporate Services, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "FedEx Services") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 67), filed March 13, 2009. Joe M. Ray, Jr. ("Plaintiff") responded in opposition on April 13, 2009 (Doc. 70). With leave of Court, Defendant filed a reply brief (Doc. 84) on May 4, 2009. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. RELEVANT FACTS

This cause of action arises out of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant. On August 2, 2002, Plaintiff applied for employment with FedEx Services. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2, Decl. of Lynn Die bold (hereinafter "Diebold Decl.") ¶ 12.) At that time, Plaintiff executed an "Employment Agreement," which contained terms and conditions of employment with Defendant. (Id.) The Employment Agreement contained a provision stating that if Plaintiff wishes to bring legal action against FedEx Services, he is required to do so "within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of the lawsuit, whichever expires first." (Id., Ex. C thereto at 18.) Plaintiff signed the Employment Agreement, indicating that he had read its contents and understood its terms. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, Excerpts of Joe M. Ray, Jr. Dep. (hereinafter "Ray Dep.") 23:10-24:15.) On September 24, 2002, FedEx Services hired Plaintiff as a Business Development Analyst. (Id. 12:11-18.)

On February 24, 2006, Defendant terminated Plaintiffs employment, citing a good-faith belief that he had engaged in illegal activity and violated FedEx Service's discipline policy as reasons for his termination. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 8, Decl. of Allan Carmack 118; Die bold Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) At the time Plaintiff was terminated, he was forty-six years old. (Ray Dep. 21:3-4.) On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff brought this cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA"), alleging that Defendant's decision to terminate him was motivated by age discrimination rather than by a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). So long as the movant has met its initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and the nonmoving party is unable to make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When confronted with a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1998). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial "if the evidence [presented by the nonmoving party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In essence, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

In the instant Motion, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Plaintiffs case is time-barred; (2) Defendant has identified legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant's reasons were pretextual.1

Having reviewed the parties' briefs and supporting evidence, the Court finds that Defendant's first ground for summary judgment is determinative. The Court will therefore limit its discussion to whether Plaintiffs claim was timely filed.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs ADEA claim is time-barred pursuant to the sixmonth limitations provision in the Employment Agreement. Defendant asserts that the provision should bar Plaintiffs claim because: (A) the statute of limitations defense was adequately pled to give Plaintiff notice and (B) the Employment Agreement is enforceable.

A. Notice Pleading

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that notwithstanding the enforceability of the Employment Agreement, Defendant failed to assert a "contractual shortening of a limitations period" as an affirmative defense. As a result, Plaintiff argues, Defendant has waived its right to raise the defense in its summary judgment motion.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party must affirmatively state a statute of limitations defense in its responsive pleading. Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(c). A statute of limitations defense may be waived if not asserted in a responsive pleading and if the plaintiff can show that he was prejudiced as a result of the omission. See Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 346 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir.2003) (finding that the government did not waive its statute of limitations defense because plaintiff had a fair opportunity to respond to the defense and, as a result, was not prejudiced). An affirmative defense may be pled in general terms provided the plaintiff has fair notice of the defense. Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir.1998) ("[A]n affirmative defense may be pleaded [sic] in general terms and will be held to be sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.")(quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1274 (3d ed.2009)).

There is no dispute that Defendant raised a "statute of limitations" defense in its Answer. Defendant's Answer states in pertinent part that "[s]ome or all of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations." (Def.'s Answer to Pl.'s Compl. (Doc. 9) ¶ 7.) Plaintiff argues, however, that because Defendant failed to specify that a "contract" and not a "statute" governed the time in which he could bring his claim, Plaintiff was not given adequate notice of the defense. The Court is not persuaded.

Rule 8 does not create a distinction between a statute of limitations defense and a defendant's assertion that a plaintiffs complaint is contractually time-barred. Moreover, federal courts in this circuit have routinely referred to contractual limitations periods as "statute of limitations" periods. See e.g., Austral-Pac. Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 1997 WL 124097 at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) ("Austral-Pacific and Cooper Industries included implied warranties ... not subject to any contractual statute of limitations."); Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Rocwall Co., 2008 WL 619206 at *1 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 28, 2008) ("In essence, the Clause is a contractual statute of limitations that requires the Union to timely file a complaint. . . ."); Burton v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 2007 WL 3309076 at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 6, 2007) ("`[T]he contractual statute of limitations begins to run upon denial of liability. . . .'").

Plaintiff cites no case law where a court has distinguished a statute of limitations affirmative defense from a contractual limitations defense for purposes of Rule 8 notice pleading. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that a distinction exists, a "contractual" limitations defense is not one of the affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8(c), and thus, is not subject to waiver under the rule. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has not waived its contractual statute of limitations defense.

B. Enforceability

Defendant argues that the Employment Agreement is enforceable because: (1) there was consideration; (2) a contractual limitations provision is consistent with public policy; and (3) a breach of good faith and fair dealing, if one exists, does not affect Plaintiffs obligation to comply with the six-month limitations provision.

1. Consideration

It is undisputed that when Plaintiff applied for employment at FedEx Services, he executed an Employment Agreement containing the terms and conditions of employment. The Employment Agreement provided in relevant part that:

To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against FedEx Corporate Services, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.

(Diebold Decl., Ex. C at 18.)

While Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Employment Agreement, he asserts that the contract is unenforceable because there was no consideration. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the agreement was signed before he was employed with FedEx Services, and that he "received no extra benefit by agreeing...

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  • Kennedy v. Fed. Express Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • September 28, 2016
    ...in the Employment Agreement. See Dkt. No. 66 at 6. For this argument, FedEx relies on the case Ray v. FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. 2009), to support its argument that filing a charge with the EEOC does not constitute "legal action." In Ray, the ......
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