Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

Citation674 A.2d 1300,236 Conn. 681
Decision Date23 April 1996
Docket NumberNo. 15341,15341
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesANGELSEA PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al.

Albert Zakarian, with whom, on the brief, were Margaret J. Strange and Peter M. Wendzel, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Charles Krich, Assistant Commission Counsel II, with whom was Philip A. Murphy, Jr., Commission Counsel, for appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The issues raised by the parties' reservation to this court are whether the statutory deadlines embodied in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are mandatory and whether the failure to abide by those deadlines therefore strips the commission on human rights and opportunities of jurisdiction over a complaint before it.

The following facts are undisputed. On or about April 11, 1991, the defendant Susan E. Hyde filed a complaint with the named defendant, the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), alleging various discriminatory acts by the plaintiff, Angelsea Productions, Inc., which had employed Hyde from September, 1990, until her resignation on January 29, 1991. On March 3, 1993, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the commission's investigation had not been timely concluded in accordance with the nine month deadline imposed on the commission by § 46a-83(b). 1 On March 17 1993, the commission, despite its two year delay in investigating the complaint issued a reasonable cause finding in favor of Hyde. Thereafter, on June 15, 1993, the commission denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on November 29, 1993, because of the commission's failure to comply with the requirements of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) 2 that it hold a hearing within ninety days of the issuance of the reasonable cause finding, the plaintiff filed another motion to dismiss and a petition for an expedited declaratory ruling asking the commission to declare that the time limitations of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are mandatory and that failure to follow them strips the commission of jurisdiction over the complaint. On January 4, 1994, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss was denied by the commission's presiding hearing officer. On March 22, 1994, the ruling on the motion to dismiss was upheld by the agency commissioners, who, in accordance with General Statutes § 4-176(e)(1), 3 issued a declaratory ruling in which they concluded that the time limitations of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are directory and not mandatory. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-176(h) 4 and 4-183, 5 the plaintiff appealed from that declaratory ruling to the Superior Court.

To expedite resolution of the administrative appeal, on April 4, 1995, the parties submitted a stipulated reservation of questions to the Superior Court for consideration by and the advice of the Appellate Court. The questions upon which advice is sought are as follows: (1) "Is the time limit for investigating a complaint set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-83(b) ] mandatory?" (2) "If the [commission] fails to make a reasonable cause determination within nine months from the date of filing a complaint, as set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-83(b) ], must the [commission] dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?" (3) "Is the time limit for holding a public hearing set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-84(b) ] mandatory?" and (4) "If the [commission] fails to hold a public hearing within [ninety] days after a finding of reasonable cause, as set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-84(b) ], must the [commission] dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?" 6 The trial court reserved the questions for consideration by the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-235 and Practice Book § 4147. 7 We transferred the case from the Appellate Court to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 4023.

To determine whether the commission's declaratory ruling properly decided that §§ 46a-83 and 46a-84 are directory, we begin with an examination of the statutes. "Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes. Police Department v. State Board of Labor Relations, [225 Conn. 297, 300, 622 A.2d 1005 (1993) ]; Crocetto v. Lynn Development Corporation, 223 Conn. 376, 381, 612 A.2d 1212 (1992). [A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 262, 579 A.2d 505 (1990). This case, however, presents a pure question of law, and therefore invokes a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Id., at 263; State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 718, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency's determination is not entitled to special deference. Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra at 263, 579 A.2d 505; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control, 210 Conn. 349, 357, 554 A.2d 1089 (1989)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Administrative Services v. Employees' Review Board, 226 Conn. 670, 678-79, 628 A.2d 957 (1993).

Therefore, we approach the task relying on familiar principles of statutory construction in order to determine the intent of the legislature. Police Dept. v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 225 Conn. at 303 n. 7, 622 A.2d 1005. "It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation.... Petco Insulation Co. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 315, 321, 649 A.2d 790 (1994). In order to determine the meaning of a statute, we must consider the statute as a whole when reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation. Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 6, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murchison v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Conn. 35, 45, 660 A.2d 850 (1995). The task of determining whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory involves the same criteria, namely, the statute's language, the legislative history and the statutory context. Engle v. Personnel Appeal Board, 175 Conn. 127, 129-31, 394 A.2d 731 (1978).

Looking first to the words of the statutes, it appears that their language requires the commission to complete its investigation within nine months and hold a hearing within ninety days. Section 46a-83(b) provides that "[t]he investigator shall make a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause in writing and shall list the factual findings on which it is based not later than nine months from the date of filing of the complaint...." (Emphasis added.) Section 46a-84(b) provides that the "hearing shall be held not later than ninety days after a finding of reasonable cause." (Emphasis added.) Definitive words, such as "must" or "shall," ordinarily express legislative mandates of a nondirectory nature. State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 410, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); see Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 240, 558 A.2d 986 (1989); LoSacco v. Young, 210 Conn. 503, 507, 555 A.2d 986 (1989); Caulkins v. Petrillo, 200 Conn. 713, 717, 513 A.2d 43 (1986); Sullivan v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 174 Conn. 229, 233, 384 A.2d 384 (1978). We have noted, however, that the use of the word "shall," though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty. Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989); see e.g., Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 (1985).

"The test we have adopted for determining whether such a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to matter material or immaterial--to matters of convenience or of substance.... If it is a matter of convenience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 230 Conn. 828, 838-39, 646 A.2d 822 (1994). Stated another way, language is deemed to be mandatory if the mode of action is of the essence of the purpose to be accomplished by the statute; LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 710, 579 A.2d 1 (1990); but will be considered directory if the failure to comply with the requirement does not compromise the purpose of the statute. 8 Id.

In Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 569 A.2d 518 (1990), this court applied these principles in interpreting a statute addressing the civil rights of persons who are mentally ill. The court noted that the statute, which was part of the patients' bill of rights, illustrated "the breadth of the legislative concern for the fair treatment of mental patients." Id., at 556, 569 A.2d 518. The court therefore held that a statutory provision stating that no person treated in a mental health facility " 'shall be deprived of any ... civil...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 2, 2002
    ...A.2d 645 (2001) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 696-97, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996) (pertinent provisions of act intended to provide parties with mechanism for fair, expediti......
  • Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 7, 2001
    ...and, therefore, not waivable or subject to equitable tolling. Id. The court, relying on Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996), determined that § 46a-82 (e) was a mandatory time limitation that deprived the commission of......
  • Strand/BRC Grp., LLC v. Bd. of Representatives of Stamford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 15, 2022
    ...the requirement does not compromise the purpose of the statute." (Citation omitted.) Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 681, 690, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996).The express signature requirements in § C6-30-7 are elaborate in detail and crafted to ach......
  • Wallace v. Caring Solutions, LLC
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • July 5, 2022
    ...aware of the decisions of our courts and those of the United States Supreme Court. See Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 681, 693, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). Had the legislature concluded that our Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted CFEPA as i......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Connecticut Appeliate Review
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 71, January 1996
    • Invalid date
    ...decided whether the state had a legally cognizable right in the case. 236 Conn. at 667, 674 A.2d at 832~33 (Palmer, J., concurring). 51 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). 52 237 Conn. 169, 676 A.2d 375 (1996). 53 The early return are quite remarkable. See Capers v. lze, 239 Conn. 265, 275......
  • Labor Relations and Employment Law: 1999 Developments in Connecticut
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 70, January 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...would remand for a new trial on damages for the plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim. 118. 248 Conn. 392, 727 A2d 1268 (1999). 119. 236 Conn. 681, 674 A2d 1300 120. 248 Conn. at 399. 121. Id. at 400. 122. Id. 123. Id. at 400-401. 124. Id. at 402 qu,ting P.A. 96-241 §1 (a), codified at CONN. G......
  • Labor Reilations and Employment Law: Developments in Connecticut in 1996
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 71, January 1996
    • Invalid date
    ...law in Connecticut will continue to present new challenges and problems for the state's practitioners. * Of the Hufford Bar. See 236 Conn. 681, 674 A-2d M 1 See 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). 2 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-83(b), revised to 1993. This provision was later amended by PA 94-23......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT