State v. Hornik
| Decision Date | 17 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-0580.,03-0580. |
| Citation | 672 N.W.2d 836 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Linda Ann HORNIK, Ryan McCallister, Wendy Frantz, Todd Michel, Peter Andersen, Sandra Davis, Dennis Dorman, Daniel Cox, Andrew Jaquez, Karmon Coleman, Corey Wilson, Cathryn Daman, Jose Miranda, Mynor Garcia, Adrienne Denniger, and Latasha Fuller, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Michael D. Brennan, Adam Pollack, David Tiffany, M. Victoria Dominguez, and Iris Frost, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for all appellees except Todd Michel.
Todd V. Michel, West Des Moines, pro se.
In this appeal, we consider whether the district court correctly sustained motions to suppress evidence of the defendant-appellees' breath alcohol concentration acquired through the use of the DataMaster cdm, a governmentally approved device for taking such measurements. Numerous defendants in Johnson County moved to suppress this evidence alleging the State had failed to ensure the device's operation conformed to the Iowa Code and the Iowa Administrative Code. The district court sustained the motions, finding one of the statutory prerequisites for using the DataMaster was not satisfied. We granted discretionary review of the district court's ruling and now reverse and remand these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Between August 15, 2001, and February 11, 2003, the State filed trial informations charging each of the defendant-appellees in this consolidated proceeding with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). Six of the appellees later filed motions to suppress evidence of their breath alcohol concentration that had been acquired through the use of a governmentally approved measurement device, the DataMaster cdm (DataMaster). The remaining appellees later joined in the motions advanced by the first six appellees.
The district court heard evidence pertinent to the motions to suppress during a two-day hearing.1 One witness who testified at the hearing was John Fusco, the president and CEO of the company that manufactures the DataMaster. Fusco explained the normal process undertaken to acquire a breath sample with the device and the mechanics and science behind the device's operation. Robert Monserrate, one of the officials in charge of alcohol concentration testing for the division of criminal investigation criminalistics laboratory (DCI lab) of the department of public safety, provided additional testimonial evidence. His testimony focused on the DataMaster's operation in Iowa and the training methods employed by the State to help law enforcement officers properly operate the device.
After taking the evidence presented during the hearing under advisement, the district court issued a ruling sustaining the appellees' motions to suppress. In its ruling, the district court observed it was "clear that no uniform methods for the operation of the [DataMaster] were ever submitted to the Commissioner of Public Safety [(commissioner)] for review or adoption" and "the commissioner has done nothing to adopt approved methods for the DataMaster." For this reason, the district court concluded that the State had failed to meet a statutory requirement that the breath alcohol concentration measurements be taken by using "devices and methods approved by the commissioner," making the measurements inadmissible. Iowa Code § 321J.11 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 321J.2(8), 321J.15. The State sought and we granted discretionary review of the district court's ruling.
Although the parties agree error has been preserved, they disagree over the standard of review applicable to this appeal. A similar disagreement arose in one of our prior cases involving issues similar to those presented in this appeal, and we find our observations in that case applicable here:
Defendant contends the issue centers on the States failure to produce the requisite foundation for the admission of evidence. From this premise he argues our review is [for] an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hershey, 348 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984)
( ) (citations omitted). The State, on the other hand, asserts our review is on errors of law because the issue is one of statutory interpretation. See State v. Davis, 271 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1978) ().
This case more closely resembles Davis in that "the operative facts and inferences are not controverted," id., and the result will turn on the construction of Iowa Code [section 321J.11].[2] We thus reject defendant's contention which, in the final analysis, would compel us to accept the district court's statutory interpretation, absent an abuse of discretion.
The use and operation of the DataMaster is contemplated by both statute and administrative rule. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.11, law enforcement officers must use "devices and methods approved by the commissioner" to "take a specimen of a person's breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration." This testing is important for the initial assessment of whether an individual is intoxicated, but it is also important for later prosecutions:
Upon the trial of a civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by a person while operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A, evidence of the alcohol concentration or the presence of a controlled substance or other drugs in the person's body substances at the time of the act alleged as shown by a chemical analysis of the person's blood, breath, or urine is admissible. If it is established at trial that an analysis of a breath specimen was performed by a certified operator using a device intended to determine alcohol concentration and methods approved by the commissioner of public safety, no further foundation is necessary for introduction of the evidence.
Iowa Code § 321J.15; see also id. § 321J.2(8). Ultimately, both sections 321J.11 and 321J.15 require the use of "devices and methods approved by the commissioner." Id. § 321J.11; accord id. § 321J.15; see also State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 222-23 (Iowa 1972)
(). However, the most important aspect of these statutes for this appeal is the prerequisite that the commissioner approve both the devices and methods used.
The commissioner has attempted to satisfy this approval requirement by promulgating Iowa Administrative Code rule 661-7.2, which, at the time of the suppression hearing,3 provided, in part:
There is no dispute that the commissioner has properly approved the use of the DataMaster as a breath testing device. Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.2(1), (3)(b); see also Bruno v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 603 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Iowa 1999)
(). However, in attempting to satisfy the requirement that the commissioner approve the methods for using the DataMaster, the rule provides only that "[t]he operator of the [approved] device shall proceed in accordance with the instructions furnished by the [DCI lab]." Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.2(1). It is this portion of the rule that gives rise to the core controversy in this case.
The State contends that the commissioner's promulgation of administrative rule 661-7.2 and the actions of the DCI lab in furtherance of the rule sufficiently meet the statutory requirement that the commissioner approve the methods for breath alcohol concentration measurement. It argues that written instructions and ongoing training provided by the DCI lab ensure that the breath testing system is foolproof and its results reliable. Moreover, the State points to several statutory provisions and interpretive...
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State v. Pitz, No. 8-102/06-0795 (Iowa App. 5/14/2008), 8-102/06-0795
...requirements for admission of breath test results have been disputed repeatedly. See Stratemeier, 672 N.W.2d at 821; State v. Hornik, 672 N.W.2d 836, 839-42 (Iowa 2003); Bechtel, 434 N.W.2d at 893-94. Pitz could have raised these constitutional issues prior to appeal. We fail to see how the......