Archibald v. Mosel

Decision Date08 January 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1555,81-1555
Citation677 F.2d 5
PartiesTonora ARCHIBALD, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Charles MOSEL, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Winston Kendall, Roxbury, Mass., with whom Charles Ray Johnson, Roxbury, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiffs, appellants.

Arlene LaPenta, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, Mass., with whom Bohdan S. Ozaruk was on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, TIMBERS, * Senior Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

The appellants, Tonora Archibald and her mother Gertrude Archibald, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and pendant claims under state law, against two Boston policemen, the police commissioner and the City of Boston. They claimed damages arising out of a "warrantless search" of their home. The district court directed verdicts in favor of the commissioner and the City, and submitted the case against the policemen to a jury which found in favor of the policemen. Appellants attack the judgments against them on various grounds and seek a new trial. As they conceded at oral argument, however, they cannot succeed on this appeal if the warrantless entry into their home was in fact justified under the Fourth Amendment. We believe that undisputed facts in the record of this case show that it was.

The following facts were uncontroverted at trial: On February 25, 1980, Mr. Kamya Tivay called Boston police headquarters reporting that he had been robbed. Two policemen, defendants in this case, immediately responded and contacted Tivay, who told them that about ten to fifteen minutes earlier a man, whom he described in considerable detail, had robbed him of $105 and his coat. Tivay added that he had just chased the robber into apartment 2005 at 300 Ruggles Street, a half-block away. They all went to the apartment. The police officers pointed to the door of apartment 2005, and, after Tivay said he was certain the robber had entered it, the policemen knocked. There was no response, but the officers heard noises that sounded like furniture being moved inside. After announcing their presence and hearing only these noises in response, one of the officers broke in through a window. When they entered, guns drawn, they found no robber, but only a small child, who was seriously frightened by the knocking and the entrance. The issue before us is whether on these facts a warrantless entry was justified.

Appellants recognize that a warrantless entry and search of an apartment can escape the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" searches because an emergency, reasonably so identified, makes such an entry "reasonable." They agree that such an entry is reasonable if justified by "exigent circumstances" of the sort described in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (police entered a house to search for an armed robbery suspect who had been seen entering that house only five minutes before), or if the police were in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, as in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (the suspect, in view of the police, retreated through a doorway into her own home). They argue, however, that Hayden is limited to cases involving guns, physical danger, and five minutes of elapsed time, and that Santana requires "some sort of chase" involving (in appellants' words) the "sighting" of the suspect by the police officers.

We do not believe that Hayden or Santana are as limited in their scope as appellants suggest. Certainly other courts have read them as permitting warrantless searches in situations similar to this one. Thus, in United States v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866, 93 S.Ct. 161, 34 L.Ed.2d 114 (1972), a warrantless entry and arrest was upheld although the police relied upon witnesses, not their own observations, in tracing a bank robbery suspect to his home where he was arrested two hours after the robbery. In United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct. 788, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), a still more attenuated chain of identifying testimony led the police to an apartment house, where they invaded an apartment on the strength of scuffling noises and arrested suspects an hour and forty-five minutes after a bank robbery. See also People v. Escudero, 23 Cal.3d 800, 153 Cal.Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312 (1979) (suspect need not be kept physically in view at all times); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 246 Pa.Super. 371, 371 A.2d 885 (1977) (Hayden governs even though bystander told the victim, not the police, where robbers were); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash.App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) (victim told police that assailant had gone to house next door); 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 6.1 & n.66 (1978). Moreover, nothing in the language of Santana or Hayden suggests that all other cases involving chases, "hot pursuit" or "exigent circumstances" must involve "sightings" or exactly similar facts to justify warrantless entry or search. Rather those cases exemplify the types of fact that offer justification. And, such facts are present here:

The crime described to the police officers was a serious crime that is by definition accompanied by violence. 1 The witness seemed trustworthy, for he was able to give a detailed description of the assailant, and to explain coherently what had occurred. He described his own "pursuit" up to the point the officers took over. And, he stated unequivocally that the thief had entered appellants'...

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  • Com. v. Quiles
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • January 4, 1993
    ...because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. See Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (CA1 1982). Id. at 186, 110 S.Ct. at 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 160. As with other factual determinations regarding search and seizure, the Court ......
  • Marganet v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 2006
    ...because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. See Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (C.A.1 1982). 497 U.S. at 183-184, 110 S.Ct. 2793. In Rodriguez, the court [W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement office......
  • Illinois v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1990
    ...because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. See Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (CA1 1982).* Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964), is in our view not to the contrary. There, in holding ......
  • Bloomquist v. Albee, No. Civ. 03-276-P-S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • March 9, 2006
    ...because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. See Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (C.A.1 1982). Id. at 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793. 68. Maine recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution and, therefore, there is no question tha......
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