Brown v. Bryan County, Okl.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-5376,93-5376
• Parties: Jill BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. BRYAN COUNTY, OK, et al., Defendants, Bryan County, OK and Stacy Burns, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1174

67 F.3d 1174

Jill BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. BRYAN COUNTY, OK, et al., Defendants, Bryan County, OK and Stacy Burns, Defendants-Appellants,

Cross-Appellees.

No. 93-5376.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 23, 1995.

Jack G. Kennedy, Kennedy, Minshew, Campbell, Sherman, TX, Wallace B. Jefferson, Sharon E. Callaway, Crofts, Callaway & Jefferson, San Antonio, TX, for appellant.

J. Kermit Hill, Duke Walker, Hill, Ellis & Walker, Sherman, TX, Brian J. Serr, Professor of Law, Baylor Law School, Waco, TX, for appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

(Opinion June 2, 5th Cir., 1995, 53 F.3d 1410)

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

SUBSTITUTE PANEL OPINION ¹

A claim for damages was brought against Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns (Burns) and Bryan County, Oklahoma (Bryan County), ² by Jill Brown (Mrs. Brown) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Oklahoma law. The case proceeded to trial, in which the jury found in favor of the Plaintiff on every interrogatory submitted. The district court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict with one exception: Mrs. Brown was not allowed to recover for loss of past income or future earning capacity. Burns and Bryan County (collectively the "Appellants") appeal the judgment against them while Mrs. Brown appeals the portion of the judgment that denied her recovery for lost past income and future earning capacity. For the reasons stated below we affirm the district court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

In the early hours of May 12, 1991, Todd Brown (Mr. Brown) and Mrs. Brown were traveling from Grayson County, Texas, to their home in Bryan County, Oklahoma. After crossing into Oklahoma, Mr. Brown, who was driving, noticed a police checkpoint. He decided to avoid the checkpoint and headed back to Texas, allegedly to spend the night at his mother's house. Although the parties offer conflicting stories leading to the pursuit, Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison (Deputy Morrison) and Burns stated that they "chased" the Browns' vehicle at a high rate of speed before successfully pulling it over. Mr. Brown testified that he was oblivious to the deputies' attempts to overtake him until both vehicles had traveled approximately three miles. ³ By the time the two vehicles eventually stopped, the parties had crossed Immediately after exiting the squad car, Deputy Morrison unholstered his weapon, pointed it toward the Browns' vehicle and ordered the occupants to raise their hands. Burns, who was unarmed, ⁴ rounded the corner of the truck to the passenger's side. After twice ordering Mrs. Brown from the vehicle, Burns pulled her from the seat of the cab and threw her to the ground. Burns employed an "arm bar" technique whereby he grabbed Mrs. Brown's arm at the wrist and elbow, extracted her from the vehicle and spun her to the ground. Mrs. Brown's impact with the ground caused severe injury to her knees, requiring corrective surgery. ⁵ While Mrs. Brown was pinned to the ground, Burns handcuffed her and left to assist Deputy Morrison in subduing her husband. Mrs. Brown remained handcuffed anywhere from a minimum of thirty minutes to just over an hour.

into Grayson County, Texas, four miles from the Oklahoma checkpoint.

According to Mrs. Brown's version of the facts, which will be reviewed in greater detail below, the deputies' pursuit and the force consequently applied against her were unprovoked. Furthermore, she claims that her detention constituted false imprisonment and false arrest. Due to the injuries resulting from that encounter, Mrs. Brown seeks compensation from Burns and Bryan County. Mrs. Brown premised the county's liability, inter alia, on the hiring of Burns by Sheriff B.J. Moore (Sheriff Moore), the county policymaker for the Sheriff's Department.

DISCUSSION

The Appellants have presented this Court with a host of issues to support their position that the lower court erred. For efficiency's sake, we will address only those points that we believe merit review. We first address the claims against Burns for the constitutional injuries that Brown suffered.

I.

In their first argument, Burns and Bryan County allege that the force applied against Mrs. Brown was proper. Appellants claim that the evidence "undisputedly" established that Burns' actions on the morning of May 12, 1991, were objectively reasonable. Therefore, the jury's findings should be reversed.

All claims that a law enforcement officer has used excessive force--deadly or not--in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen, are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. The "reasonableness" of the particular force used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. In cases implicating excessive force, "not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the question is whether the officer's actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872.

Determining whether Burns' actions were reasonable depends on whose story the trier of fact accepts as true. According to the testimony of Burns and Deputy Morrison, they were involved in a "high-speed" pursuit ⁶ Certainly, Appellants' version of the facts supports a claim that Burns acted reasonably and with an appropriate amount of force. The Browns, however, paint a strikingly different picture. They testified that they were oblivious to the attempts made by the deputies to catch up to them (the Browns) after avoiding the Oklahoma checkpoint. ⁸ Mr. Brown avoided that stop because he feared the possibility of being harassed or unnecessarily detained by the deputies. ⁹ He further testified that he did not believe that he turned the truck around either in a reckless fashion nor with wheels squealing or throwing gravel, and that he drove away at a normal rate of speed. Finally realizing that they were being pursued, Mr. Brown pulled over only to find a gun pointed at him. They were ordered to put their hands up and they did so.

                after the Browns abruptly turned their truck and sped from the checkpoint.  After a four mile "chase" both vehicles came to a full stop.  The deputies exited their vehicle and made several commands for the occupants to raise their hands before those commands were obeyed.  After rounding the truck, Burns twice ordered Mrs. Brown to exit the vehicle, but she did not comply.  He then perceived that she was "lean[ing] forward" in the cab of the truck as if she were "grabbing a gun." 7  He was "scared to death," so he extracted her from the vehicle.  He spun her around, dropped her to the ground via the arm bar maneuver and handcuffed her.  That was the lowest amount of force he deemed necessary to extract her and ensure he and his partner's safety
                

Mrs. Brown then testified that Burns ran to her side of the vehicle and ordered her to get out. She was paralyzed with fear and heard Burns repeat the command. According to her testimony, however, she was not slow in responding to Burns' orders and she did not make any sudden moves while exiting the vehicle. Her only forward movement was to exit the truck and, contrary to Burns' testimony, she did not reach for anything. Then, while she was exiting the truck, Burns suddenly grabbed her arm, yanked her out, spun her around and threw her to the pavement. She could not break her fall because one arm was raised and Burns firmly gripped the other.

In addition to this conflicting testimony, both sides elicited expert testimony concerning the reasonableness of Burns' actions. Mrs. Brown's expert, for example, concluded that the force applied by Burns in this situation was unjustified and excessive. ¹⁰ The jury weighed all the evidence, evaluated the conflicting testimony and rendered a verdict in Mrs. Brown's favor. Under our standard of review, ¹¹ when the evidence supports

the verdict, this Court will not impose its own opinion in contravention to the jury's. Therefore, we will not interfere with the fact finder's conclusion that Burns' actions were unreasonable and that the force he used was excessive.

II.

Notwithstanding the jury's findings, Appellants also assert that there was probable cause to arrest Mrs. Brown. They argue that the facts justified Burn's actions, thereby precluding Mrs. Brown's Sec. 1983 claim for false arrest.

There is no cause of action for false arrest under Sec. 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause. Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir.1991). To determine the presence or absence of probable cause, one must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 212 (5th Cir.1974), ¹² cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912, 95 S.Ct. 1567, 43 L.Ed.2d 777 (1975). Whether officers have probable cause depends on whether, at the time of the arrest, the " 'facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the arrested] had committed or was committing an offense.' " Id. (quoting Beck v....