Chartrand v. Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 April 1910 |
| Citation | 67 S.E. 741,85 S.C. 479 |
| Parties | CHARTRAND v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; J. C Klugh, Judge.
Action by Kate Kirby Chartrand against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
E. M Thomson, for appellant. F. G. Tompkins, for respondent.
Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for the value of certain goods delivered by her to defendant for transportation from Columbia, S. C., to a point in Cuba. The destination given in the bill of lading is: "Ceiba Mocha, Prov. Matanza Cuba." The route given is: "Havana, Cuba." The bill of lading stipulates that no carrier thereunder shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its portion of the route. This stipulation was pleaded by the defendant in exoneration of liability. The goods never reached their destination. Defendant put in evidence a receipt for the identical goods, "in good order," from the Southern Railway Company, signed: "Jas. Gibboney & Co., Agts., per Cooper." This receipt gave the name of the consignee as in the bill of lading, but the destination given was: "Havana, Cuba, Prov. via Matanza, Cuba." Defendant's warehouse foreman testified that he delivered this shipment to Gibboney & Co., who were agents for the Manson Steamship line, a connecting carrier, which ran a line of boats from Mobile, Ala., to Havana, and took the receipt in evidence, which was signed and delivered to him by Cooper, a clerk in their office.
The defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor on the ground that having proved a receipt for the goods from the connecting carrier, in regular course of transportation, under the stipulation in the bill of lading, and under the provisions of section 2176 of the Code of 1902, it was released from liability. The motion was refused. Section 2176, so far as relevant to the issue here, is as follows: "In case of the loss of or damage to any article, or articles, delivered to any railroad corporation for transportation over its own and connecting roads, the initial corporation, or corporation first receiving the same, shall, in every case, be liable for such loss or damage, but may discharge itself from such liability by the production of a receipt, in writing, for the said article, or articles, from the corporation to whom it was its duty to deliver such article, or articles, in the regular course of transportation." Construing this section, it was held in Miller Bros. v. Railway, 33 S.C. 359, 11 S.E. 1093, 9 L. R. A. 833, that the statute should be liberally construed, and that the production of a receipt from a steamship company, to whom the freight was delivered, as the next connecting carrier, in the regular course of transportation, was a substantial compliance with its provisions, and released the initial carrier from liability; the words "connecting roads" being held to include "connecting steamship lines." The statute had a liberal construction also in Jonesville Mfg. Co. v. Railway, 77 S.C. 480, 58 S.E. 422, where it was held that the production by the initial carrier of a per diem sheet showing delivery to a connecting carrier each day of goods and cars containing goods, including the goods in question, signed by the agents of the connecting carrier, was a sufficient receipt in writing to satisfy the requirement of the statute.
In the case of Miller Bros. v. Railway, supra, the court said: "The object of the enactment being manifestly to provide a proper remedy for the shipper in what is called 'through transportation,' by making each link--each carrier in the line--liable for its own negligence or conduct causing loss or damage to the property, the act, to promote this intent, should be construed liberally, so as to include a steamship company which happens to be one of the common carriers in a through line of transportation agreed upon by the parties." And on page 367 of 33 S. C., on page 1096 of 11 S.E. (9 L. R. A. 833): "The intention was to require the delivering company, in order to discharge itself, to produce such written evidence of the receipt of the property by the connecting company to which it was delivered as will shift the liability to account for the property to that company."
In view of the purpose and intent of the act, above stated, the liability of the initial carrier continues, until that of the next succeeding carrier has attached. The initial carrier acts as the agent of the shipper in delivering the goods to the next in line, and is not discharged from liability until the duties of the agency have been performed, according to the contract of shipment, or the directions of the shipper. The mere delivery of the goods to the next in line is not enough to discharge the initial carrier from liability, but he must show that the delivery was accompanied with proper shipping instructions, or at least such as he received from the shipper, so that the carrier receiving them can forward them to destination. 6 Cyc. 483; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 608-8, and notes. On page 628, it is said:
The variance between the shipping instructions as to the destination and route contained in the bill of lading and those contained in the receipt from Gibboney & Co., which according to the evidence, was made out by the defendant's agents at Mobile, shows that the defendant did not give the next carrier proper instructions as to the destination and route. This may have caused the loss. If it did, the defendant cannot claim the benefit of the statute, or of the exemption stipulated for in the bill of lading. The burden was upon the defendant to show that its failure to extend to the connecting carrier proper shipping instructions did not cause or contribute to the loss. 6 Cyc. 383, 384; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 423. It did not attempt to do this, but contented itself with introducing evidence tending to show delivery of the goods to a connecting carrier, and with...
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