Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
| Decision Date | 29 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-4553,79-4553 |
| Citation | 673 F.2d 266 |
| Parties | 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1577, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,646, 3 Ed. Law Rep. 308 Richard C. IVEY, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, University of Alaska, Foster F. Diebold, Neil D. Humphrey, Charles O. Ferguson, Robert W. Hiatt, Elaine Ramos, Thomas B. Gruenig, Jane Demmert, Alaska Commission on Post-Secondary Education, Kerry Romesburg, Inupiat Council on Postsecondary Education, Inc., Ross Dixon, Lyle O. Wright, North Slope Borough, and Eben Hopson, Appellees/Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard C. Ivey, in pro. per.
Julie Simon, Anchorage, Alaska, Charles K. Cranston, Gallagher, Cranston, Snow, Walters & Dahl, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellees/defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court District of Alaska.
Before HUG and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, * District Judge.
In 1976 appellant, Richard C. Ivey, was discharged from employment by the University of Alaska and by Inupiat University. He subsequently filed suit under the Civil Rights Act for back pay and reinstatement claiming that he was terminated because of his efforts to desegregate the schools and uncover corruption. The trial court denied appellant's request for appointed counsel and dismissed two named defendants. This is an appeal from those two rulings. We affirm.
During the 1975-76 academic year appellant was a director of vocational classes at the Barrow Extension of the University of Alaska located in the North Slope Borough service area, and at Inupiat University, a private institution also located in Barrow. In 1976 an investigation conducted by the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education revealed that he was not teaching courses which he purported to teach and that students had been given credit for attending those courses. Appellant was suspended and then terminated by the University of Alaska and the Inupiat Council on Postsecondary Education, appellees herein. Criminal charges were filed and appellant was convicted by a jury in an Alaskan court on 26 felony counts of forgery and obtaining property by false pretenses. This conviction is currently being appealed in the Alaska appellate courts.
Appellant filed the present action pro se under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 2000e-(2)(a)(2) seeking back pay, reinstatement, and to enjoin racial discrimination in the operation of postsecondary education in the North Slope Borough service area. Named defendants include the Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education, the Inupiat Council on Postsecondary education, the North Slope Borough (a county-type municipal corporation), and Eben Hopson, the mayor of the Borough. Appellant filed suit individually and on behalf of a class alleging that appellees acted in concert to racially segregate employment, attendance, and instruction within the school system, and that he was terminated because he attempted to desegregate the schools. No class was ever certified. On June 12, 1979, the district court denied appellant's motion for appointment of counsel and granted the motions of Eben Hopson and the North Slope Borough ("the Borough defendants") for dismissal for failure to state a claim.
The standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss is a liberal one, particularly when the action has been filed pro se. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). However, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); Kennedy v. H & M Landing, Inc., 529 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Keker v. Procunier, 398 F.Supp. 756, 766 (E.D.Cal.1975).
The first amended complaint in the instant case alleges that North Slope Borough provided large amounts of money in financial support to Inupiat University and otherwise intervened in the University's operations and control. It additionally alleges that the school system became racially segregated as a result of the illegal actions of all the defendants. The complaint, however, is devoid of specific factual allegations showing the Borough defendants' participation in the alleged discriminatory employment practice. The general assertion that a municipality gives monetary support or intervenes in the operations of a separate educational institution with no showing of a direct connection between the municipality's actions and the alleged discrimination is insufficient to state a claim under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) or 2000e. See, e.g., United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1979); Daughtry v. Arlington County, Virginia, 490 F.Supp. 307 (D.D.C.1980). Because appellant's allegations were not supported by reference to any specific actions, practices, or policies of the Borough defendants, the complaint was properly dismissed as to them. Additionally, the court's failure to provide appellant with reasons for granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint was not error.
Appellant sought the appointment of counsel on his behalf in the trial court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), but relies on appeal only upon § 2000e-5(f)(1), which authorizes appointment of counsel "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." At oral argument the question of whether a denial of a motion to appoint counsel is an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Quiroga v. Graves
...that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his ri......
-
Koch v. Ahlin
...that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his ri......
-
Demonte v. Griffith
...that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir......
-
Alarcon v. Davey
...that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir......