Reeves v. State
| Citation | 105 Idaho 844,673 P.2d 444 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 15153,15153 |
| Parties | William Douglas REEVES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
David Z. Nevin, Chief Appellate Deputy, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for petitioner-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Lance D. Churchill, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.
William Reeves has appealed from the denial of an application for post-conviction relief. His application embraced numerous claims, including a contention that he had not received effective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty to a charge of robbery. The plea resulted in conviction and imposition of a ten-year indeterminate sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, Reeves' application was denied. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in deciding that Reeves had not been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. Our review of this issue is governed by three general standards. First, a post-conviction applicant has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he seeks relief. E.g., Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 448 P.2d 649 (1968). Second, because post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature, we will not disturb a judge's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Third, a contention that effective assistance of counsel had been denied will be measured against the standard that an accused person is constitutionally entitled to the "reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious advocate." State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975). Accord State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 546 P.2d 380 (1976). See generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.REV. 1077 (1973).
Reeves' challenge to the effectiveness of counsel is framed by the following facts. Reeves originally was charged with robbery and grand larceny. The prosecutor alleged that Reeves, at knifepoint, had robbed a victim of personal jewelry, a wallet, a checkbook, and car keys. Reeves and an accomplice then allegedly used the keys to steal the victim's automobile. While these charges were pending, Reeves informed his attorney that the encounter with the victim had originated with an incident of consensual homosexual contact between the victim and the accomplice. The victim had not previously reported this information to the police. Reeves' attorney took the information to the prosecutor who, upon further inquiry, accepted it as being true.
Plea negotiations ensued. In light of possible embarrassment to the victim at a trial, the prosecutor agreed that in return for a plea of guilty to robbery, he would dismiss the grand larceny charge and limit his sentencing recommendation to an indeterminate period of ten years. Reeves accepted the bargain and entered his plea. The plea was accepted by the district court after a thorough inquiry into its voluntariness, its factual basis, the surrounding circumstances, and Reeves' full understanding of the consequences.
Reeves, who is now represented by other counsel, attacks the adequacy of representation by his former attorney on two fronts. First, Reeves contends that his attorney had a conflict of interest. Second, Reeves contends that he did not receive much of a bargain for his decision to enter a plea of guilty. We will examine these contentions in turn.
The suggestion of conflicting interests arises from Reeves' impression that there was a "cover-up" of facts relating to the homosexual contact. Reeves invites attention to the fact that his attorney was acquainted with the victim and, at one time, had been employed by the victim's brother. However, at the evidentiary hearing on Reeves' application, the former attorney testified only that he may have met the victim "in passing at a ... cocktail party or something." He stated that the victim was not a friend, but just an acquaintance. As to his prior employment with the victim's brother, the attorney testified that he had left that job because their relationship was "strained." It appears undisputed in the record that these relationships were disclosed to Reeves while the plea negotiations were being conducted.
The district judge who conducted the post-conviction hearing did not make a specific finding about a "cover-up," but he did find that Reeves had been "very aptly represented" by his attorney. The judge implicitly found that the attorney had not acted improperly in representing Reeves. This implicit finding is supported by the record and will not be disturbed.
Reeves also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because either he should have received a better plea bargain or he should not have pled guilty. This contention is the inverse of a proper allegation of ineffective assistance. A post-conviction applicant is required to show counsel's ineffectiveness and then to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was prejudiced by such ineffectiveness. See, e.g., State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140 (1980); State v. Moore, 100 Idaho 492, 600...
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Free v. State
... ... Gee v. State, 117 Idaho 107, 110, 785 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.1990); Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 845, 673 P.2d 444, 445 (Ct.App.1983) ... II. DISCUSSION ... 1. Lack of opportunity to meet with the Jurisdictional Review Committee prior to its tentative recommendation ... Free first alleges that he was not allowed to be present at the ... ...
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... ... State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 620 P.2d 300 (1980); Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 673 P.2d 444 (Ct.App.1983). Potter has not challenged the effectiveness of trial counsel in any particular respect. We note that during the pretrial procedures Potter sought to have his public defender removed ... [109 Idaho 972] from his case due to animosity between ... ...
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... ... Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct.App.1983). However, we freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Gee v. State, 117 Idaho 107, 110, 785 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.1990); Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 845, 673 P.2d 444, 445 (Ct.App.1983) ... A post-conviction applicant bears the burden not only to prove a constitutional violation, but also to demonstrate that he suffered some resulting prejudice that would entitle him to relief. Free v. State, 125 Idaho ... ...
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