International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Commission
| Decision Date | 06 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1664,81-1664 |
| Citation | 678 F.2d 1092 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
On Certification of Constitutional Questions from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
John Silard, Washington, D. C., with whom Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., James C. Turner and Judy Lyons Wolf, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for plaintiffs.
Carolyn U. Oliphant, Sp. Asst. Gen. Counsel, Federal Election Com'n, Washington, D. C., with whom Charles N. Steele, Gen. Counsel, Richard B. Bader, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Jeffrey H. Bowman, Atty., Federal Election Com'n, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for defendants. Kathleen Imig Perkins, Atty., Federal Election Com'n, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for defendants.
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, and TAMM, ROBB, WILKEY, WALD, MIKVA, EDWARDS and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
OUTLINE OF OPINION
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1094
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE ................................. 1095
III. STANDING ............................................ 1097
IV. ANALYSIS ............................................ 1099
A. Is the asserted imbalance between corporations
and labor unions under the 1976 FECA amendments
unconstitutional? ................................ 1099
1. Background of the 1976
amendments ................................... 1100
2. The alleged imbalance ........................ 1103
3. The standard of review ....................... 1105
4. The governmental interest .................... 1106
5. Means scrutiny: to what extent are
corporations and labor unions similarly
situated for the purpose at
hand? ........................................ 1107
B. Does the statute impair career employees'
First Amendment right of political
abstention by permitting the corporate
PAC solicitation as detailed in the
record? .......................................... 1109
1. Is solicitation of career employees
inherently coercive? ............................ 1110
2. The considered judgment of Congress
and the deference due to it .................. 1112
C. Does the use of general corporate assets
to establish and support a corporate
PAC violate the First Amendment rights
of dissenting shareholders? ...................... 1115
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 1118
Before this en banc court are three questions concerning the constitutionality of two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or the "Act") 1 that regulate the solicitation practices of corporations and labor unions. Plaintiffs-a national labor organization and six individuals 2-argue that Congress has acted without sufficient regard for their political speech rights and the political speech rights of others in face of the proliferation of corporate political action committees ("PACs") and their concomitant increased influence in federal elections. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that (1) Congress in the 1976 FECA amendments has created an unconstitutional imbalance between corporations and labor unions, in favor of the former, by allowing corporate PACs to solicit their executive and administrative (career) employees; (2) such corporate solicita tion of executive and administrative employees, which occurs under inherently coercive circumstances, violates the First Amendment right of career employees to abstain from political expression; and (3) the provision of the Act that authorizes the financing of operating and administrative costs of a corporate PAC from general corporate assets violates the First Amendment rights of dissenting shareholders.
On June 3, 1981, the district court certified three questions matching these allegations pursuant to section 315(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a), the extraordinary judicial review provision of the Act, which provides: "(t)he district court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc." 3 Finding none of plaintiffs' arguments legally persuasive, we rule against them on each of the certified questions, and hold that the congressional product before us does not transgress constitutional limitations.
On October 9, 1979, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Commission"), pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1), alleging that the solicitation practices of eleven selected corporations, 4 in obtaining funds for their political action committees, contravened the prohibitions in section 441b(b). 5 Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that if the Commission construed the relevant provisions of the Act to permit the corporate conduct challenged in the complaint, then those provisions of FECA violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. Acting on a recommendation from the Commission's General Counsel that there was no "reason to believe" the Act had been violated, the Commission, on December 13, 1979, unanimously voted to dismiss the complaint without further investigation and without an additional statement of reasons.
On February 4, 1980, plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in the district court, pursuant to section 437g(a)(9) (A), 6 seeking review of the Commission's dismissal of their complaint. The first count alleged that "corporate PAC solicitations of unprotected career employees are yielding donations which are not free and voluntary, and constitute corporate political contributions because they result from the employment relationship." Plaintiffs maintained that because these solicitations violated the Act, the Commission failed to discharge its statutory duty to investigate; thus, the Commission's dismissal was contrary to law.
The second, third and fourth counts all alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiffs made clear in their complaint that they sought relief on their constitutional claims only if they were denied relief on the statutory count. Plaintiffs sought certification of the constitutional issues to this court pursuant to section 437h(a).
On cross-motions for summary judgment on the statutory claim, the district court upheld the Commission's dismissal of plaintiffs' administrative complaint. The Commission had previously filed a motion to dismiss the constitutional counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for the further reason that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and announced it would certify the three constitutional questions for this court's en banc determination. The court found plaintiffs' constitutional claims "neither frivolous nor so insubstantial as to warrant dismissal for failure to state a claim." 7 As to standing, the court concluded that each of the plaintiffs had made a threshold showing of injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III. 8 The court further ruled that, although no corporate executive or administrative employee was party to the litigation, the plaintiffs possessed standing to assert vicariously the First Amendment rights of such employees. 9 On January 12, 1981, plaintiffs noticed their appeal from the district court's order upholding the Commission's dismissal, D.C.Cir. Docket No. 81-1044.
Section 437h(a) requires a district court to certify immediately all questions of the constitutionality of the Act. However, as this court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc), it is undesirable to decide a constitutional issue abstracted from its factual context. 10 Therefore, on January 8, 1981, the district court entered a consent order providing for discovery of facts concerning the solicitation practices of four of the eleven corporations named in plaintiffs' administrative complaint. On April 27, 1981, the parties signed an agreement stipulating two hundred ten findings of fact. The district court, on June 3, 1981, certified the three constitutional questions 11 and submitted as the record the findings of fact agreed to by the parties. This court gave the certified constitutional case a regular docket number, No. 81-1664.
The Commission renewed in this court its motion to dismiss for lack of standing. This court sitting en banc consolidated the statutory appeal in No. 81-1044 with the certification of constitutional questions in No. 81-1664, deferred decision on the motion to dismiss until after argument, and expedited the two cases as contemplated by the Act. 12
On October 26, 1981, this court issued a judgment in No. 81-1044 affirming the district court's disposition of the statutory claim, thereby putting squarely in issue plaintiffs' three constitutional challenges. 672 F.2d 894.
The Commission contends initially that none of the plaintiffs possesses the "voter standing" section 437h(a) requires; accordingly, the plaintiffs are not eligible to invoke the expedited procedure. Second, the Commission argues that the plaintiffs have failed to meet the Article III "case or controversy" requirement. We reject both arguments and therefore deny the Commission's motion to dismiss at the threshold.
The text of section 437h states that these categories of plaintiffs may...
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