Jordan v. Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 24 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 79-3112,79-3112
• Parties: 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 518, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,525 Charles L. JORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1311

669 F.2d 1311

28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 518,

28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,525

Charles L. JORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-3112.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 19, 1980.

Decided Feb. 24, 1982.

Walter Cochran-Bond, Taylor, Roth & Hunt, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellant; A. Thomas Hunt, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.

Alan Terakawa, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before TANG, SCHROEDER and NELSON, Circuit Judges.

TANG, Circuit Judge:

Jordan filed an employment discrimination class action against the County of Los Angeles, alleging that the County's failure to hire persons because of their arrest records, juvenile records, and marijuana conviction records violates Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jordan's motions for class certification, partial summary judgment, and leave to amend his complaint were denied. After judgment was entered on Jordan's individual claims, he appealed each of these orders. We reverse the order denying class certification, affirm the order denying Jordan leave to amend his complaint, and decline to review the order denying Jordan's motion for partial summary judgment. The cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

In June 1976, appellant Charles L. Jordan (Jordan), a black male, filed an action against the County of Los Angeles (County), alleging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by withholding him from appointment to the position of custodian in September 1973 based upon his juvenile record. Jordan pled a class action, claiming that disqualification based upon applicants' juvenile records disproportionately impacts upon blacks.

In September 1976, Jordan amended his complaint and additionally alleged that disqualification based upon his arrest record and his conviction for a marijuana-related offense also violated Title VII and section 1981. Each separate cause of action involving the three types of criminal record, i.e., juvenile record, arrest record, and marijuana conviction record, was pled as a class action. Jordan's amended complaint further alleged that disqualification based upon each type of criminal record impermissibly discriminated against males.

In October 1977, the parties entered into a stipulation of uncontested facts for purposes of cross-motions for summary judgment and a second stipulation for purposes of Jordan's motion for class certification. Jordan thereafter moved for partial summary judgment and class certification. In December, the district court denied the motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of fact existed, and denied the motion for class certification because essential facts stipulated to by the parties were unsupported by the record.

In March 1978, Jordan sought leave to amend his complaint in order to replace the Title VII sex discrimination claims with a constitutionally based action under the equal protection clause. The district court granted the portion of the motion that sought to delete the Title VII sex discrimination claims but denied the portion that sought to add causes of action under the equal protection clause.

Jordan filed a second class certification motion in April 1978. In July, the district court denied the motion, finding that Jordan had failed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. In October, the parties entered into a settlement whereby, in exchange for $500, Jordan agreed to release his individual claims against the County. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, final judgment was entered on January 15, 1979.

On January 19, 1979, Jordan filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the orders denying partial summary judgment, denying in part leave to amend his first amended complaint, and denying class certification. In September, the County moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Jordan's settlement rendered his individual claims moot and deprived this court of jurisdiction to address the appeal due to the absence of a case or controversy under Article III. Relying upon our decision in Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1977), a motions panel dismissed Jordan's appeal for lack of a case or controversy on November 16. ¹

Jordan subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on November 30 and a motion to add parties on April 19, 1980. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), rendered on March 19, Jordan's motion for reconsideration was granted and the question whether the appeal presents a justiciable case or controversy despite the settlement agreement, or whether the settlement precludes Jordan from challenging the order denying class certification, was referred to the merits panel. The order dismissing the appeal was vacated and the question whether putative members of the uncertified class should be joined as named plaintiffs-appellants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 or whether they should be allowed to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 was referred to the merits panel.

II.

Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies." Federal courts may only entertain "questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). Thus, federal courts are without jurisdiction and no justiciable controversy is presented when the questions sought to be adjudicated are moot, i.e., "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

The second aspect of the mootness doctrine, the parties' interest in the litigation, has also been referred to as the "personal stake" requirement. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1259-60, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). The personal stake prerequisite is designed to insure that the federal judicial power is limited to disputes capable of judicial resolution. A party without the requisite personal interest in the litigation is without "standing" to prosecute the action. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 101, 88 S.Ct. at 1953.

At the outset therefore we must decide whether the settlement agreement entered into by the named plaintiff in the absence of a certified class renders this action moot and correspondingly deprives him of standing to prosecute this appeal. As just noted, resolution of this question turns on whether there is a "live" issue between the parties and whether the named plaintiff appellant has a "personal stake" in the outcome.

A.

The first related question before us is whether there is a live controversy between the County and at least some members of the class Jordan seeks to represent. We find that the attempt by several members of the putative class to intervene as party plaintiffs clearly demonstrates the existence of a live controversy. See United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). The County contends, however, that it has revised its hiring policies so that the new guidelines exclude any potentially impermissible consideration of arrest or conviction records. Thus, it argues that a live issue is lacking and no case or controversy exists. To the contrary, Jordan argues that under the new procedures the County's continued consideration of juvenile offense and marijuana-related conviction records results in disqualification of a substantially disproportionate number of blacks. He also asserts that the County's claim that it no longer considers arrest records as being disqualifying is a mere restatement of its previous policy which the County has not adhered to.

We do not reach the merits of the controversy between the parties since a named plaintiff may not press the appeal on the merits until a class has been certified. See Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. at 336, 100 S.Ct. at 1172-73. ² We note, however, that whether the County's hiring considerations are validly related to job performance or whether, in the absence of compelling justification, the policies burden or benefit one race as opposed to another in violation of Title VII, is the heart of the dispute between the parties. Until this issue is resolved by judicial review, it necessarily remains a live controversy. Whether this action is moot therefore turns not on whether there exists a live controversy, but on whether in light of the settlement agreement, the named representative has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

B.

As noted above, the "personal stake" requirement is designed to assure that the case is capable of judicial resolution. "In order to satisfy Article III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). Only where this personal stake requirement is met can a judicial decision redress the plaintiff's injury or accrue to his or her benefit. The County argues that Jordan has no personal stake in the outcome because the settlement agreement has totally satisfied his individual claims. The terms of the settlement agreement and the release, however, convince us otherwise.

The stipulation to entry of final judgment provided in part:

(A)ll parties understand that the...