Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 20 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–55879.,10–55879.
• Citation: 277 Ed. Law Rep. 109,669 F.3d 956,12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 827,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 840
• Parties: LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Michael GARCIA, California, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 827

2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 840

277 Ed. Law Rep. 109

669 F.3d 956

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Michael GARCIA, California, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 10–55879.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Jan. 20, 2012.

Daniel Lopez Gonzalez, Esquire, Barrett Green, Littler & Mendelson, PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Hannah Cannom, Linda Dakin–Grimm, Daniel Perry, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Andrea Faye Oxman, Shawna Parks, Paula Dee Pearlman, Esquire, Executive Director, Disability Rights Legal Center, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant–Appellee.

D.C. No. 2:09–cv–09289–VBF–CT, Central District of California, Los Angeles.Before: BETTY B. FLETCHER, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, and KIM McLANE WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This case requires us to decide, as a matter of California law, whether the responsible agency for providing special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., to an eligible child incarcerated in a county jail is the school district where the child's parents reside. We respectfully request that the California Supreme Court decide the certified question that follows.

I. Question Certified

Pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court, we request that the California Supreme Court answer the following question:

Does California Education Code § 56041—which provides generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services—apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails?

The California Supreme Court's decision on this question of California law would determine the outcome of this appeal and no controlling precedent exists. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(a). We agree to accept and follow the Court's decision. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(b)(2). We certify this question because deciding it would require us to answer a novel question of California law that could impose substantial financial obligations on school districts throughout the state. Moreover, because suits concerning special services required by the IDEA are subject to federal jurisdiction, the California courts are unlikely to have the opportunity to address this question of substantial importance to local school districts unless the California Supreme Court grants a request for certification.

II. Background

Appellee Michael Garcia is twenty-one years old and, until recently, was incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail awaiting trial. ¹ At all relevant times, Garcia's mother has resided within the boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). Garcia has a learning disability and a speech and language impairment, and he qualifies for special education services under the IDEA and corresponding state law. Garcia first began receiving special education services in the second grade and continued receiving them prior to his incarceration and while he was incarcerated in a juvenile facility. After Garcia turned eighteen on June 1, 2008, he was transferred to the adult jail facility and stopped receiving special education services.

In December 2008, Garcia filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he is entitled to under the IDEA. The complaint named a variety of education and corrections agencies, including the California Department of Education, but not LAUSD. After noting that no “statute or regulation specifically allocat[es] responsibility for the special education of eligible students 18 to 22 years of age who are incarcerated in an adult correctional institution,” OAH concluded that the question was governed by California Education Code § 56041, which provides in full that:

Except for those pupils meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, if it is determined by the individualized education program team that special education services are required beyond the pupil's 18th birthday, the district of residence responsible for providing special education and related services to pupils between the ages of 18 to 22 years, inclusive, shall be assigned, as follows:

(a) For nonconserved pupils, the last district of residence in effect prior to the pupil's attaining the age of majority shall become and remain as the responsible local educational agency, as long as and until the parent or parents relocate to a new district of residence. At that time, the new district of residence shall become the responsible local educational agency.

(b) For conserved pupils, the district of residence of the conservator shall attach and remain the responsible local educational agency, as long as and until the conservator relocates or a new one is appointed. At that time, the new district of residence shall attach and become the responsible local educational agency.

Applying this statute, OAH determined that LAUSD was responsible for providing a FAPE to Garcia because LAUSD is the “last district of residence in effect prior to the pupil's attaining the age of majority.” ² Because LAUSD was not named in Garcia's complaint, however, OAH dismissed the complaint “without prejudice to the filing of a complaint naming proper parties.”

Garcia filed an amended complaint naming only LAUSD as a respondent. In November 2009 OAH issued a decision again concluding that “[t]he Los Angeles Unified School District is the entity legally responsible for providing [Garcia] with a free appropriate public education while he is incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail” and ordered LAUSD to begin providing Garcia with special education services.³ The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order affirming the OAH decision on May 4, 2010. LAUSD timely appealed to this court.

III. Explanation of Certification

The resolution of this appeal turns on whether California Education Code § 56041 applies to students who are incarcerated in adult county jails, an issue of California law for which there is no controlling authority.

Under the IDEA and corresponding California law, children who are eligible for special education services are entitled to continue receiving those services until they turn twenty-two or receive a high school diploma. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Cal. Educ.Code § 56026. If a child between ages eighteen and twenty-two received special education services in his last educational placement prior to being incarcerated in an adult correctional facility, that child remains entitled to services while he is incarcerated. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2)(ii).

Each state is responsible for ensuring compliance with the IDEA and must specify which state or local educational agency (SEA or LEA) is responsible for providing special education services to certain students, including students who are incarcerated. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (states are generally responsible for ensuring IDEA's requirements are met); id. § 1412(a)(11)(C) (responsibility for meeting requirements for incarcerated children may be assigned to any public agency in the state). Thus, questions of which agency is responsible for providing a student with a FAPE are determined under state law. See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1525–27 (9th Cir.1994).

Apart from a state's supervisory responsibilities, a state can be required to provide direct services to a child if the relevant LEA is unable or unwilling to provide those services. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(g). The state is also responsible for providing services when there is no state law or regulation that delegates its responsibility. Orange Cnty. Dep't of Educ. v. California Dep't of Educ., 668 F.3d 1052, 1052–53 (9th Cir.2011).

In most circumstances, however, a state will assign responsibility for providing special education services to an LEA, such as a school district. In California, the responsible LEA is usually the school district where the child would otherwise be assigned. See Orange Cnty. Dep't of Educ. v. A.S., 567 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1167 (C.D.Cal.2008). California's compulsory school attendance law requires that children between the ages of six and eighteen attend school in “the school district in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located.” Cal. Educ.Code § 48200. This provision, § 48200, “embodies the general rule that parental residence dictates a pupil's proper school district.” Katz v. Los Gatos–Saratoga Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546, 553 (2004). Section 48204 provides exceptions to that rule, mostly for students who do not reside with their parents. Thus, students ages six to eighteen usually receive special education services from the school district in which their parents reside.

According to Garcia, § 56041 creates an analogous system for special education students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. Garcia argues that the plain language of § 56041 indicates that all eligible students between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two will receive special education services from the school district where their parents reside, unless they are subject to a conservatorship or fall under one of the exceptions outlined in § 48204. Most importantly, Garcia claims that because it does not specify otherwise, § 56041 applies to students like himself who are incarcerated in adult county jails.

LAUSD responds that the legislative history of § 56041 and the existing statutory framework regarding education services in correctional facilities demonstrate that § 56041 does not extend to students like Garcia. LAUSD argues that California law simply does not delegate responsibility for providing special education services to...