State v. Sepulvado

• Decision Date: 08 April 1996
• Citation: 672 So.2d 158
• Parties: 93-2692 La
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 158

672 So.2d 158

93-2692 La. 4/8/96

STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher SEPULVADO.

No. 93-KA-2692.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 1996.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1996.

On Appeal from the Eleventh Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, State of Louisiana, Honorable Robert E. Burgess, Presiding Judge.

Joseph William Bailey, Logansport, R. Neal Walker, Clive Adrian Stafford Smith, Elizabeth B. Daniel, New Orleans, for Applicant.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Don M. Burkett, District Court, Richard Z. Johnson, Jr., Charles B. Adams, Mansfield, for Respondent.

[93-2692 La. 1] MARCUS, Justice.

Christopher Sepulvado was indicted for the first degree murder of his six year old stepson, Wesley Allen Mercer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. ¹ After trial by jury, defendant was found guilty as charged. A sentencing hearing was conducted before the same jury that determined the issue of guilt. The jury unanimously recommended that a sentence of death be imposed on defendant. The trial judge sentenced defendant to death in accordance with the recommendations of the jury.

On appeal, defendant relies on eighteen assignments of error ² for reversal of his conviction and sentence. ³

[93-2692 La. 2] FACTS

On Thursday, March 5, 1992, defendant married the victim's mother, Yvonne. The next day, Friday, the victim came home from school, having defecated in his pants. Yvonne spanked him and refused to give him supper. Defendant returned home from work at approximately 9:00 p.m. That night, the victim was not allowed to change his clothes and was made to sleep on a trunk at the foot of his bed. On Saturday, the victim was not allowed to eat and was again made to sleep on the trunk in his soiled clothes. At around 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, defendant and the victim were in the bathroom, preparing to attend church services. Defendant instructed the victim to wash out his soiled underwear in the toilet and then take a bath. When the victim hesitated to do so, defendant hit him over the head with the handle of a screwdriver several times with enough force to render him unconscious. Thereafter, the victim was immersed in the bathtub which was filled with scalding hot water.

Approximately three hours later, at around 1:50 p.m., defendant and his wife brought the victim to the emergency room at the hospital. At that time the victim was not breathing, had no pulse, and probably had been dead for approximately thirty to sixty minutes. All attempts to revive the victim were futile. The cause of death was attributed to the scald burns covering 60% of the victim's body, primarily on his backside. There were third degree burns over 58% of the body and second degree burns on the remaining 2%. The scalding was so severe that the victim's skin had been burned away. In addition to the burns, medical examination revealed that the victim had been severely beaten. The victim's scalp had separated from his skull due to hemorrhaging and bruising. Also, there were deep bruises on the victim's buttocks and groin which were not consistent with accidental injury.

At trial, defendant admitted that he hit the victim with a screwdriver, but contended that the victim fell into the tub accidentally. However, the state presented expert testimony that the burn marks on the victim's body did not indicate he accidentally[93-2692 La. 3] fell into the tub, since there were no signs of splash marks that would result from a struggle. The experts testified that the marks were consistent with the victim being dipped or immersed into the scalding water.

DISCUSSION

Scope of Review

In State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, we overruled our decision in State v. Smith, 554 So.2d 676 (La.1989), and returned to the previous standard of review in which errors not contemporaneously objected to during the guilt phase of a capital case were not reviewable on appeal, although unobjected to errors during the sentencing phase were reviewable, as mandated by La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.9 and Supreme Court Rule 28, § 1. See State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La.1981). In argument before this court, defendant concedes that we can adopt such a rule, but contends it should be applied prospectively only and not be applied to his case. We disagree, finding there is nothing retroactive in applying this standard of review to the present case.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A) provides that an "error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of the occurrence." Although Smith indicated that as a policy decision, this court would review unobjected to errors in the guilt phase of capital cases, the law embodied in art. 841(A) remained the same. Moreover, defendant cannot claim his attorney acted in reliance on Smith, since during the guilt phase, his attorney had no way of knowing if defendant would ultimately receive the death penalty.

Accordingly, we adhere to our decision in Taylor and will not review any errors in the guilt phase in which no contemporaneous objection was lodged. ⁴

[93-2692 La. 4] PRETRIAL ISSUES

Assignment of Error No. XII

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to suppress a videotaped statement taken subsequent to his arrest. He argues he was tricked into giving the statement because police led him to believe that giving the statement would be to his advantage.

Before the state may introduce a confession into evidence, it must affirmatively show that the statement was voluntary and not induced by fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, inducements, or promises. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(D); La.R.S. 15:451; State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198 (La.1993). The test for voluntariness requires a review of the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given; any inducement offered is but one factor in that analysis. State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199 (La.1989). A statement by police to a defendant that he would be better off if he cooperated are not "promises or inducements designed to extract a confession." State v. Petterway, 403 So.2d 1157, 1160 (La.1981); State v. Dison, 396 So.2d 1254 (La.1981).

In the instant case, the testimony by the police officer demonstrates that any inducements or promises made to defendant were not of such a nature to render the statement involuntary. He was merely told that making a statement might be to his or his wife's advantage. This vague, noncommittal remark hardly rises to the level of a promise which would cause defendant to make a statement that he otherwise would not. The trial judge did not err in refusing to suppress this statement.

Assignment of Error No. XII is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. XIII

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to appoint a sanity commission. He argues that he presented "clear evidence" that he was having hallucinations and delusions while in his jail cell and his testimony was corroborated by the jailer.

The appointment of a sanity commission is not a perfunctory[93-2692 La. 5] matter or a ministerial duty of the trial court and is not guaranteed to every accused in every case. State v. Nix, 327 So.2d 301, 323 (La.1975). The defendant must establish reasonable grounds for the trial judge to believe that he is mentally defective or lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense before the court is required to appoint a sanity commission. La.Code Crim.P. art. 643; State v. Rogers, 419 So.2d 840, 843 (La.1982).

In the instant case, it is clear from the testimony at the hearing that defendant did not establish reasonable grounds requiring the trial judge to appoint a sanity commission. Defendant has no history of mental illness, except for the hallucinations which began to occur only after his arrest. Furthermore, the trial judge found that he was oriented as to time and place, he knew who he was, and could accurately relate his personal and family history. He understood what the charges were against him, and the consequences of these charges. Defendant's testimony at trial demonstrated that he was able to assist his counsel in his defense. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied the motion to appoint a sanity commission.

Assignment of Error No. XIII is without merit.

VOIR DIRE ISSUES

Assignment of Error Nos. V(B) & (C)

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his challenges for cause of four prospective jurors who were predisposed toward the death penalty. He argues the trial judge used an incorrect standard in determining whether the prospective jurors were predisposed toward the death penalty.

The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 [93-2692 La. 6] U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985).

In the instant case, some of the trial judge's remarks suggested he applied the standard of whether the juror would "automatically vote for the death penalty," as opposed to the correct "substantial impairment" standard. However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that all the challenges for cause were properly denied under the "substantial impairment" standard.

Billie Simmons testified that she saw "nothing wrong with the death penalty" and felt there were "a lot of cases now that deserve it." However, Ms. Simmons also testified that she would seriously consider mitigating circumstances. Clearly, her responses do not indicate a predisposition toward the death penalty, and her views on the death penalty do not appear to be such that they would substantially impair her from performing her duties as a juror. Therefore, the challenge for cause was properly denied.

Royal Youngblood initially stated that if defendant...