Guttman v. Khalsa

• Citation: 669 F.3d 1101,44 NDLR P 130,25 A.D. Cases 1316
• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 10–2167,10–2172.,s. 10–2167
• Parties: Stuart T. GUTTMAN, M.D., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. G.T.S. KHALSA; Livingston Parsons; and the State of New Mexico, Defendants–Appellees.United States of America, Intervenor–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

25 A.D. Cases 1316

44 NDLR P 130

669 F.3d 1101

Stuart T. GUTTMAN, M.D., Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.G.T.S. KHALSA; Livingston Parsons; and the State of New Mexico, Defendants–Appellees.United States of America, Intervenor–Appellant.

Nos. 10–2167

10–2172.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 11, 2012.

Ian D. McKelvy, Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley, P.A., Roswell, NM, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Dirk C. Phillips, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division (Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, and Diana K. Flynn, with him on the briefs), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Intervenor–Appellant.

Thomas C. Bird (Sean Olivas and Neil R. Bell, with him on the brief), Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, and EBEL and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the Eleventh Amendment protects New Mexico from a suit for money damages under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65. We conclude it does. New Mexico has state sovereign immunity from a claim that it violated the ADA when it revoked the medical license of a physician whose practice the state claimed constituted an imminent danger to the public.

As a result, we find the district court did not err by dismissing the ADA claim of the appellant, Dr. Stuart Guttman, against the State of New Mexico for revoking his medical license. We also conclude the state's actions did not violate the United States Constitution. But after a careful review of the record, it appears that Guttman may still have extant claims for prospective injunctive relief.

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further consideration of the claim for injunctive relief against the individual defendants on the basis of the alleged ADA violation.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this case is complex, and has been extensively recounted in four prior opinions. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 320 F.Supp.2d 1164 (D.N.M.2003) ( Guttman I); Guttman v. Khalsa, 401 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.2005) ( Guttman II); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir.2006) ( Guttman III); Guttman v. New Mexico, 325 Fed.Appx. 687 (10th Cir.2009) ( Guttman IV). Thus, we provide only a summary of the underlying facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal.

I. Board of Medical Examiners

Stuart Guttman is a physician with a history of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. At the time he brought this case, he was practicing medicine in Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Before that, he practiced in Gallup, New Mexico, and also in Mississippi and Texas. Because of his medical history, when he applied for a New Mexico medical license in 1993, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) initially granted him only a qualified medical license, subject to quarterly reports by his psychiatrist and other conditions. The Board removed these requirements in 1995.

Four years later, after receiving many complaints about Guttman, the Board directed him to meet with an Impaired Physician Committee (IPC). The IPC consisted of an anesthesiologist and two psychiatrists. Before meeting Guttman, the IPC reviewed reports of his conduct in Truth or Consequences, which indicated that his problems interacting with others had caused disruptions among healthcare providers.

The IPC then interviewed Guttman. During that meeting, Guttman allegedly told the IPC that no complaints had been filed against him in either Gallup or Texas. Nevertheless, the IPC recommended the Board further investigate Guttman's conduct in those locations. Two weeks later, the IPC received materials from Gallup indicating numerous complaints against Guttman by patients, their families, and hospital staff. The IPC also learned Guttman had been sued for malpractice and that a Gallup hospital had denied him staff privileges. In response, the IPC reported to the Board that Guttman's interpersonal problems were serious and “certainly [had] a deleterious influence on his ability to diagnose and manage patients.” R. at 217. The IPC also concluded Guttman's behavior was neither “situation nor place related.” Id.

In March 2000, the Board summarily suspended Guttman's license after finding clear and convincing evidence that “Guttman's continuation in practice would constitute an imminent danger to public safety.” Id. at 303. Following the suspension, the Board conducted a three-day administrative hearing to take evidence on whether the suspension should be made permanent. Guttman participated in the hearing with the assistance of counsel. As an alternative to revocation, Guttman proposed more stringent stipulations on his license, but the IPC members testified they could envision no restrictions that would enable Guttman to practice medicine safely.

In February 2001, after recognizing an extensive pattern of disruptive and abusive behavior by Guttman in dealing with patients and healthcare professionals, the Board revoked his license. The Board also found that further treatment of his mental health problems was unlikely to succeed, and that Guttman's inability to interact professionally with others posed a danger to his patients.

II. State and Federal Court Proceedings

Guttman challenged the Board's findings in state court, asserting for the first time that the Board's actions violated Title II of the ADA. Because Guttman had not raised an ADA claim before the Board, the state court refused to consider it and affirmed the revocation of his license. Guttman then petitioned both the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court for review, but they did not disturb the lower court's holding.

While his petition to the New Mexico Supreme Court was pending, Guttman filed a pro se complaint in federal district court against New Mexico and two individuals: G.T.S. Khalsa, the Board's administrative prosecutor, and Livingston Parsons, the Board's hearing officer. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after finding (1) the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity, and (2) the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibited consideration of Guttman's Title II claim.¹ Guttman I, 320 F.Supp.2d at 1164. We affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated our judgment in light of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Guttman II, 401 F.3d at 1170, vacated and remanded, 546 U.S. 801, 126 S.Ct. 321, 163 L.Ed.2d 29 (2005).

On remand, after finding the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, we upheld the district court's ruling that Khalsa and Parsons were entitled to absolute immunity. But we remanded the case to determine, in light of Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004), and United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated sovereign immunity in the area relevant to this controversy. Guttman III, 446 F.3d at 1027, 1035–36.

After we issued Guttman III, Guttman filed an amended complaint, which contained the following claims under Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983:(1) an ADA claim, (2) an equal protection claim, (3) a procedural due process claim, (4) a First Amendment retaliation claim, (5) a “defamation and false data bank report” claim, which Guttman now calls a “stigma plus” claim, and (6) a claim for injunctive relief. The amended complaint's principal alterations were the addition of the injunctive relief claim and a reference to Khalsa and Parsons in their official capacities.

The district court considered the claims against New Mexico and the individual defendants separately, in a series of memorandum opinions and orders. In October 2006, the court again granted the Board members' motion to dismiss, holding they were entitled to absolute immunity for all claims under Title II and § 1983. R. at 69–88. But after a request to reconsider the dismissal, the court restored the stigma-plus claim and clarified that it was the only claim remaining against the individual defendants. Id. at 89–92. Finally, in June 2007, the court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss in toto, holding they were entitled to qualified immunity on that last remaining claim. Id. at 100–17.

With regard to Guttman's Title II claim against New Mexico, the district court found he had alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a protected disability under Title II and concluded the sovereign immunity analysis would be “more appropriate for a decision at a later stage,” because “a decision will require some development of the facts.” Id. at 72. New Mexico timely filed an interlocutory appeal. We vacated the district court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss and remanded for consideration of the sovereign immunity issue. Guttman IV, 325 Fed.Appx. at 690–92.

In March 2010, after finally considering New Mexico's Eleventh Amendment claim, the district court concluded that Title II did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity because its remedy was not proportional to a pattern of unconstitutional state action in the area of professional licensing. Although the district court permitted Guttman to file a second amended complaint, the court later concluded the only remaining claim for which a ruling had not been made was Guttman's First Amendment retaliation claim against New Mexico, which it dismissed. And after finding all of Guttman's claims had been resolved, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.

ANALYSIS

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or...