Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 11 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-2384,80-2384 |
| Citation | 669 F.2d 1038 |
| Parties | 2 Ed. Law Rep. 961 LUBBOCK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Thomas J. Griffith, Wendell Coffee, Ralph H. Brock, Lubbock, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Albach, Gutow, Rosenberg & Blume, Stephen Gutow, Dallas, Tex., Nathan Z. Dershowitz, American Jewish Congress, New York City, amicus curiae.
McWhorter, Cobb & Johnson, D. Thomas Johnson, Charles L. Cobb, Lubbock, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before POLITZ and RANDALL, Circuit Judges, and GORDON *, District judge.
The Lubbock Civil Liberties Union (LCLU) appeals from a decision of the trial court in its suit brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for declaratory and injunctive relief, damages and attorneys fees against the Lubbock Independent School District (the District) and several individual defendants. The LCLU alleged various practices and policies of the District constituted an impermissible establishment of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
For the reasons set forth below we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the constitutionality of the current policy.
In September, 1979, the LCLU filed suit seeking an end to various practices in the District which it contended were unconstitutional violations of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 1 Included in these practices were morning Bible readings over school public address systems, classroom prayers led by teachers, a period of silent prayer ended by "Amen" over school public address systems and distribution of "Gideon" Bibles to fifth and sixth grade students.
These allegedly unconstitutional practices had occurred for almost ten years prior to the filing of the suit, and were traced to at least 1971, when the record indicates that several complaints were made to the District concerning the presentation of school assemblies "of a Protestant Christian evangelical variety." An attorney for the LCLU discussed the complaint with the District at that time. As a result, a policy relating to religious activities was formulated and is apparently reflected in a letter, dated May 3, 1971, from the District's counsel to the attorney for the LCLU. 2 The policy reflected in the letter called for neutrality of all personnel regarding religious activities, a prohibition against the encouragement of any particular religious activity, the prohibition of any speakers on religion in any assembly, and the discontinuance of what apparently had been a practice of the Gideon Camp's "placing New Testaments in the hands of students." Additionally, the District agreed that prayers given over school public address systems would be stopped, although the letter advised that its recipients should "not be misled" into believing that the District was prohibiting "open prayer."
The evidence adduced at trial, uncontroverted by the District, indicated that the practices complained of in 1971 continued unabated after the "adoption" of the "policy" in 1971. The District wholly failed to discontinue loud speaker prayer and Bible readings in the schools, continued to have assemblies with evangelistic speakers and continued the distribution of the Gideon Bibles. 3
In January, 1979, after further complaints were received in December, 1978 from patrons of the District, the District Board of Trustees, statutorily authorized to make rules and regulations for the District, 4 authorized the first written "policy" on religious activities in the District. 5 This policy was followed by the adoption, in April, 1979, of procedures to implement the policy. 6
The adoption of the January, 1979 policy did not, however, stem the allegedly unconstitutional Bible reading, religious assemblies, and daily prayers. To the contrary, the District apparently had no intention of altering the practices about which the LCLU had complained as early as 1971 but rather instructed that the practices should be student rather than teacher initiated. The desire to maintain the status quo is, in fact, clearly reflected in the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees.
In its meeting on January 25, the Board adopted a broad policy regarding religion in the schools, and the administration was instructed to develop procedures and guidelines to implement the policy. These procedures were adopted by the Board on April 19. The procedure provides that we allow student initiated religious activities. Basically, this will fairly well continue following our present practice. You should make the staff aware that we are to comply with the student-centered activity. This provision applies even in the classroom, and teachers are not to promote or initiate the activities. We have the responsibility to provide alternate activities for students who have objections to taking part in any of these programs that we may have.
(emphasis added). The policies and practices complained of continued unabated in the schools and were amply documented in surveys taken by the District in October, 1979. The District does not dispute on appeal that, even after the adoption of the January, 1979 policy, the practices engaged in by the district "fell short of constitutional standards."
In September, 1979, the LCLU filed suit against the District. The case proceeded through discovery toward trial. In August, 1980, after receipt of the pretrial order and docketing of the case for trial, the District radically altered its religious practices policy. A new and detailed policy was approved by the Board of Trustees. 7 The LCLU, contending that adoption of the new policy did not render moot the question of the prior practices and alleging that the adoption of the policy was no indication that the District would discontinue its former practices, proceeded to trial, requesting a declaratory judgment that the prior practices had been unconstitutional and injunctive relief to enjoin continuation of those practices.
The LCLU also challenged the new August, 1980 policy, particularly Paragraph 4 of the policy which states:
The school board permits students to gather at the school with supervision either before or after regular hours on the same basis as other groups as determined by the school administration to meet for any educational, moral, religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary.
The LCLU claimed that this part of the newly devised policy was unconstitutional.
The case was tried to the court. There was abundant evidence to substantiate the LCLU claims of prior unconstitutional practices by the district. There was, however, less evidence introduced concerning the meaning and operation of the new policy, specifically Paragraph 4, adopted shortly before trial commenced.
The trial court determined at the close of evidence that the District practices cited above under both the unofficial policy prior to 1979 and the first written policy of January, 1979 infringed on the first amendment rights of students. The trial court, however, also determined that the newly adopted August, 1980 policy on religious practices was not facially unconstitutional. The court specifically noted that Paragraph 4 was not unconstitutional as it permitted student groups of all types to gather at the school as long as attendance at meetings was voluntary. According to the court, there was undisputed testimony that there would be no extra expense accruing to the district resulting from the meetings before or after school, and in the event that such an expense was incurred, the group using the facility would be required to pay.
Additionally, the trial court found that no injunctive relief was necessary to correct any past unconstitutional practices or to insure future adherence to the August, 1980 policy that it had determined to be constitutional. The court stated that the passage of the new policy effectively wiped out any threat of harm from past violations. Secondly, the court found that the district had acted in good faith in establishing the new policy and that there was no need to enjoin the district to affirmatively carry out this new policy.
Finally, the trial court held that the LCLU did not have standing to bring an action for actual damages and that only nominal damages would be awarded, finding no evidence of knowledgeable ill-will that would form a basis for exemplary or punitive damages. The court did award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the LCLU.
The LCLU challenges that portion of the trial court's judgment wherein the court refused to declare Paragraph 4 unconstitutional. It also challenges the trial court's refusal to enjoin the District from continuing past practices and current unconstitutional practices under Paragraph 4. We address each argument in turn.
The first amendment which prohibits any law respecting an establishment of religion also prohibits laws which prevent the free exercise thereof. In the case before us, the LCLU contends the District has, through its adoption of Paragraph 4, violated the establishment clause. The District defends on the basis that its action simply conforms to the right of students to freely exercise their religion in a public forum. We are thus faced with the classic first amendment confrontation.
This scenario in the first amendment area is not new. The United States Supreme Court has many times been called upon to determine whether or not a particular practice or policy of the state violated the first amendment, 8 or whether the prohibition of a particular policy or practice was in fact a prohibition on an individual's free exercise...
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