Hall v. Ledex, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-3588,80-3588
• Citation: 669 F.2d 397
• Parties: 30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 82, 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1126, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,367 Joy HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEDEX, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 397

669 F.2d 397

30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 82,

25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1126,

27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,367

Joy HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEDEX, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-3588.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 16, 1981.

Decided Jan. 15, 1982.

David L. Hall, Slicer, Hall & Slicer, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

W. Joseph Dehner, Jr., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and MERRITT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Ledex appeals an adverse judgment for sex discrimination in employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Pay Act of 1975. Joy Hall has worked for Ledex as a Senior Office Clerk since 1969. In April, 1974, Hall was promoted to her former supervisor's job, and was given the title "Expeditor." Hall's immediate predecessor, Richard Habermehl, held the job under the title "Production Control Coordinator." When Habermehl resigned, Ledex reclassified the job and offered it to Hall at a salary two-thirds lower than the salary Habermehl had received.

Habermehl trained Hall to succeed him for two weeks before he departed. Although Ledex did not give Hall a written job description, its Personnel Director testified that Hall assumed all of Habermehl's duties, and that later she assumed additional duties. Despite evidence Ledex collected indicating that Expeditors in the Wilmington area received greater salaries than Production Control Coordinators, Ledex paid Hall less than Habermehl.

Hall sued Ledex for sex discrimination. After a trial, the Magistrate found that the jobs held by Hall and her predecessor required equal skill, effort, and responsibility. He also found that Ledex consciously decided to pay Hall less for the same work a man had previously performed. The Magistrate concluded that Hall established a prima facie case of discrimination, and that Ledex failed to justify its actions. The Magistrate rejected Ledex' statute of limitations defense, finding that the violation continued, and discrimination occurred with each paycheck Hall received.

The District Court reviewed and accepted the Magistrate's findings and conclusions. Ledex was ordered to adjust Hall's rate grade and pay range, and to pay Hall back wages dating from April, 1974. The court also awarded Hall attorneys' fees.

On appeal, Ledex contends that Hall's action is barred by the statute of limitations specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), which requires a party to file charges within 180 days of the date discrimination occurred. If a party resides in a deferral state, such as Ohio, charges must be filed within 300 days. Ledex argues that Hall's claim is untimely because it was not filed until 330 days after she was promoted.

We disagree. The record shows that the discriminatory acts Hall complains of occurred well within 300 days of May 9, 1975, the EEOC filing date. Hall was assigned additional duties in September, 1974, without a pay increase. Ledex re-evaluated her pay-grade twice, and did not inform Hall until September, 1974 that she would continue to receive a lower salary than her predecessor had received.

Furthermore, the discrimination was continuing in nature. Hall suffered a denial of equal pay with each check she received. Satz v. I.T.T. Financial Corp., 619 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 293, 34 L.Ed.2d 232 (1972). See also Roberts v. North American Rockwell Corp., 650 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981).

Mohasco Co. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), and other cases Ledex cites are inapposite. As an initial matter, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that Mohasco should not apply retroactively. Wiltshire v. Standard Oil of California, 652 F.2d 837 (1981). In all those cases Ledex relies on, discharged employees waited too long after discriminatory terminations to complain. Similarly, in Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1979), reversed, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the discriminatory act which triggered the statute was a decision to deny tenure, and therefore terminate employment. For these reasons, we reject Ledex' first contention.

More problematic is Ledex' second contention that the District Court erroneously required Ledex to "establish" that its reasons for reclassifying the position were not pretextual. Hall presented a prima facie case by showing that she was a member of the class entitled to Title VII protection, and that she was treated differently than Habermehl was, an otherwise similarly situated person not a member of the class. Potter v. Goodwill...