McDonald v. City of Saint Paul

Decision Date10 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11–2264.,11–2264.
Citation679 F.3d 698
PartiesEdward Charles McDONALD, Appellant, v. CITY OF SAINT PAUL and Mayor Christopher B. Coleman, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael Ajiawung Fondungallah, argued, Roseville, MN, for appellant.

Louise Toscano Seeba, argued, St. Paul, MN, for appellees.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Edward C. McDonald appeals the district court's 1 order granting summary judgment to defendants—the City of St. Paul (the City) and Mayor Christopher Coleman (the mayor)—on various claims arising from McDonald's unsuccessful application for appointment as director of the City's Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity, as well as denial of his motion to compel various depositions. We affirm.

I.

In 2002 and 2003, McDonald worked for the City as its director of the Office of Affirmative Action and the Coordinator of Minority Business Development and Retention. In 2003, after the termination of his employment, McDonald brought a lawsuit against the City and city officials, alleging violations of the Minnesota Whistleblower Protection Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In 2004, the parties to that action executed a settlement agreement and release of all claims, in which they agreed that the agreement and release did not constitute an admission of liability by any of the parties.

In August of 2008, the city council adopted an ordinance creating the Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity (the Department). The city council then passed a resolution that “the City should engage in a community process in order to select a director for the newly formed Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity.” City Resolution of Aug. 8, 2008. Councilmember Melvin Carter III was appointed to chair the thirteen-member committee—consisting of community members and stakeholders—to “recommend to the Mayor a list of finalists.” McDonald's App'x 261.

Shortly thereafter, information about the creation of the Department and the director-selection process appeared on the City's website. It indicated that the mayor and city council had appointed a selection committee; that [t]he 12–member committee is charged with hosting a series of community meetings to engage the public and advising Human Resources on the recruitment, screening and selection of the best possible candidate”; that [n]ew and amended ordinances will be proposed in the fall to support the departmental framework”; that the City hoped to appoint a director for the Department by January of 2009; and that [t]he new director will serve 3–year terms at the recommendation of the mayor and will be vetted through a community selection process similar to that for the City's police and fire chiefs.” 2

In September of 2008, McDonald applied for the position of director of the Department. The selection committee received thirty-one applicants for the position. The selection committee interviewed eight applicants, including McDonald. Selection committee member Susan Kimberly, against whom McDonald had filed a workplace conduct complaint during his tenure with the City, recused herself from McDonald's November 14, 2008, interview before the committee. Kimberly did participate in the remainder of the selection committee's activities. During McDonald's interview, another committee member asked McDonald about his 2003 whistleblower action.

After the screening interviews, the selection committee certified three finalists to the mayor: McDonald, Hope Jensen, and Lynn Littlejohn. Each of the three finalists appeared at a community interview forum on December 9, 2008, at which councilmember Carter stated that one of the three would become the director of the Department. On December 11, 2008, Mayor Coleman and Deputy Mayor Ann Mulholland also interviewed each of the three finalists. Mayor Coleman offered the position to Jensen, who declined to accept it. The mayor then offered the position to Littlejohn, who also declined, leaving McDonald as the sole remaining finalist. Councilmember Carter, in an interrogatory response, explained his decision to reconvene the selection committee:

[S]ometime after December 31, 2008, and before January 5, 2009, Councilmember Carter believes he and the Mayor spoke, perhaps through a staffer, about the dilemma of suddenly having only one viable finalist. Since the Selection Committee's charge was to produce a slate of 3–5 candidates for the Mayor to choose from, Councilmember Carter determined the committee's work was yet incomplete and informed the Mayor's Office that, barring their objection, Councilmember Carter intended to reconvene the committee to complete its work. Councilmember Carter then reconvened the Selection Committee.

McDonald's App'x 272. The selection committee identified Paula Forbes, Luz Frias, and Sharon Garth as additional finalists. Forbes then withdrew from consideration, leaving Frias and Garth as the two additional finalists certified to the mayor. Prior to an interview with the mayor, Garth withdrew. Mayor Coleman and Deputy Mayor Mulholland interviewed Frias and ultimately offered her the director position. Frias accepted and became the director.

McDonald brought the current action against the City and the mayor in April 2009, alleging (1) violations of his rights to equal protection and procedural and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, resulting from his engagement in protected activity; (2) conspiracy to deny him an employment opportunity with a public institution because of engagement in protected activity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) violations of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 2000e–3(a)) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (4) violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.); (5) violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) (Minn.Stat. §§ 363A.14(1) and 363A.15(a)); (6) violation of his rights to equal protection and substantive due process under Article I, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress under Minnesota law. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Zike v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 646 F.3d 504, 509 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir.2006)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

III.
A. Due Process

McDonald contends that the mayor and the City violated his right to due process under the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution 3 by failing to appoint him to the director position after Jensen and Littlejohn—who, along with McDonald, composed the initial list of finalists—had declined the mayor's offer. Defendants argue that McDonald never had a constitutionally protected property interest in a potential position of employment with the City.

To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) violation of a constitutional right, (2) committed by a state actor, (3) who acted with the requisite culpability and causation to violate the constitutional right.” Shrum ex rel. Kelly v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). “Analysis of either a procedural or substantive due process claim must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated.” Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 445–46 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Carolan v. Kansas City, 813 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir.1987)).

“The possession of a protected life, liberty or property interest is a condition precedent to the government's obligation to provide due process of law, and where no such interest exists, there can be no due process violation.” Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Movers Warehouse, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 71 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir.1995)). Property interests “are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 417 (8th Cir.1987) (citations omitted) (noting that [a] state may also create a constitutionally protected interest by establishing statutory or regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion.”). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701;see Schueller v. Goddard, 631 F.3d 460, 462–63 (8th Cir.2011) (“A protected property interest exists where a plaintiff has a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit that is derived from a source such as state law.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to McDonald, we conclude that McDonald had no protected property interest in the director position. The resolution naming the selection committee indicated that “the City should engage in a community process...

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