Baker v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 08–2288,08–2365.,s. 08–2288 |
| Citation | 670 F.3d 448 |
| Parties | Darryl Orrin BAKER, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America; Government Officials, at F.C.I. McKean; Ellen McNinchs; Mr. Merrillo; Warden James Sherman; Kathleen Hawk Sawyer; Mr. Rayome. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alexander Bilus, Esq. [Argued], Carolyn H. Feeney, Esq., Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Nicholas J. Bagley, Esq., Thomas M. Bondy, Esq., Michael E. Robinson, Esq. [Argued], U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Robert L. Eberhardt, Esq., Megan E. Farrell, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.
Matthew H. Duncan, Esq. [Argued], Fine, Kaplan & Black, Philadelphia, PA, for Court Appointed Amicus Curiae.Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
In 2005, Darryl Orrin Baker, proceeding pro se, filed a federal lawsuit against the United States and various officials of the McKean Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI–McKean”), alleging personal injuries caused by their exposing him to second-hand smoke while he was incarcerated at that facility in 2004, in violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The District Court dismissed his case, but, as is discussed at length below, news of the dismissal did not reach Baker for quite some time. His efforts to rectify the situation created by the late notice were, as a result, untimely.
Baker appeals the District Court's orders denying his untimely motions to reopen the time to take an appeal and his untimely motions for reconsideration of the prior order dismissing his complaint. He contends that his motions were untimely because prison officials delayed in transmitting to him the District Court's dismissal order. He urges that because of the delay, we should either rule that the District Court can consider reopening the time to take an appeal, or should deem his motion for reconsideration timely, which would enable us to review the underlying dismissal order.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that we cannot relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those timing requirements are governed by a statute and are jurisdictional in nature. Furthermore, while prison delay may make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely so as to permit us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an order we would otherwise lack jurisdiction to review, the delays Baker complains of were not caused by prison officials, and therefore, his untimely motions for reconsideration do not permit us to review the underlying dismissal order.
When Baker filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lisbon, Ohio (“FCI–Lisbon”). While his case was proceeding in the District Court in 2005, Baker was transferred from FCI–Lisbon to the Lewisburg United States Penitentiary (“USP–Lewisburg”).
The District Court entered an order on July 11, 2006 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss (the “Dismissal Order”), and sent notice of the dismissal to Baker and the defendants. Unfortunately, the District Court clerk's office sent the Dismissal Order to Baker's address at FCI–Lisbon, the address then listed on the docket sheet, instead of USP–Lewisburg.1 (Amicus App. at 273.) An internal docket entry dated July 24, 2006 confirms that Baker did not receive a copy of the order. The entry states, “ * * *Staff notes; Order dated 7/11/06 returned from Darryl Orrin Baker; envelope marked ‘Not at this address; Return to Sender.’ ” ( Id. at 274.) It appears that the clerk's office did not make any effort to locate Baker after the copy of the order was returned. Unfortunately for Baker, this was just the beginning of a series of missteps that gave rise to the procedural puzzle presented in this appeal.
The next docket activity occurred nearly seven months later, in February 2007. The first docket entry dated February 9, 2007 is a change-of-address notice from Baker. Baker had written a letter to the District Court dated December 28, 2005, notifying the clerk's office of his move from FCI–Lisbon to USP–Lewisburg and providing a new mailing address. However, the clerk's office did not docket the letter or enter his address change on the docket until February 9, 2007, more than a year after Baker had sent his notice. The second docket entry on February 9, 2007 reflects that Baker sent a letter to the District Court dated January 31, 2007, in which he explained that he had obtained a copy of the docket sheet in his case and learned from it that the District Court issued the Dismissal Order. Baker asserted that he never received a copy of the Dismissal Order, and as a result, had been unable to file a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal. Baker asked the clerk's office to provide him with a copy of the Dismissal Order. The clerk's office did so, but not until eleven months later, on January 7, 2008.
In the meantime, on May 31, 2007, Baker filed 2 several motions: a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b); a motion to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1); 3 a motion to toll the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4); and a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). Then, as noted above, on January 7, 2008, nearly a year after Baker requested it, Baker was served with a copy of the Dismissal Order. Baker then supplemented his May 31, 2007 motions on January 16, 2008 by filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). In all of these motions, Baker alleged that the prison was responsible for his not receiving a copy of the Dismissal Order, averring generally that staff at USP–Lewisburg mishandled his mail by returning a copy of the Dismissal Order to the District Court. This error, Baker contended, prevented him from filing timely post-judgment motions and a timely notice of appeal from the Dismissal Order.
On January 31, 2008, the District Court denied all of Baker's motions. First, the District Court construed all of Baker's motions under Appellate Rule 4 as motions to reopen the time to take an appeal, pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). The District Court explained that it was barred from reopening Baker's time to file a notice of appeal because Baker's motion was not filed within the earlier of 180 days after the judgment was entered or within seven days of his receiving notice of the entry, as then-required by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B).4 Next, the District Court denied Baker's motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) as untimely because Baker failed to file that motion within ten days of the Dismissal Order, as then required under Rule 59(e).5 The District Court also denied Baker's Rule 60(b) motion, but that is not at issue on appeal.
On February 9, 2008, Baker filed another motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In that motion, Baker asserted that the District Court erred in denying his first motion for reconsideration because it failed to consider in that denial order that prison authorities mishandled the delivery of the Dismissal Order. At the same time, Baker also filed another motion to reopen the time to take an appeal. The District Court denied these motions on April 10, 2008. As to Baker's attempts to reopen the time to take an appeal, the District Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) sets a 180–day outer limit on such an attempt. As to Baker's Rule 59(e) motion, the District Court rejected Baker's argument that it needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether prison officials actually interfered with the delivery of his mail, believing that our opinion in Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368 F.3d 263, 265–66 (3d Cir.2004), barred exclusion of delay caused by prison officials from time limits for filing an appeal in civil cases.6
Baker timely appealed the District Court's January 31, 2008 and April 10, 2008 orders. We consolidated Baker's appeals with three other cases— Barner v. Williamson, et al., No. 08–1025, Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, et al., No. 06–4732, and Cycle Chem, Inc. v. Jackson, et al., No. 09–1320—that also concern the timeliness of appeals under Appellate Rule 4(a).7
Baker's appeals raise two issues, each of which concerns a separate rule of appellate procedure. The first rule, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), concerns a district court's ability to reopen the time to file an appeal. It states:
The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry;
(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier; and
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). The second rule at issue is Appellate Rule 4(a)(4). That rule states, in pertinent part:
(A) If a party timely files in the district court any of the following motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion:
... (iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59;
...
Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4). Thus, the timely filing of a Rule 59 motion tolls the time to appeal the underlying order...
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