Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
Citation | 674 A.2d 1300,236 Conn. 681 |
Decision Date | 23 April 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 15341,15341 |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Parties | ANGELSEA PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al. |
Albert Zakarian, with whom, on the brief, were Margaret J. Strange and Peter M. Wendzel, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Charles Krich, Assistant Commission Counsel II, with whom was Philip A. Murphy, Jr., Commission Counsel, for appellee (named defendant).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.
The issues raised by the parties' reservation to this court are whether the statutory deadlines embodied in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are mandatory and whether the failure to abide by those deadlines therefore strips the commission on human rights and opportunities of jurisdiction over a complaint before it.
The following facts are undisputed. On or about April 11, 1991, the defendant Susan E. Hyde filed a complaint with the named defendant, the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), alleging various discriminatory acts by the plaintiff, Angelsea Productions, Inc., which had employed Hyde from September, 1990, until her resignation on January 29, 1991. On March 3, 1993, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the commission's investigation had not been timely concluded in accordance with the nine month deadline imposed on the commission by § 46a-83(b). 1 On March 17 1993, the commission, despite its two year delay in investigating the complaint issued a reasonable cause finding in favor of Hyde. Thereafter, on June 15, 1993, the commission denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on November 29, 1993, because of the commission's failure to comply with the requirements of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) 2 that it hold a hearing within ninety days of the issuance of the reasonable cause finding, the plaintiff filed another motion to dismiss and a petition for an expedited declaratory ruling asking the commission to declare that the time limitations of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are mandatory and that failure to follow them strips the commission of jurisdiction over the complaint. On January 4, 1994, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss was denied by the commission's presiding hearing officer. On March 22, 1994, the ruling on the motion to dismiss was upheld by the agency commissioners, who, in accordance with General Statutes § 4-176(e)(1), 3 issued a declaratory ruling in which they concluded that the time limitations of §§ 46a-83(b) and 46a-84(b) are directory and not mandatory. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-176(h) 4 and 4-183, 5 the plaintiff appealed from that declaratory ruling to the Superior Court.
To expedite resolution of the administrative appeal, on April 4, 1995, the parties submitted a stipulated reservation of questions to the Superior Court for consideration by and the advice of the Appellate Court. The questions upon which advice is sought are as follows: (1) "Is the time limit for investigating a complaint set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-83(b) ] mandatory?" (2) "If the [commission] fails to make a reasonable cause determination within nine months from the date of filing a complaint, as set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-83(b) ], must the [commission] dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?" (3) "Is the time limit for holding a public hearing set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-84(b) ] mandatory?" and (4) "If the [commission] fails to hold a public hearing within [ninety] days after a finding of reasonable cause, as set forth in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46a-84(b) ], must the [commission] dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?" 6 The trial court reserved the questions for consideration by the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-235 and Practice Book § 4147. 7 We transferred the case from the Appellate Court to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 4023.
To determine whether the commission's declaratory ruling properly decided that §§ 46a-83 and 46a-84 are directory, we begin with an examination of the statutes. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Administrative Services v. Employees' Review Board, 226 Conn. 670, 678-79, 628 A.2d 957 (1993).
Therefore, we approach the task relying on familiar principles of statutory construction in order to determine the intent of the legislature. Police Dept. v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 225 Conn. at 303 n. 7, 622 A.2d 1005. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murchison v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Conn. 35, 45, 660 A.2d 850 (1995). The task of determining whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory involves the same criteria, namely, the statute's language, the legislative history and the statutory context. Engle v. Personnel Appeal Board, 175 Conn. 127, 129-31, 394 A.2d 731 (1978).
Looking first to the words of the statutes, it appears that their language requires the commission to complete its investigation within nine months and hold a hearing within ninety days. Section 46a-83(b) provides that "[t]he investigator shall make a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause in writing and shall list the factual findings on which it is based not later than nine months from the date of filing of the complaint...." (Emphasis added.) Section 46a-84(b) provides that the "hearing shall be held not later than ninety days after a finding of reasonable cause." (Emphasis added.) Definitive words, such as "must" or "shall," ordinarily express legislative mandates of a nondirectory nature. State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 410, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); see Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 240, 558 A.2d 986 (1989); LoSacco v. Young, 210 Conn. 503, 507, 555 A.2d 986 (1989); Caulkins v. Petrillo, 200 Conn. 713, 717, 513 A.2d 43 (1986); Sullivan v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 174 Conn. 229, 233, 384 A.2d 384 (1978). We have noted, however, that the use of the word "shall," though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty. Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989); see e.g., Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 (1985).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 230 Conn. 828, 838-39, 646 A.2d 822 (1994). Stated another way, language is deemed to be mandatory if the mode of action is of the essence of the purpose to be accomplished by the statute; LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 710, 579 A.2d 1 (1990); but will be considered directory if the failure to comply with the requirement does not compromise the purpose of the statute. 8 Id.
In Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 569 A.2d 518 (1990), this court applied these principles in interpreting a statute addressing the civil rights of persons who are mentally ill. The court noted that the statute, which was part of the patients' bill of rights, illustrated "the breadth of the legislative concern for the fair treatment of mental patients." Id., at 556, 569 A.2d 518. The court therefore held that a statutory provision stating that no person treated in a mental health facility " 'shall be deprived of any ... civil...
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