Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 79-3922,79-3922
• Citation: 676 F.2d 1043
• Parties: 29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 433, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,717 Oliver W. SCARLETT, H. B. Starkes, Franklin D. R. Bell, David Jones, W. J. Odol, L. A. Waters, W. K. Lindsey, J. Wimyond Jones, Horace V. Thomas and William D. Rood, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Franklin D. R. Bell, W. J. Odol, W. K. Lindsey, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellee. v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. . Unit B *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1043

676 F.2d 1043

29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 433,

29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,717

Oliver W. SCARLETT, H. B. Starkes, Franklin D. R. Bell,

David Jones, W. J. Odol, L. A. Waters, W. K.

Lindsey, J. Wimyond Jones, Horace V. Thomas and William D. Rood, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Franklin D. R. Bell, W. J. Odol, W. K. Lindsey, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellee. v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

No. 79-3922.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Unit B ^*

May 24, 1982.

Rives, Peterson, Pettus, Conway, Elliott & Small, Clarence M. Small, Jr., Thomas A. Carraway, Birmingham, Ala., for United Transp. Union.

Fletcher Farrington, Savannah, Ga., O. Peter Sherwood, Jack Greenberg, New York City, for Scarlett, et al.

Malcolm R. Maclean, F. Saunders Aldridge, III, Savannah, Ga., for Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.

Before HILL, HENDERSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

These plaintiffs ¹ believe that they have been deprived of employment opportunities and benefits because they are black. Invoking the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e et seq., they have sued both their employer, the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company (SCL) ² and the labor union which represents them, the United Transportation Union (UTU). ³ The gravamen of their complaint is that SCL and UTU collectively bargained, inter alia, a seniority system which has perpetuated the allegedly illegal racial discrimination and has resulted in present violations of the federal laws. They have asked for both declaratory and injunctive relief as well as back pay. ⁴

The case was tried without a jury. Six of the plaintiffs testified. ⁵ Additionally, plaintiffs read from two scholarly treatises, ⁶ offered into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 1004, which discussed and analyzed racial issues germane to employment on the railroad generally. Essentially, plaintiffs' evidence established that prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 blacks were excluded from certain jobs on the railroad and thus were unable to accumulate the seniority and other benefits available to their white contemporaries who worked in those particular positions. The evidence also demonstrated that because blacks were excluded in the past some are unable to compete with their white contemporaries for those positions today. Thus, plaintiffs insist, the advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately toward whites and away from blacks.

The defendants did not rebut plaintiffs' evidence establishing that blacks were once excluded from certain crafts. Rather, defendants attempted to demonstrate that no present violation of the federal laws has occurred. They showed that the seniority system is neutral both facially and as applied and insisted that a legitimate seniority system which does no more than continue the effects of pre-Civil Rights Act discrimination is not illegal.

Trial lasted two days. The district court, after considering all of the evidence, whether offered before trial or at trial, found the defendants liable. The seniority system, the court concluded, is facially neutral, but "the defendants perverted it by applying it to Blacks discriminatorily." Record, vol. VII, at 201. Furthermore, the court concluded that the seniority "system has not been negotiated and maintained free from any illegal purpose." Id. This, the court held, constituted a violation of Title VII. Nevertheless, the court granted relief to only some of the plaintiffs, because the others had not convinced the court that they had suffered from any discrimination. ⁷

Not all of the issues presented to the district court have been resolved; ⁸ this, therefore, is an interlocutory appeal. Defendant UTU has appealed from the district court's finding that the defendants violated the federal anti-discrimination laws. Three of the trainmen plaintiffs who were dismissed have filed cross-appeals, alleging they should not have been dismissed. We have divided the issues before us into four categories: (1) administrative prerequisites to pursuit of Title VII claims; (2) statutes of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' section 1981 claims; (3) issues focusing on the railroad's seniority system; and (4) issues raised in the cross-appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Administrative Prerequisites to Title VII Claims

Above all else, the record before us reveals a convoluted and untidy presentation of these plaintiffs' claims. We have a copy of one "Charge of Discrimination," filed on October 13, 1972 by Scarlett, naming the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad and complaining that "the company and union seniority system perpetuates past discrimination against blacks in the present." In an accompanying narrative, Scarlett described the event which prompted him to file the charge. ⁹ Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The charge is marked "Case File No. TMM3-0356. It is not clear what developed from this charge. There is some suggestion that Scarlett received a response from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); there is also some suggestion that the EEOC misplaced the charge. Record, vol. I, at 16, Exhibits A & B. There is nothing suggesting Scarlett sued.

In any event, it appears that Scarlett filed a second charge on February 27, 1976. We do not have a copy of the charge; we are told generally that it "charg(ed) defendants with discrimination based on race." Record, vol. I, at 1:4. Shortly thereafter, the EEOC sent Scarlett a Notice of Right to Sue. That notice is dated March 2, 1976; it is numbered TMM3-0356 (could this be a belated response to Scarlett's 1972 charge?); it states that Scarlett's charge (which one?) "has been dismissed for ... failure to proceed"; it explains to Scarlett that he has "the right to sue the respondent(s) named in this case"; and it indicates that copies were sent to both SCL and UTU. Record, vol. I, at 16, Exhibit C. Scarlett claims that he received the notice on March 19, 1976. His complaint was filed June 15, 1976, eighty-eight days later.

Joining Scarlett in the complaint, however, are ten other plaintiffs. ¹⁰ We are told that six of these plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC on the same day Scarlett filed his second charge; another plaintiff filed a charge on May 10, 1976; two more filed charges on October 11, 1976. We do not have any of these charges. Even if one accepts that these charges exist, it is clear that three of them were filed after the plaintiffs had brought suit.

The complaint clearly establishes, however, that only Scarlett had been notified by the EEOC of his right to sue prior to the filing of the complaint. It is beyond argument that a prerequisite to a cause of action under Title VII is the exhaustion of administrative remedies, usually evidenced by the filing of a charge with the EEOC and the receipt of notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f). With this in mind, the district court dismissed the Title VII claims of all plaintiffs except Scarlett because they had not alleged individual compliance with the administrative prerequisites of Title VII. The court invited the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Record, vol. I, at 33:7.

Meanwhile, however, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include class allegations, suggesting in an accompanying memorandum that "the jurisdictional prerequisites becomes (sic) immaterial once plaintiffs' complaint is amended to make it a class action. It has long been settled law in the Fifth Circuit that the jurisdictional prerequisites of Title VII are met if one class member has complied with them. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968)." Record, vol. I, at 17:2. The motion to amend was granted, but apparently plaintiffs never followed through with a motion for class certification. For that reason, and also because SCL established that any potential class lacked the requisite numerosity, the district court denied class certification. Record, vol. II, at 73. Finally, or so it appeared, the district court held that even Scarlett had failed to satisfy the administrative prerequisites to maintenance of his Title VII claims. Consequently those claims were dismissed for failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC. Record, vol. II, at 76; vol. III, at 82. Eventually, on October 27, 1977, the entire complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Record, vol. III, at 102.

That judgment was later opened, primarily for substantive reasons, ¹¹ on plaintiffs' Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion. Record, vol. III, at 110; vol. IV, at 127. The court also reconsidered its previous findings and concluded that Scarlett had filed a timely charge, since his allegations fell " 'within the accepted doctrine of continuing violations.' " Record, vol. IV, at 127:3 (quoting Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1977)). The other plaintiffs, however, were not allowed to reassert their Title VII claims; the court concluded both that they had failed to allege that they had exhausted their administrative remedies and that they could not depend upon Scarlett's exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Record, vol. IV, at 127:3-4.

Two and a half months later, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to allege satisfaction of the administrative prerequisites. Apparently, after receiving the court's order dismissing the Title VII claims, plaintiffs (except Scarlett) "began what turned out to be a Herculean effort to obtain the necessary letters from an inexplicably balky EEOC." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Amend the Order of June 13, 1978, and for Leave to Amend and Supplement the Complaint, Record, vol. V, at 140:3. It seems that the EEOC had declined to issue the requisite notices because plaintiffs had already filed suit. ¹² Eventually, the remaining plaintiffs...